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INTRODUCTION 
It is often remarked that Anarchism is an impractical theory imported into the 
United States by a lot of ignorant foreigners. Of course, those who make this 
statement are as much mistaken as though they made it while conscious of its 
falsity. The doctrine of personal freedom is an American doctrine, in so far as the 
attempt to put it into practice is concerned, as Paine, Franklin, Jefferson and 
others understood it quite well (Joseph Labadie, Anarchism: What It Is and What 
It Is Not). 
 
Anarchy does not mean simply opposed to the archos, or political leader. It means 
opposed to archē. Now, archē, in the first instance, means beginning, origin. From 
this it comes to mean a first principle, an element; then first place, supreme 
power, sovereignty, dominion, command, authority; and finally a sovereignty, an 
empire, a realm, a magistracy, a governmental office  
(Benjamin Tucker, “Anarchism and the State” 34). 
 
We have no illusions that there are any shortcuts to anarchy. We don’t seek to 
lead “the” people, but to establish a nation of sovereigns; we don’t seek to be a 
vanguard of theorists, but to empower a readership of authors; we don’t seek to be 
the artists of a new avant garde, but to enable an audience of performers—we 
don’t so much seek to destroy power as to make it freely available in abundance: 
we want to be masters without slaves. (CrimethInc, Fighting for our Lives: An 
Anarchist Primer 7).  
 
A casual reader of humanities and social sciences scholarship could be forgiven for 
thinking that critical theory has been either dead or dying for nearly three decades. Concomitant 
with the budding “big theory” era in American universities, Steven Knapp and Walter Benn 
Michaels questioned its very foundations in their infamous 1982 article, “Against Theory.” In 
1996, Alan Sokal’s famous “hoax” on the venerable critical theory organ Social Text left many 
opponents of critical theory as a method (and certainly of its popularity in academic research and 
mass media coverage of the same) gleefully celebrating the “vindication” of their beliefs that the 
endeavor was intentionally obtuse and, in any case, one conducted with little or no stakes in the 
“real world” of contemporary political economy. The year 2004 marked the beginning of another 
pang in the supposed “death of theory,” one seen everywhere from the publication of Terry 
Eagleton’s After Theory, to the linking of Jacques Derrida’s death to the death of critical theory 
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as a whole in his obituary in the New York Times, to what Jeffrey Nealon calls the “high profile 
wake” for the enterprise that inadvertently resulted from Critical Inquiry’s roundtable on its 
future.
1
 Yet, unlike any of its previous “deaths,” the 2004 postmortem of critical theory did not 
present the enterprise as corrupt from the start, or one that had been recently outdated, but rather 
as a victim of its own success. Critical theory, long taken to be, in the works of Max Horkheimer, 
the “intellectual side of the historical process of proletarian emancipation,” the resistant 
counterpoint to the dominant forces of oppression, had proven itself to be so effective that its 
methods had been co-opted by the very institutions of social power that it was once leveraged 
against (Horkheimer 215). 
The post-Marxist writers Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, perhaps the most vocal 
proponents of this conclusion, suggest that from the 1980s onward “the postmodernist and 
postcolonial theorists who advocate a politics of difference, fluidity, and hybridity in order to 
challenge the binaries and essentialism of modern sovereignty have been outflanked by the 
strategies of power” (138). As Negri writes elsewhere, critical theory’s critique of capital and 
power relations has in many important ways become the very logic of capitalism, thereby 
crippling critique as a political tool of dominant social and economic systems and concomitantly 
shifting “any possible critical space towards the outside, to its margins” (“The Italian Difference” 
13). Similarly, Bruno Latour has drawn our attention to how critical theory’s focus on the power 
of discourse and social constructivist epistemology is now being used by those with retrograde 
political objectives, such as the “dangerous extremists” who oppose the science of climate 
change and who leverage theories of textual indeterminacy and accusations of ideological bias in 
order to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our lives” (227). Far from celebrating critical 
                                                 
1
 See Jeffrey T. Nealon’s “Post-Deconstructive: Negri, Derrida, and the State of Theory,” 
Symblokē 14, no. 1 (2006): 68-80. Print. 
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theory’s “success” on this score, politically inclined academics are instead tasked with thinking 
through the irony of the contemporary situation. In Horkheimer and Adorno’s words, what once 
“require[d] us to take up the cause of the remnants of freedom, of tendencies toward real 
humanity,” is now used by advertising executives, lobbyists/politicians, and CEOs to accumulate 
record profits (xi). 
In addition to critical theory’s precarious situation, contemporary American politics has 
seen a similar ironic inversion taking place around the same time and gathering significant steam 
since the election of Barack Obama in 2008. Specifically, the actions and ideas so long 
associated with the Left, particularly the populist tactics associated with the “New Left” of the 
1960s, have also become unmoored, and find themselves often equally comfortable on the Right 
of the political spectrum. The newly christened Tea Party (an acronym that stands for “Taxed 
Enough Already”) and other “patriot groups,” many of which are funded by the billionaire Koch 
Brothers, have dominated the political landscape using an arsenal of strategies more commonly 
associated with leftist organizing. Writing in the New York Times, conservative commentator 
David Brooks offers a succinct summary:  
The Tea Partiers have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for street theater, 
mass rallies, marches and extreme statements that are designed to shock polite society out 
of its stupor. This mimicry is no accident. Dick Armey, one of the spokesmen for the Tea 
Party movement, recently praised the methods of Saul Alinsky, the leading tactician of 
the New Left. (“The Wal-Mart Hippies”) 
Consequently, the American Left, despite Democratic control of both the Presidency and 
Congress from 2008-10, as well as the emergence of the ubiquitous yet short-lived Occupy Wall 
Street movement in 2010, there has been less cheering than jeering. According to a recent 
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“manifesto” in the Nation Magazine, “American progressives and principled liberals need to face 
an essential truth: the Democratic Party, as now constituted, is no longer an agency for realizing 
their ideals (“How to Save the Democratic Party”). Unable to counter the Right’s assault on 
social programs and responsible regulation, as well as the continual capitulation to the Right’s 
demands, the reform-minded and radical Left has been left disappointed on seemingly all fronts.  
The early twenty-first century has found critical theory’s critical gaze turned inward, and 
those concerned with social, political, and economic justice without a program. Thus, one might 
ask: what is or could be considered “radicalism” in the twenty-first century? In addition, what is 
the role of critical thought in/for such twenty-first century radicalism?  
For some, critical theory’s “death” warrants a gleeful adieu. Stanley Fish, for instance, 
suggests “theory is a political non-starter,” and one should “stop asking it to do things it just 
can’t do” (“Ideas and Theory: The Political Difference”). Critical theory, in this regard, is not 
political; politics alone is political. In short, “theoretical formulations are not answers to 
political/empirical questions” (“Ideas and Theory: The Political Difference”). Yet for others, the 
goal has been to interrogate and contextualize critical theory’s own existence in order to take 
stock of its impact and move beyond the contemporary impasse. This entails, in Terry Eagleton’s 
words, “reflect[ing] on the truth and reality of its [critical theory’s] existence, at a time when 
postmodern thought has grave doubts about both truth and reality” (73). Indeed, the text 
Philosophy in the Present, a dialogue between Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek addressing the role 
of philosophy in the wake critical theory’s “death” suggests both an audience and an academy 
eager to move beyond the current impasse (this text was republished three times in 2010 alone). 
In their discussion, Žižek suggests it is time to renounce the “neo-Kantian” and “postmodern 
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neosophism” that has marked the academy for over a generation and reconstitute philosophy and 
its quest for timeless truths (65-66).   
The most common answers to the questions outlined above—the same ones that guide this 
study—have included two “(re)turns.” Most prominent has been the return to the study of 
ontology by such thinkers as Jean-Luc Nancy, Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek, and Michael Hardt 
and his collaborator Antonio Negri. Furthermore, in the works of many theorists, particularly 
Fredric Jameson, David Harvey, and Terry Eagleton, Marxism remains the dominant political 
paradigm. Yet, the (re)turn to such essentialized categories threatens to roll-back the advances 
made in politics and critical thought as a result of poststructuralism’s questioning of these very 
categories. While the contemporary moment suggests the need to rethink critical theory and its 
connection to politics, the response to its latest “death” should not risk dismissing the practices 
and connections that once invigorated an entire generation of radicals, artists, and dissidents.  
Indeed, Jean-Luc Nancy, for one, points out that the revolts of May 1968, were largely 
influenced by the works of France’s most influential theorists—the same “neo-Kantians” and 
“postmodern neosophists” Badiou and Žižek are apt to blame for the decline of philosophical 
thought: “In the midst of the profound upheavals caused by decolonization—accompanied, on 
the one hand, by the multiplication of socialist-revolutionary or socialist-republican models, and, 
on the other, be the tectonic mutations of thought and representations—we left the age of 
‘History,’ as Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Deleuze, and Derrida all diagnosed very early on” (9). On 
Nancy’s view, these theorists’ critique of Western metaphysics became a tool for radicals, 
dissidents, and students in their attempt to create an egalitarian society. For Rancière, who, one 
might argue, is the heir apparent of critical theory, if there is ever to be a similar rupture in the 
body politic, one must recognize that “the end of politics” bemoaned by Badiou, Žižek, Hardt 
6 
 
 
and Negri, etc, as well as the hope for a “return of politics” by Marxists like Eagleton, Jameson, 
and Harvey, belies the possibility that both views are “two complementary ways of cancelling 
out politics in the simple relationship between a state of the social and a state of the state 
apparatus” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 42). In other words, the returns to metaphysics and 
Marxism because of critical theory’s “failure,” enact the same problematic: they limit our ability 
to (re)imagine the very concepts of politics and ethics.       
For this study, I attempt to join rhetorical theory and anarchist politics as a counterpoint to 
the current trends toward metaphysics and Marxism. To be specific, this dissertation argues that 
instead of turning away from much of critical theory and returning to originary systems of 
totalizing thought—Marxism and metaphysics—we develop more fully many of critique’s most 
influential tenets by taking up two constellations of ideas that, while implied in much of critical 
theory’s postmodern and poststructuralist expression, have either been overlooked or 
disregarded. To phrase it another way, instead of discounting critical theory out of 
disappointment and disgust and returning to the originary models of human thought (philosophy) 
and radical politics (Marxism), we optimistically take up an alternative set of ideas that stand 
directly opposed to such original categories: rhetoric and anarchism. In the chapters following 
this one, I develop what I call “anarchic rhetoric,” which, I hope, echoes Wendy Brown’s 
observation that “[c]ritical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it 
might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor” (16).   
The End of Politics?  
Before continuing with the argument, however, it is necessary to reiterate and elaborate 
on some of the concepts and ideas that have marked critical theory since the mid-twentieth 
century and characterize what has broadly been called the “linguistic turn” within critical theory. 
7 
 
 
Doing so will allow me to better articulate the various responses to critical theory’s “death,” as 
well as frame my project’s relationship to these responses. The following, then, is a brief 
description of the ideas of Jacques Derrida, whose work I take to be emblematic of the sort of 
poststructuralist and critical thought that has been both venerated and valorized since the mid-
twentieth century and, as such, informs much of my own approach in the following chapters. To 
be clear, while I recognize that Derrida’s ideas are well-worn territory, I begin here because the 
project of “deconstruction,” with its emphasis on the contingency of language and its ability to 
undermine dialectical/philosophical thought, as well as its influence on later critical theorists, 
provides the proper contextualization for my turn to rhetoric and anarchism. To be specific, 
deconstruction, insofar as it is “political,” represents both the best and worst of critical theory’s 
uptake in French poststructuralist and postmodern thought.   
Being well-worn territory, I will reserve a long explication of Derrida’s thought and 
instead offer a brief summary in order to move into a discussion of Derrida’s reception among 
Marxist-oriented critical theorists. Derrida’s project takes up the whole of Western metaphysics 
through a reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, as well as the way in which a certain desire for absolute 
“presence” characterizes the work of, among others, Rousseau and Levi-Strauss. Most famously, 
though, Derrida targets the relationship between speech (dialectical/philosophical examination) 
and writing (rhetoric) in the Phaedrus, and, through a philological investigation into the meaning 
of the word “pharmakon” undermines Plato’s condemnation of writing/rhetoric and valorization 
of dialectical exchange.  
As Derrida notes in his book Dissemination, when Plato criticizes writing (qua sophistic 
rhetoric), Plato uses the term “pharmakon,” which means both remedy and poison. Thus, when 
Plato’s Socrates makes the case against writing, which is a criticism directed “above all against 
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sophistics” that “mark[ed] out the battle lines between sophistics and philosophy” for over two 
millennia (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 1855-1856), Plato attempts to efface “the fact that the pharmakon 
properly consists in a certain inconsistency, a certain impropriety, this nonidentity-with-itself 
always allowing it to be turned against itself” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 1865). To phrase it another 
way, Plato pits dialectic (philosophy) against rhetoric, which he labels a poison (“pharmakon”).  
However, as Derrida points out, because “pharmakon” also suggests remedy or healing, the 
distinction between rhetoric and philosophy lacks the substantive grounding Plato thought he 
was providing. By making this distinction, Derrida calls into question the Platonic hope for 
metaphysical knowledge via dialectical exchange, which, as he suggests, marks the history of 
Western philosophy and its claim to absolute correspondence between signifiers and signified. 
The result is that all “Truth” claims, in being cast against some opposing or competing concept, 
have a priori assumptions that “deconstruct” the binary. Such a situation reveals that the Platonic 
desire for an idealized communicative process that brings one into contact with the everlasting 
and divine is an impossibility. Echoing Horkheimer’s characterization of “traditional theory,” 
philosophy, on Derrida’s view, is characterized by the desire to efface contingency and 
undecidability by developing totalizing systems of thought and action.
 2
 
The result of Derrida’s view is that the desire for Platonic truth is undermined by 
language’s slipperiness. For Derrida, because language lacks a transcendental referent, meaning 
is constructed at certain times, among certain groups, and in particular places. Such a view, then, 
seems to suggest a rhetorical view of truth and meaning that evokes Plato’s archenemies, the 
Sophists and their interest in kairos—the recognition that persuasion is dependent on arguing the 
                                                 
2 Horkheimer writes, “The general goal of all theory is a universal systematic science, 
not limited to any particular subject, but embracing all possible objects” (“Traditional and 
Critical Theory” 188).  
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“right” thing at the “right” time in front of particular audience. The sophist Gorgias, for instance, 
writes, “[O]n most subjects most men take opinion as counselor to their soul, but since opinion is 
slippery and insecure it casts those employing it into slippery and insecure successes” (41). Thus, 
the works of both Derrida and Gorgias continually point to the idea that “truth” and “meaning” 
are contingent and open to construction and revision at anytime.  
However, despite bearing such a strong resemblance to sophistic thought, Derrida is 
unwilling to assign rhetoric the same all-encompassing definition as Gorgias. Whereas Gorgias 
calls rhetoric “a powerful lord” (41), Derrida argues, “I am in favor of the most rigorous and 
most generous attention given to rhetoric. What I'm suspicious of under the name 'rhetoricism’ is 
the authority of language” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16). In fact, when 
faced with the opposition between the Plato and the sophists, Derrida says he “would be on the 
side of philosophy” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16), and any privileging of 
“rhetoricism…is synonymous with logocentrism or phonocentrism” (“Jacques Derrida on 
Rhetoric and Composition” 19). To summarize, Derrida’s project might be characterized as a 
rhetorically inclined philosophy that, in being “interested in the way concepts or arguments 
depend intrinsically on metaphors, tropes, and are in themselves to some extent metaphors or 
tropes,” is somewhere in between philosophy and rhetoric. Alternatively, to use Derrida’s 
description, “To the extent that I am caught up within this couple, I'm a philosopher, but I try not 
to remain within this opposition” (“Jacques Derrida on Rhetoric and Composition” 16). The 
point I am trying to make here is that although his critique of Western philosophy shares much in 
common with philosophy’s Other—rhetoric—Derrida is unwilling to place himself in that 
tradition. He makes clear that one must “be fully cognizant that this reading of Plato is at no time 
spurred on by some slogan or password of a ‘back-to-the sophists-nature” (“Plato’s Pharmacy” 
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1857). While his work has done much for (re)invigorating rhetorical studies, his project’s own 
undecidability and his refusal to take hard stances leaves much to be desired, particularly, as I 
hope to show, when it comes to questions of politics and ethics.  
Derrida would come to take up variety of controversial and politically oriented themes 
late in his career, which included penning perhaps his most (in)famous work, Specters of Marx. 
In this text, Derrida develops the concept of the “new international,” one who is “an untimely 
link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, 
without contract, ‘out of joint,’ without coordination, without party, without country, without 
national community” (Specters of Marx 107).  The “new international” “refers to a profound 
transformation, projected over the long term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of 
intervention” (Specters of Marx 105). Yet, this collective existence, this striving for a more 
egalitarian existence is a future-to-come. The “new international,” and Derrida’s entire project, is 
“even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of a promise 
that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious 
determination, from any messianism” (Specters of Marx 111). Such a goal—to be messianic 
without the messianism—means recognizing the “undeconstructibility of a certain form of 
justice” (Specters of Marx 112). Derrida suggests that such a project begins by acknowledging 
that “no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so 
many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth” 
(Specters of Marx 106). Yet this knowledge is only a beginning. For as he puts forth in his essay 
“On Cosmopolitanism,” to create such a messianic project with the messianism is a task of 
“invention” (4).  
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Paradoxically, this future-to-come, which is to remedy these concrete political injustices, 
is dependent on the constant questioning of any possible future. That is, endless critique must 
orient any possible politics stemming from deconstruction: 
A deconstructive thinking, the one that matters to me here, has always pointed out the 
irreducibility or affirmation and therefore of the promise, as well as the 
undeconstructability of a certain idea of justice (disassociated here from law). Such a 
thinking cannot operate without justifying the principle of a radical and interminable, 
infinite (both theoretical and practical, as one used to say) critique. (Specters of Marx 
112) 
The formation of a “new international,” a messianic project, must endlessly critique its own 
possible futures so as to avoid becoming a “messianism.” Thus, we are left with an aporia 
whereby the invention of the “new international” means constantly striving for and critiquing an 
(un)known future.  
Regarding Derrida’s decision to enter into radical political discourse in 1994 with his 
Specters of Marx, the moment when the future of Marxism was being debated most vigorously, 
Terry Eagleton wryly remarks, “He has…been an unconscionably long time coming” (“Marxism 
Without the Marxism” 83). Eagleton continues by asking, “[W]here was Jacques Derrida when 
we needed him, in the long dark night of Reagan-Thatcher” (“Marxism Without the Marxism” 
83)? The implicit answer in Eagleton’s question is that Derrida would not have risked making 
and taking a stand, as it would have then ran the risk of transforming into dogmatic ideology 
(“logocentrism”), and would have performed the same act that Derrida targets in his works. 
Derrida’s method seeks, instead, to question these dogmas, the binary oppositions that favor and 
oppress, but are forever intertwined with one another. Thus, in an effort to avoid committing the 
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same act he criticizes, Derrida refuses to move beyond his analyses and critique to posit a 
concrete and more egalitarian alternative. However, at the time of Marxism’s collapse, Derrida 
also makes the claim that deconstruction is a but a “radicalization” of Marxism, and “[e]ven 
where it [Marxism] is not acknowledged, even where it remains unconscious or disavowed, this 
debt remains at work, in particular in political philosophy which structures implicitly all 
philosophy or all thought on the subject of philosophy” (114-115). All we are left with, 
according to Eagleton, is a “preoccupation with slippage, failure, aporia, incoherence, not-
quiteness, its suspicion of the achieved” (“Marxism Without Marxism” 86). Like Derrida’s 
refusal to go “back-to-the sophists” despite his works’ affinity to Sophistic thought, Derrida’s 
(re)turn to Marx results in what Eagleton characterizes as “Marxism without Marxism”—a 
radical critique without a politics (“Marxism Without Marxism” 87). 
Whither Radical Politics? 
For many thinkers, the connection between deconstruction and radical Marxist politics 
fails on all accounts: it gives no concrete political recommendation, nor does it provide any 
substantiated grounding from which to think about the political. Indeed, as was spelled out in the 
opening pages, critique’s unmooring from leftist politics has left critical theorists and radicals 
alike searching for some place to hang their hats. Perhaps Antonio Negri’s commentary on 
Specters of Marx best lays bare the alleged impotence, and, indeed the danger, of a politics of an 
(anti)metaphysical (anti)Marxist deconstruction: 
When the analysis passes from the hermeneutic and ontological viewpoint to the 
experience of the political, the picture given is terrible. The conspiracy against Marxism 
and the world evangelization of the free market, the construction of a global power 
“without place” and “without time,” the structuring of the “end of history,” the media’s 
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colonization of consciousness and the impoverishment in the quality of work, the 
emptying out of meaning from the word “democracy—within individual countries and in 
international relations—these represent only a few of the hegemonic orders of capitalism 
in one phase of the spectral construction of the real. (“The Specter’s Smile” 9) 
Those who echo Negri’s observations include Fredric Jameson and Eagleton, who argue that the 
separation of critique from political leftism warrants a return to the originary radical politics of 
Karl Marx. In 2010, Jameson published Representing Capital: A Reading of Volume One and 
Eagleton released Why Marx Was Right. Within philosophy, Alain Badiou points to the need for 
the “reconstruction or re-emergence of the category of truth” as a corrective to 
poststructuralism’s lack of genuine philosophical thought (“Philosophy and Desire” 36). He 
suggests, “Our epoch can be said to have been stamped and signed, in philosophy, by the return 
of the question of Being” (Deleuze: The Clamor of Being 19). Thus, as mentioned in the opening 
pages and developed in the discussion of Derrida’s work, the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries have been marked by the following situation: poststructuralist critique, with its 
“deconstruction” of binary thought, refusal of monolithic structures of meaning, and challenge to 
“grand narratives,” has been both unmoored from political leftism and co-opted by contemporary 
capitalism, as have the leftist political tactics been appropriated by the political right. As a result, 
many—particularly Badiou and Žižek—have sought to replace the outdated, outmoded, and 
outflanked critical theory with a resurrecting of and return to metaphysics and Marxism.  
Rhetoric and Anarchism 
Bearing the above in mind, my aim here is to provide an alternative to the return to 
metaphysics and Marxism by pursuing many of the ideas handed down by critical theory’s 
“linguistic turn.” As I hope will become clear, a turn to rhetoric can be seen as extending many 
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tenets of critical theory’s poststructuralist expression, and, as such, provides a salient (and 
persuasive) set of ideas through which to interrogate the death of critical theory and radical 
politics. Instead of returning to those concepts that critical theory has sought to overcome, 
rhetoric provides a new and generative perspective on today’s political and critical impasse. 
What’s more, by turning to rhetoric to address the above questions, one might deduce a curious 
situation whereby instead of setting Western metaphysics on its head, poststructuralist critical 
thought might be seen as an opening act to the main event: a whole hog embrace of philosophy’s 
Other—rhetoric. Indeed, in what comes next, I claim that turning to rhetoric implies another 
Other: anarchism.   
In his book, Saving Persuasion, Bryan Garsten writes, “In both theory and practice today, 
the reigning view of rhetorical speech is that it is a disruptive force in politics and a threat to 
deliberation” (3). In place of the State, the practice of rhetoric holds the possibility of a polity 
“being subjected to the rule of persuasive speakers.” Garsten argues this anxiety begins with 
Plato and can be traced through philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant. Indeed, 
Plato’s suggestion that “self-adornment is to gymnastic, so is sophistry to legislation; and as 
cookery is to medicine, so is rhetoric to justice” largely set the stage for subsequent dismissals of 
rhetoric from progressive social theory; rhetoric, more often than not, is simply positioned as the 
probable or contingent masquerading as the transcendental or just (Gorgias 72). As a result of 
this vilification, argues Garsten, the dominant practice has been to eliminate rhetoric from the 
political arena, which, in turn, has alienated citizens from democratic participation. In other 
words, rhetoric holds the potential to violate notions of the sovereign State and its embodiment 
of reason and the capacity for judgment. Therefore, one might reasonably say that because 
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rhetoric is void of any meaningful content, the rhetoricians who practice this craft pose a 
potential threat to the State.  
So, is the insinuation here that rhetoricians are anarchists? While I in no way claim that 
all who engage in rhetoric are anti-Statists, there is a striking resemblance between anarchist 
politics and certain strands of rhetorical theory. To elaborate, because of its very nature, 
anarchism, as both a politics and philosophy, is notoriously difficult to define. As Peter Marshall 
writes, “It would be misleading to offer a neat definition of anarchism, since by its very nature it 
is anti-dogmatic. It does not offer a fixed body of doctrine based on one particular world-view” 
(3). Despite this, every study of anarchism begins with an obligatory explanation that attempts to 
explain the major tenets and aims of anarchism. While this essay is no different, I want to 
emphasize anarchism’s inherent skepticism and contingency.  
Anarchism can be characterized as “[t]he philosophy of a new social order based on 
liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that all forms of government rest on violence, 
and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary” (Goldman 50). Its goal is “to 
establish the condition of anarchy, that is to say, a decentralized and self-regulating society 
consisting of a federation of voluntary associations of free and equal individuals,” which allows 
for humans to “realize their full potential” (Marshall 3). To realize this goal, anarchism adopts a 
dynamic and experimental approach to fostering social change. Paul Goodman’s short 
“Reflections on the Anarchist Principle” captures the pragmatic, contingent, and kairotic nature 
of anarchism: 
[T]his relativity of the anarchist principle to the actual situation is of the essence of 
anarchism. There cannot be a history of anarchism in the sense of establishing a 
permanent state of things called “anarchist.” It is always a continual coping with the next 
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situation, and a vigilance to make sure that past freedoms are not lost and do not turn into 
the opposite, as free enterprise turned into wage-slavery and monopoly capitalism, or the 
independent judiciary turned into a monopoly of courts, cops, and lawyers, or free 
education turned into school systems. (56)  
Anarchism’s skepticism and kairotic nature has resulted in several varying trends. Depending on 
the emphasis of the practitioner, anarchism is often categorized as either “social” or 
“individualist,” each of which has a unique set of practices and aims. Marshall notes, “The 
individualists see the danger of obligatory cooperation and are worried that a collectivist society 
will lead to the tyranny of the group. On the other hand, the social anarchists are concerned that a 
society of individualists might become atomistic and that the spirit of competition could destroy 
mutual aid and general solidarity” (6). While this division has given birth to several schools of 
thought and practice—mutualist, collectivist, communist, syndicalist, anarcho-capitalist—all 
anarchists reject the institutionalized concentration of power. Consequently, the only way to 
check this concentration is through a flexible approach that rejects any “incontrovertible 
blueprint for future generations” (Marshall 6).  
Standard histories of political anarchism, while acknowledging the work of William 
Godwin’s “philosophical anarchism,” begin with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and his disciple 
Mikhail Bakunin. While these two laid the foundation for the views described above, what is 
also of note here is their relationship to Karl Marx. Indeed, the conflict between the anarchists 
and Marx largely laid the foundation for radical politics for well over a century. In fact, Marx’s 
philosophy was largely developed in response to the anarchist movement over a nearly thirty-
year period. Proudhon’s well-known 1846 letter to Karl Marx best illustrates the debate between 
the two. Responding to Marx’s invitation to engage in a series of letters, Proudhon writes: 
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I applaud with all my heart your thought of bringing all opinions to light; let us carry on a 
good and loyal polemic; let us give the world an example of learned and far-sighted 
tolerance, but let us not, merely because we are at the head of a movement, make 
ourselves the leaders of a new intolerance, let us not pose as the apostles of a new 
religion, even if it be the religion of logic, the religion of reason. Let us gather together 
and encourage all protests, let us brand all exclusiveness, all mysticism; let us never 
regard a question as exhausted, and when we have used our last argument, let us begin 
again, if need be, with eloquence and irony. (“Proudhon to Marx”)  
Against Proudhon, Marx would develop his own philosophy, a dialectical view of historical 
progress that poked a finger in the eye of Proudhon’s anarchism. In fact, a year after Proudhon’s 
letter, Marx would publish The Poverty of Philosophy as a direct refutation of Proudhon’s The 
Philosophy of Poverty. This trend would continue throughout Marx’s work and eventually boil 
over during the 1872 Hague Conference of the First International. During the conference, Marx 
and the Congress voted to expel the anarchist wing of the International thereby laying the 
foundation for the reign of Marxism as the paradigmatic radical political program.  
The role of the State constituted the primary point of contention among Marx and the 
anarchists. While the Marxist and anarchist programs have always shared the desire for a 
Stateless society, they differed on the means for realizing this goal. Whereas Marx’s historical 
materialism retained an important role for the State in ushering communism, the anarchists 
argued that a “dictatorship of the proletariat” would simply be replacing one oppressive force 
with another. Indeed, Bakunin, Marx’s rival in the First International, polemically writes, “In a 
word, we reject all legislation, all authority, and all privileged, licensed, official, and legal 
influence…This is the sense in which we are really anarchists” (35). For the anarchists, the State, 
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no matter the form, was an obstacle to emancipation. In positioning themselves against the State, 
the anarchists, then, were left to seek modes of rhetorical engagement that did not rely on 
appealing to the State for social or political reforms or participating in the State via the electoral 
or legislative processes. In light, then, of the seemingly anti-Statist Occupy Wall Street and Tea 
Party movements, a reconsideration of anarchism and its strategies of persuasion and coalition 
building seem timely.  
Marx vs. the Sophists? 
The connection between anarchist politics and certain strands of rhetorical thought is not 
an uncanny one. As the epigraph by Benjamin Tucker points up, anarchist politics, in its refusal 
of “first principles,” seemingly does what Plato and a long line of dialecticians saw as the danger 
of rhetoric and those sophists who practiced it; rhetoric and rhetoricians are a threat to reason and 
its codification in institutions and processes. Such a connection becomes apparent when 
examining Marx’s quarrel with the anarchists. As Marx—possibly the archetypal dialectician—
was developing his system of thought against the anarchists, he forwarded a critique that echoes 
Plato’s dismissal of Sophistic rhetoric that reveals, despite his own ambivalence towards the 
Greek philosopher, a veiled Platonism. For example, in stark contrast to Proudhon’s above letter, 
Marx’s 1871 letter concerning Bakunin’s writings sounds rather Platonic:  
This infant's [Bakunin] spelling-book found favour (and still has a certain hold) in Italy 
and Spain, where the real conditions of the workers' movement are as yet little developed, 
and among a few vain, ambitious and empty doctrinaires in French Switzerland and 
Belgium. For Mr. Bakunin the theory (the assembled rubbish he has scraped together 
from Proudhon, St. Simon, etc.) is a secondary affair – merely a means to his personal 
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self-assertion. If he is a nonentity as a theoretician he is in his element as an intriguer. 
(“Marx to Friedrich Bolte”)  
In this light, anarchism, like rhetoric, lacks a metaphysical or intellectual grounding, and, 
because of this, is empty, void of any meaningful content. That is, we hear in Marx’s critique of 
Bakunin’s anarchism Plato’s assertion that rhetoric is simply an “experience” void of content and 
unable to bring one into contact with metaphysical conceptions of the “good” or “just.” 
Furthermore, in enacting the sort of Platonism that he always sought to avoid, Marx’s criticism 
and expunging of anarchism during the First International established the modus operandi for all 
successive critiques of anarchism. Namely, as E.J. Hobsbwam writes, “the main appeal of 
anarchism was emotional and not intellectual;” and, as a result, “it has almost been designed for 
failure.” Thus, tracing this homology out, one might say that as anarchism is to Marxism (and 
politics in general), rhetoric is to metaphysics and philosophy.  
In suggesting this homology, one is left not only with two competing views of 
epistemology and metaphysics, but also with two competing political ends: taking power or 
challenging power. Extending this line of thought, theories of political engagement founded on 
dialectics lead to “taking power.” As Richard McKeon notes: 
The dialectical invocation of truth as guide in action and in use of power is easily 
transformed into the assumption that those in power possess wisdom and defend truth 
(totalitarianism) or into the use of power (as in the dictatorship of the proletariat) to 
establish conditions of "freedom" which have no clear connection with the common 
good. (24) 
Certainly, Plato’s “guardians of the republic” (those with an understanding of dialectical logos 
that allows them to see past reality to the eternal realm of metaphysics) are mirrored in Marx’s 
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class-conscious vanguard (those with an understanding of how the “real conditions” of capitalist 
production obscure “species-being”). The result, according to Bakunin, is that the “[t]he highly 
inspired must be listened to and obeyed by the less inspired, and the less inspired by the 
uninspired, and with it the fundamental institutions of slavery: Church and State” (53). Figured 
in this way, both Platonism and Marxism give way to a first and guiding principle that is to direct 
and determine action and engagement, which in Plato’s case, is discovered via 
dialectical/philosophical exchange and is to be embodied in the Republic, or, in Marx’s case, 
discovered via historical materialism and is to be enforced by the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat.” In short, both politics rely on the power of a metaphysical arkhê and its 
manifestation in the State form. The result is a strict limiting, restricting, and determining of the 
acceptable forms of rhetorical engagement.  
In stark contrast to dialectical/metaphysical philosophies that seek to consolidate and 
concentrate thoughts and actions in the State form, rhetoric serves to democratize power. In his 
reading of the Phaedrus, Jacques Rancière argues that Plato’s concern with writing (rhetoric) is 
not that it is unable to defend itself against the dialectician, but that it is “too loquacious”; 
rhetoric can “transmit anything, anywhere.” Further, Rancière suggests that “[m]ute in the face 
of the philosophers’ questions, it [rhetoric] cannot restrain itself from speaking to the uninitiated” 
(Philosopher 40). As such, rhetoric “put the logos at the disposal of men whose work had 
damaged their bodies and mutilated their souls” (Philosopher 40). By resisting dialectic and 
speaking to the “uninitiated” and unqualified, rhetoric undermines the arkhê determining 
political action and organization. Unrestrained by dialectics/metaphysics and the State, rhetoric 
becomes democratically grounded in the lives of individuals who have the ability to question the 
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principles that are meant to guide action and present counter-arguments so as to shape and create 
the lives they deem fit for living.  
Following this line of argument, one might say, then, that the State, with its foundational 
arkhê, is by and large an institution formed to protect against rhetoric’s an-arkhê-istic function—
its democratic loquaciousness. By keeping rhetoric within acceptable bounds and in the proper 
hands, the State protects the powerful. Bearing this distinction in mind, the following chapters 
aim to connect the rhetorical tradition and the anarchist tradition to develop an “anarchic 
rhetoric.” Or, in other words, the rest of this essay seeks to show what James Arnt Aune suggests 
Marxism with its veiled Platonism has failed to answer: “[W]hat sorts of communicative 
processes enable historical actors to see liberatory possibilities” (13)?   
Anarchism and the Academy 
I see the argument I am making here as contributing to much contemporary thinking on 
anarchism, while also advocating for a new theoretical and methodological frame. To be specific, 
while I see this study as participating in a recent “anarchist turn” in cultural studies that was 
largely inaugurated by Todd May’s The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism, I 
contend that much of the work within this “turn” does not escape the pitfalls outlined above 
concerning poststructuralism’s connection to politics. In connecting poststructuralist thought to 
anarchism, May begins by noting that although many thinkers, particularly French thinkers, 
including Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, and Badiou, have made politics explicit in their writings, 
their engagements have been with Marxist thought. May suggests that because of the tenuous 
connections between these thinkers and the Marxist tradition, it may be time to move beyond 
Marxism (if one can call today’s radical politics Marxist in the first place). He writes: 
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There has been much dialogue between these thinkers and the Marxist tradition. Often, 
this dialogue involves various kinds of modification of Marxist thought. However, given 
the contortions made in order to bring Marx into alignment with current thinking, one 
might wonder whether it would be better to seek a new tradition in which to embed their 
thought. (11) 
Indeed, May’s own work has sought to connect the “classical” anarchism of Bakunin, Proudhon, 
and Stirner with the poststructuralist thought of Deleuze and Foucault ushered in a small “turn to 
anarchism.”3 Since the publication of May’s text, there have been many other attempts to 
synthesize anarchism and poststrucuralism. These connections have resulted in various theories 
of “postmodern anarchism” (Lewis Call) and “postanarchism” (Saul Newman).4 These studies 
are joined by those other scholars, who, along with May, have pointed to anarchism as an 
alternative to the Marxism that permeates discourses on radical politics, most notably Jacques 
Rancière, David Graeber, and Simon Critchley. The works of Rancière, Graeber, and Critchley 
have enjoyed a widespread readership, thus they serve as frequent reference points throughout 
this dissertation. 
While I agree with the general aims of these studies, I find their desire to connect 
philosophy, even the sort of poststructuralist philosophy we described above, and anarchism 
somewhat ironic. As Benjamin Tucker, who called himself a “philosophical anarchist,” reminds 
us, anarchism is opposed not just to government or the State, but all “archē,” all fundamental and 
guiding principles, those very things that philosophy seeks to provide. I address this issue 
explicitly in chapter two and suggest that Tucker’s response to the alleged bombing of police by 
                                                 
3
 See the newly-minted journal Anarchist Developments in Cultural Studies. 
4
 See Newman’s From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-authoritarianism and the Dislocation of 
Power. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001, and Call’s Postmodern Anarchism. Lexington: 
Lexington Books. 2002. 
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Chicago anarchists reveals a rhetorically-inflected anarchism that stands in opposition to the 
search of and appeal to immutable truths. To put it bluntly, in opposition to any sort of 
philosophical anarchism, my figuration of “anarchic rhetoric,” I hope, provides a model of 
communicative interaction that allows for a particularly timely and persuasive political 
intervention that takes the form of a collective “declaration of independence” from the body 
politic.      
Perhaps because of its uncanniness, anarchism has been relatively absent within rhetorical 
studies. Any studies that have investigated anarchist rhetoric have, in large part, focused on 
individual rhetors such as Emma Goldman or Mikhail Bakunin. A study such as Martha 
Solomon’s “Ideology as Rhetorical Constraint: The Anarchist Agitation of ‘Red Emma’ 
Goldman,” reveals the sort of rhetorical scholarship surrounding anarchism. Soloman writes, 
“close study of her [Goldman’s] work suggests, in the final analysis, the self-contradictions of 
anarchist rhetoric” (185). This “final analysis” is one that is too narrow in scope. Though it does 
offer an interesting read on Goldman’s rhetoric, Solomon’s dismissal of anarchist rhetoric 
illustrates a naïve understanding of anarchist philosophy, one that fails to account for the 
historical situation surrounding Goldman and the movement at large. Further, if one considers 
the fact that Emma Goldman was imprisoned and deported by the American government, as well 
as the resulting legislation that sought to limit anarchist activity, one might reasonably say that 
Goldman’s rhetoric was in fact successful.5 In short, Solomon is unable to locate Goldman’s 
rhetorical practice within larger historical and political frameworks. 
Other studies dismiss anarchism altogether. In Persuasion and Social Movements, a 
seminal text in social movement rhetoric, authors Stewart, Smith and Denton Jr. write, 
                                                 
5
 The United States’ Immigration Acts of 1903 and 1918 were otherwise called the 
“Anarchist Exclusion Acts.” See “Alien Anarchists,” The New York Times, December 15th, 1919.   
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“[p]erhaps the most prominent advocate of revolutionary argument was the anarchist Johann 
Most. While others simply blew buildings to pieces, Most delighted in using language to 
describe violent acts” (198). Described as such, the authors reduce anarchism to a disturbing and 
oversimplified dichotomy, whereby one either willingly commits violence or takes a sadistic 
pleasure in describing it. In either case, the authors pay little attention to the larger rhetorical 
situation, thereby castigating anarchist rhetoric to the periphery, where it has remained, deemed 
unworthy of attention. This dissertation aims to remedy the neglect of this tradition within 
rhetorical scholarship by analyzing the specific tropes and strategies of persuasion used within 
anarchist rhetoric and how those reference points might allow us to rethink the possibilities for 
radical political rhetoric, persuasion, and critical thought in the present.  
Methodology 
To develop what I call “anarchic rhetoric,” I employ a genealogical method indebted to 
Michel Foucault. The genealogical method, according to Foucault, examines the formations and 
uses of knowledges and concepts in the service of power. Foucault suggests that genealogy is “a 
form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of 
objects, etc., without having to make reference to the field of events or runs in its empty 
sameness throughout the course of history” (“Truth and Power” 59). In other words, genealogy 
demands the isolation and documentation of the points when a particular interpretation of a 
concept “emerges,” as well as “the use it serves” (“Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” 86). Such a 
method, then, allows me take up a set of individuals and groups, who, at first blush, seem wholly 
unconnected. In fact, only chapter two takes up the work of a self-identified anarchist. This does 
not mean, though, that the title of this project is a misnomer. As the epigraph by the Detroit 
anarchist Joseph Labadie underscores, America has been home to an often neglected and 
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maligned radical anti-Statist tradition since its founding. A genealogy focusing on the strategies 
of persuasion that these “anarchists” employed reveals a rhetoric without a partisan home or 
metaphysical underpinnings that has often been used in advocating paradoxical and conflicting 
ends. Specifically, what becomes clear throughout this dissertation is that whereas anarchist 
rhetoric was once used to challenge the English Empire and its colonial practices and the 
concentration of power in the Federal Government following the American Revolution, it is now 
being used to justify the unrestricted and unfettered growth of Empire.  
Because of the recent resurgence in the use of Revolutionary symbols and rhetoric by the 
conservative Tea Party, the “Founding Fathers” serve as bookends for the entire project. More 
specifically, the first chapter takes up Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. In 
doing so, I attempt to answer the question: why do anarchists, whether on the Left or the Right, 
look back fondly on the American Revolution and its Declaration of Independence? In other 
words, what tropes and figures did Jefferson, in his penning of the Declaration, employ that 
resonate so strongly with anarchists?   
To clarify the question, the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker, who I take up in 
chapter two, suggests that anarchists are “unterrified Jeffersonian Democrats” (“State Socialism: 
How Far they Agree and Wherein the Differ” 13). In fact, the pages of Tucker’s radical anarchist 
periodical Liberty are filled with references and allusions to Jefferson and Jeffersonian 
democracy. Moreover, the anarchism of the New Left thinker Paul Goodman’s is also heavily 
influenced by Jefferson’s vision of government and citizen engagement. Thus, this chapter 
examines the intersection of Jefferson’s writings and anarchism in order to explain both his 
appeal to anarchists and lay the foundation for my figuration of “anarchic rhetoric.” By 
contextualizing Jefferson’s view of rhetoric and politics and analyzing the Declaration of 
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Independence, I argue that Jefferson lays the foundation for anarchic rhetoric. In opposition to 
those scholars who place Jefferson in the liberal or republican camps, I suggest Jefferson, in his 
complicating of these two traditions, points to the following figuration of an anarchist society: a 
society can be considered anarchistic in proportion to the rhetorical engagement of its 
inhabitants.  The more rhetoric there is, the less concentrated power there will be.  
Chapter Two takes us from the macro to the micro level. Whereas Jefferson provides us 
with a view of an anarchist society, the response of Benjamin Tucker and his compatriots, who 
are often called the “Boston Anarchists,” to the Chicago Haymarket Affair offers a look at the 
rhetorical exchange between individuals and groups of people within an anarchist arrangement. 
The bombing of a column of police officers, which was allegedly committed by a group of 
European immigrants and anarchists, led to anarchism’s vilification among politicians, citizens, 
and other leftist radicals. However, in the face of widespread condemnation, repression, and 
intimidation, Tucker proudly donned the anarchist label. Thus, at a time when anarchism 
becomes synonymous with terror, violence, and infiltration, Tucker still sought to attract others 
to the cause. So, what tropes, figures, and strategies did Tucker employ to navigate this problem? 
I argue that Tucker draws on Adam Smith’s figuration of “sympathy,” the rhetorical construction 
of moral sentiments. In foregrounding the sympathetic process, Tucker provides a foil to the 
Platonic dialectic, which seeks persuasion through reason, empathy, and consensus, and begins 
to draw our attention to the affective dimension of anarchic rhetoric and the ways in which the 
rhetorical construction of moral sentiments (sympathy) can take the place of the State while 
avoiding absolute moral relativism.  
While chapter three is largely a demonstration of anarchic rhetoric from a leftist position, 
it also draws our attention to the aesthetic dimension of such a rhetoric. Specifically, this chapter 
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examines the Marxist C.L.R. James’ intervention into what was called the “negro question” 
among radical leftist groups. Contextualizing James’s work within the leftist movements of the 
early twentieth-century reveals his dissatisfaction with both American liberalism and the 
dominant Stalinism in addressing the needs of African Americans, whom he identified as the 
most radicalized population in the United States. Although he began his venture into American 
radical politics as a Trotskyist, he would eventually forge his own path and advocate for a 
decentralized and autonomous African American politics. In doing so, he would seek to build a 
coalition by seeking “sympathy” around the particular affect of anger. What is more, in rejecting 
both the liberal and Stalinist attempts to represent African Americans, James would ironically 
appropriate the Roosevelt’s “fireside chat” in order to advocate for Bigger Thomas, a character 
from Richard Wright’s novel Native Son, occupying the White House. James’ turn away from 
Trotskyism, and call for an autonomous African American political movement violates what 
Rancière calls the “police order,” and works “the interval between identities” in order to 
“reconfigure the distributions of the public and private” and the “universal and particular” 
(Hatred of Democracy 62-63). By taking us into the realm of the aesthetic, James underscores 
the role of rhetoric in determining politics, instead of the common assumption that politics 
determines the rhetoric.  
In the concluding chapter, I take up the rewriting of social studies curriculum by the Tea 
Party-influenced Texas State Board of Education in order to suggest that the latest iteration of 
anarchic rhetoric is a conservative one. The revamped curriculum foregrounded America’s 
Christian tradition, while downplaying and/or eliminating its progressive strains. In fact, it all but 
removed Thomas Jefferson from its textbooks. However, whereas most on the Left have 
chastised the Board’s actions and its version of American “history,” I argue that its rhetoric 
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enacts many of critical theory’s central tenets, particularly its emphasis on social constructivist 
epistemology. It is also in this chapter where I make the case for anarchic rhetoric within critical 
theory and rhetorical studies. In doing so, I make the argument that anarchic rhetoric performs 
much of the same tasks of the critical tradition, yet evacuates its tenuous connection to Marxist 
dialectics. That is, I claim that critical theory cannot be wed to a particular politics because it is 
thoroughly anarchistic, democratic, and egalitarian, and only a rhetorical view of politics and the 
critical tradition, as opposed to a philosophical one, lays bare this notion.  
To be clear, part of the argument over the next few chapters is that “anarchic rhetoric” is a 
rhetorical formalism that is “without content.” As such, this rhetoric has been available to a 
whole host of seemingly disparate American political figures to achieve often-conflicting 
political goals: the pre-partisan Thomas Jefferson (chapter one), the anarchist Benjamin Tucker 
(chapter two), the Marxist C.L.R. James (chapter three), and the far-right Tea Party (chapter 
four). While many might make the claim that such a situation reenacts the contemporary “death 
of theory/radical politics” discourse, I argue that “anarchic rhetoric,” in its non-allegiance to any 
particular person, groups, or politics, is inherently democratic and egalitarian, which are 
characteristics to be celebrated and further developed. Instead of developing rhetorics that reflect 
certain partisan politics and using them to conquer—persuade—other partisans, which, in 
essence, circumscribes politics to a Platonic dialectic, we develop politics that reflect certain 
rhetorics. Doing so endlessly challenges the codification of politics in the State form and opens 
rhetoric to the non-dialectical, the affective, and the aesthetic. To phrase it another way, a 
rhetoric that emphasizes those concepts that are said to have contributed to the death of critique 
and radical politics—the non-dialectical, the affective, and the aesthetic—points to new futures 
and new “ends” of both radicalism and critical thought. In short, it allows for six billion 
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Declarations of Independence from the ubiquitous Platonism that seemingly determines all of our 
politics and thought.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, RHETORIC, AND THE (ANTI-)FOUNDATIONS OF 
ANARCHY 
“I hold that it a little rebellion now and then is a good thing” (Thomas Jefferson, 
“To James Madison” 27). 
 
 “Thomas Jefferson, were he alive today, would probably be an anarchist. His 
philosophy pointed straight in the direction of absolute liberty” (Benjamin 
Tucker, “On Picket Duty” 1).  
 
In the prologue to his seminal biography of Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Ellis details 
Jefferson’s “ideological promiscuity” and the paradoxes of his legacy. He writes, “Soon after his 
death in 1826, Jefferson became a touchstone for wildly divergent political movements that 
continued to compete for his name and the claim on his legacy” (7). These competing claims—
which are in no short supply—have created some conflicting portraits: 
Southern secessionists cited him on behalf of states’ rights; northern abolitionists quoted 
his words in the Declaration of Independence against slavery. The so-called Robber 
Barons of the Gilded Age echoed his warnings against the encroaching powers of the 
federal government; liberal reformers and radical Populists referred to his strictures 
against corrupt businessmen and trumpeted his tributes to the superiority of agrarian 
values. (Ellis 7) 
However, the ironies of Jefferson’s legacy are not confined to the past. In his book To Save 
America: Stopping Obama's Secular-Socialist Machine, Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the 
House and architect of the 1994 “Republican Revolution,” as well as former Republican 
presidential candidate, suggests that Thomas Jefferson would stand in opposition to President 
Obama’s “progressive” and “secular” government (14). In contrast, Michael Hardt’s recent 
commentary on the Declaration of Independence sets out to “reclaim” Jefferson by placing the 
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Declaration of Independence in line with the revolutionary writings of Marx and Lenin. Hardt 
explains that Jefferson, despite being so intimately connected to the “anti-revolutionary 
vocation” of the United States, can “help us move beyond some of the obstacles to thinking 
about revolution today” (vii). Consequently, Jefferson’s lack of a partisan home, Ellis suggests, 
has resulted in Jefferson being “America’s Everyman,” a “free-floating icon” whose words and 
ideas provide a rhetorical topos that transcends political categories (7).   
While the use of Jefferson and his ideas in political discourse is an interesting question, 
what is of interest here is how Jefferson seems so easily to violate our categories of liberal and 
republican, right and left, or conservative and progressive. In the age of the Tea Party and 
Occupy Wall Street, two movements that themselves have questioned both our thinking about 
and practice of partisan politics, it might serve us well, as an alternative, to (re)examine 
Jefferson’s connection to a politics that actively seeks to transgress these categories: anarchism.  
As strange as this might seem, the connection between anarchism and Jefferson is an old 
one. Indeed, looking through anarchist literature reveals a common affinity between Jefferson 
and anarchism. For example, the 19
th
 century American radical—and first to embrace anarchism 
as a political category and project in the United States—Benjamin Tucker argued that an 
anarchist is simply an “unterrified Jeffersonian democrat” (“The Anarchist View of the 
Expansion Question” 14). Moreover, Mortimer Adler described Jefferson as a “philosophical 
anarchist” (378). Paul Goodman’s own anarchism was greatly indebted to Jefferson; he called 
the American Revolution the “only achieved liberation movement” (59). On the whole, Noam 
Chomsky suggests, “Anarchist thinkers have constantly referred to the American experience and 
to the ideal of Jeffersonian democracy very favorably” (135). After all, it was Jefferson who 
penned the Declaration of Independence, a document that makes it the right and duty of citizens 
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to “throw off” any government that prevents “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (16-
17). 
However, Ellis suggests that the idea that a government would ever be able to not 
infringe upon these self-evident and inalienable rights “is a wildly idealistic message, the kind of 
good news simply too good to be true” (8-9). According to Ellis, Jefferson’s words in the 
Declaration are “a recipe for anarchy” (9). So, the question becomes: how can a document be 
both a foundational text for a nation-state, as well as an anarchist tract? Ellis answers, rather self-
assuredly, “But, of course, the words were not intended to serve as an operational political 
blueprint. Jefferson was not a profound political thinker. He was, however, an utterly brilliant 
political rhetorician and visionary” (9).  
The insinuation here is that the paradox of the Declaration of Independence just 
described—and maybe Thomas Jefferson’s “ideological promiscuity” as a whole—is thanks to 
his being a brilliant rhetorician. In particular, Ellis argues that “[t]he genius of his vision is to 
propose that our deepest yearnings for personal freedom are in fact attainable. The genius of his 
rhetoric is to articulate irreconcilable human urges at a sufficiently abstract level to mask their 
mutual exclusiveness” (9). For Ellis, in other words, Jefferson’s rhetoric, replete with 
abstraction, pointed to an egalitarian vision of human existence, and, as such, suggests that 
government is unnecessary. To put it another way, Jefferson’s rhetoric was anarchic, and thus 
unfit for the work of creating and maintaining a new nation. That is, on the one hand Jefferson is 
a Founding Father, the patriarch who laid the foundation for a new nation, while on the other 
hand, he is an obstinate son, an heir to Continental radical thought who sought to overthrow the 
rule of the British fatherland. Starting with this idea, I want to examine Jefferson’s rhetoric in 
order to figure out what exactly makes Jefferson’s rhetoric anarchic. In short, why has Jefferson 
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become a rhetorical topos for American anarchists and radicals? This will entail pointing to the 
Declaration of Independence as an example of “anarchy in action” before connecting the 
resultant rhetoric to the tradition of political anarchism. To make this connection, I will turn to 
Hugh Blair’s rhetorical theory and the writings of the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker. 
Finally, this essay will situate an anarchist Jefferson within the larger scholarly debates 
surrounding Jefferson’s rhetorical and political legacy. 
A Recipe for Anarchy 
This essay began by discussing Joseph Ellis’ take on the Jeffersonian legacy, which 
included the allegation that Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence and his entire rhetorical 
program were, and are, a recipe for anarchy. While Jefferson’s connection to anarchism has been 
made explicit, what remains to be answered is “how” this recipe works, and “why” it has created 
a conflicting, ironic, and anarchic legacy. The answer to this question can be found in 
Jefferson’s view of rhetoric and its role in creating and maintaining a Stateless society. In what 
follows, I make the argument that Jefferson’s view of self-government presupposes the ability an 
individual to act rhetorically. To be specific, analogous to Jefferson’s view of republicanism, a 
society can be anarchistic only when individuals are free to make arguments that challenge the 
tendencies of the State to circumscribe rhetorical action within acceptable channels of political 
action and engagement. To that end, I will first discuss Jefferson’s view of rhetoric, before 
making the case for the Declaration of Independence as the anarchist document par excellance.  
While Jefferson was not known for being a particularly engaging or effective orator, 
Jefferson’s view of rhetoric reflected his beliefs in self-government; self-governance depends on 
the ability to act rhetorically. Stephen Browne makes a similar argument in his reading of 
Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address. Browne locates within the speech a theory of rhetoric that 
34 
 
 
exemplifies Jefferson’s republican virtue. Brown suggests Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address “is 
a rhetorical expression of the republican creed, and the republican expression of a rhetorical 
creed” (411). Although my argument will by and large concur with Browne’s, mine will posit an 
alternative definition that points to a rereading of Jefferson’s republicanism as the first 
expression of anarchism in America. To be specific, I suggest, rhetoric functioned in two ways 
within Jefferson’s republicanism: 1) it prevented the intrusion of the State on the individual by 
challenging the public/private dichotomy, which, in turn, 2) allowed for the unhindered and non-
teleological exchange of ideas. Characterized in this way, one might be able to revise Jefferson’s 
definition of republicanism to reflect his “anarchic rhetoric.” To be clear, Jefferson’s definition 
of republicanism is as follows: “government is more or less republican, in proportion as it has in 
its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of its citizens.” The role of 
rhetoric in Jefferson’s thought might provide the following alternative: society is more or less 
anarchistic, in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct 
rhetorical engagement of its citizens. 
In a well-known letter to Edward Carrington, one can see Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric is 
both the basis of self-government, and the check on the State’s expansion and intrusion on self-
government. Jefferson suggests that “[t]he basis of our governments being the opinion of the 
people, the very first object should be to keep that right” (24). The way to “keep that right” and 
foster anarchy is to uphold the unhindered exchange of arguments. Jefferson specifically 
identifies the newspaper as the organ that fosters this two-pronged process. He writes, “were it 
left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter” (24). This free-
exchange of arguments provides the defense against the concentration of power in the State and 
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encourages self-governance. “I am persuaded myself,” Jefferson writes, “that the good sense of 
the people will always be found to be the best army” (24). Therefore, a Stateless society suggests 
a rhetorical society; anarchy is a State of rhetoric.   
In the same letter, Jefferson famously points to the Native Americans as exemplars of 
rhetoric and anarchy. He writes:  
I am convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government enjoy 
in the general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under 
the European governments. Among the former, public opinion is in the place of law, & 
restrains morals as powerfully as laws ever did anywhere. Among the latter, under 
pretence of governing they have divided their nations into two classes, wolves and 
sheeps. I do not exaggerate. (24).  
Jefferson’s embrace of rhetoric and a State-less society is not limited to his private 
correspondences. Jefferson also makes the connection between rhetoric and a Stateless society in 
his Notes on the State of Virginia, the only book Jefferson published during his lifetime. The 
Native Americans “astonish you with the most sublime oratory; such as prove their reason and 
sentiment strong, their imagination glowing and elevated” (135). In fact, for Jefferson, the 
speech made against Lord Dunmore, the colonial Governor of the State of Virginia, by Logan, a 
Native American Chief, surpasses the greatness of the ancients. He writes, “I may challenge the 
whole orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, and of any more eminent orator, if Europe has 
furnished more eminent, to produce a single passage, superior to the speech of Logan, a Mingo 
chief, to Lord Dunmore, the governor of this State [Virginia]” (Notes 60). Jefferson’s favor, 
though, is not isolated to the Native Americans. In a letter to Abraham Small, he writes that the 
“unanswerable speech of Carnot” against Napoleon Bonaparte is another exemplary rhetorical 
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performance. Describing Carnot’s speech, Jefferson asserts, “This creed of republicanism should 
be well translated, and placed in the hands and heart of every friend to the rights of self-
government” (“To Abraham Small” 347). It is no coincidence that Jefferson commends these 
two speeches. They are both made against State powers, and, as such, also exhibit the ability to 
self-govern. They can be said to reflect Jefferson’s “republican ethos, which according to 
Browne in his discussion of the First Inaugural Address, aims to “reveal the delusion of others, 
correct their errors, [and] remind them of the republican way” (426). It is clear, then, that for 
Jefferson, anarchy depends on rhetoric, and rhetoric depends on anarchy.     
Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric also echoes against the work of Hugh Blair, a theorist whose 
work was widely read in America during the eighteenth-century, and who along with the works 
of Richard Whately and George Campbell, according to James Berlin, best reflected America’s 
belief in “individualism, equality, and self-government” (33). Jefferson read Blair’s work and 
recommended it to those interested in oratory and rhetoric. In fact, when Jefferson sold his 
library to the U.S. Government in 1815 to form the Library of Congress, Blair’s Lectures was 
included. In one of the few pieces to deal directly with Jefferson’s contribution to rhetorical 
theory, Berman and McClintock posit that one of Jefferson’s contributions to rhetorical theory is 
his insistence on the importance of Blair’s work (7). Jefferson, one might reasonably presume, 
would agree with Blair’s evaluation of “eloquence” in Ancient Greece and Rome. Blair defined 
“eloquence” as “the art persuasion,” and “[i]t is not till the rise of the Grecian republics that we 
find any remarkable appearances of eloquence as the art of persuasion” (238). Athens became 
the birthplace of eloquence because, according to Blair, “The genius of their government was 
entirely democratical; their legislature consisted of the whole body of the people” (239). To no 
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surprise, then, the downfall of oratory and eloquence among the Romans was due to the 
expansion of State power. Blair writes:  
Under their government, it was naturally to be expected that taste would be corrupted, 
and genius discouraged. Some of the ornamental arts, less intimately connected with 
liberty, continued, for a while to prevail; but for that masculine eloquence, which had 
exercised itself in the senate, and in the public affairs, there was no longer any place. 
(249)    
Thus, we find in both Jefferson and Blair the notion that rhetorical engagement—the free 
exchange of arguments by and among self-governing individuals, which also serves as the 
foundation of a Stateless society—decreases in proportion to the rise of government. 
In what follows, I further the connection between rhetoric and political anarchism via a 
reading of the Declaration of Independence. Doing so will begin to lay the foundation for the 
concept I aim to develop throughout the proceeding chapters: “anarchic rhetoric.” 
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Rhetoric     
To trace the influence of Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence would require volumes. 
In the history of modern politics, its mark has been indelible. David Armitage notes that “more 
than two centuries since 1776, over half the countries of the world have their own declarations of 
independence” (3). More to the point, during the composition of these other Declarations, “many 
of these documents drew directly on American Declaration for inspiration. They adopted and 
sometimes adapted specific phrases from the Declaration. More often, they took its structure as a 
model for their own” (3). However, as was suggested in the opening pages of this essay, there is 
a certain irony in this situation. In his hostile “review” of the Declaration, Jeremy Bentham, 
foreshadowing the views of later American anarchists and highlighting the ironic function of the 
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document, argues that if one were to follow the Declaration to its logical conclusion “[t]here 
never was, never can be, established, any government on earth” (180). Despite, Bentham’s 
allegation, the Declaration of Independence has repeatedly operated as a founding document for 
hundreds of governments. Thus, the Declaration is a liminal document. It simultaneously calls 
into question the State, but also operates as a foundational document for many Nation-States. It 
is both arkhê-istic and an-arkhê-istic. The following analysis suggests that this indeterminate 
space reveals Jefferson’s anarchism. This anarchic rhetoric reflects a “self-evident” overstepping 
of the State that has prohibited individual rhetorical action, or what Fliegelman calls the “public 
revelation of a private self” (24), and a non-teleological development of self-government. While 
these many of these ideas have already been discussed, the following section examines how the 
Declaration—the document that has come to be synonymous with Jefferson—embodies and 
plays out Jefferson’s anarchic rhetoric. For it is these facets that give Jefferson and his 
Declaration their continuing influence and anarchic function.   
The syllogistic structure of the text lays bare its appeal. The structure of the Declaration, 
by and large, is a list of “facts” that seek to prove “the establishment of an absolute tyranny over 
these States” in order to “dissolve the political bands” between the Colonies and England (“The 
Declaration of Independence” 16-17). These “facts,” however, take the form of wrongs when 
judged against the major premise of the Declaration: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, 
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (17). Moreover, 
governments derive their powers from people and are formed “among men” in order to “secure 
these rights.” The minor premise is a list of “injuries,” “usurpations,” and “invasions” made by 
the British on these “self-evident” rights. The logical conclusion of these two premises is that the 
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British government, because they have violated the “unalienable Rights” of mankind, must be 
thrown-off. 
The “self-evident” truths contained in the major premise of the syllogism reveal the 
Declaration’s profound anti-metaphysics, a dominant theme of the Enlightenment era. That is, 
recognizing government intrusion on “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” does not 
presuppose an appeal to a Platonic figuration of right or wrong. As Willis and Fliegelman argue, 
the Declaration reflects the epoch’s reliance on the tropes of “common sense” or “self-evident” 
truths provided by the Scottish Moral Sense Philosophers of Hutchinson, Kames, and Reid, as 
well as John Locke. Regarding the effectiveness of the “self-evident” truths in the Declaration’s 
syllogistic structure, Fliegelman argues that “syllogisms grounded on self-evident truths 
furnished their own eloquence, required no argumentation, and freed the Declaration from the 
charge of innovation or individualistic utterances” (51). Similarly, Alain Badiou’s recent works 
point to the power of politics founded on axioms or self-evident truths. A political decision 
stemming from an axiom, Badiou writes, “tears itself away from any dialectic of the subjective 
and the objective…The beginning, under its evental injunction, is pure declaration” (qtd in 
Hallward 772). A self-evident declaration is disruptive and resists any metaphysical or dialectical 
logos. In other words, such a view evokes Aristotle’s characterization of “contentious reasoning” 
or “sophistical refutations,” which, unlike dialectical exchange that reasons from “opinions that 
are generally accepted” in order to arrive at the “true” and “primary,” are disruptive/contentious 
to the search for the “true” and “primary” because they reason from opinions that are not 
generally accepted or “merely [seem] to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally 
accepted” (Aristotle 188).   
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Fliegelman also suggests that the form and content of the Declaration enact Jefferson’s 
desire to “believe in Bacon’s inductive dream” (53). By endowing the deductive syllogism with 
seemingly inductive content, the Declaration reframes the “Aristotelian commonplaces to a basis 
in self-evident truth [that] paralleled the simultaneous sanctioning and containing of nonrational 
appeals effected by the concept of a natural language” (51-52). In other words, Jefferson adopted 
a rhetorical approach based on the Enlightenment ideals, which, according to Wilbur Samuel 
Howell, “delivered its ideas by the method of science to a generation which greatly respected 
scientific standards of thought and expression” (214). The result of Jefferson’s approach is a 
document that exists between, as Fliegelman notes, “transcendent representativeness and 
personal revelation…between rational persuasion and affective appeals; between logic and 
rhetoric…between argument and self-evidence” (190). The result is a liminal document that 
reflects the eighteenth century epistemology wherein “[t]he old distinction between dialectic as 
the discipline of learned discourse and rhetoric as the discipline of popular discourse is destroyed 
(Berlin 769); it is both profoundly rhetorical in that it makes a deductive argument about the role 
of government, as well as anti-rhetorical because of its reliance on seemingly unarguable 
axiomatic, “self-evident” truths.                  
A close examination of the minor premise—the list of wrongs committed by the British 
Government against the colonists—reveals that the majority of the wrongs concern the 
prohibition of self-government qua rhetorical action. Like those scholars such as Maier and 
Willis who find distinct categories within the list of allegations, I find three groups pertaining to 
the prohibition of rhetoric by the King. They can be classified as 1) Platonic preclusions of 
rhetoric, 2) spatial and temporal restrictions on rhetorical engagement, and 3) acts of violence. 
For example, the Declaration reads: “He [King George] has refused to pass other Laws for the 
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accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of 
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only” 
(17). The Colonists are prevented from self-governance because of the will of King George, 
which acts as an immutable and transcendent form that bars any rhetorical/political alternative. 
The ability of the Colonists to construct political arguments in opposition to the King is 
forbidden. To further prevent this process, King George “has dissolved Representative Houses 
repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people” (17). 
This dissolving of “Representative Houses,” places where individuals engage in deliberation and 
debate, was, in effect, an effort to prevent the gathering of individuals in order to stifle and 
prevent rhetorical engagement. Lastly, the Declaration lists several incidents of violence. For 
instance, “He [King George] has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and 
destroyed the lives of our people” (18). Taken together, these three categories underscore the 
extent to which the Declaration—and the American Revolution itself—represent a conflict over 
the ability to pose arguments that question the legitimacy of the State. Furthermore, the 
Declaration also acknowledges the King’s recognition of the anarchic function of rhetorical 
engagement and his desire to keep argument within certain bounds. Judged against the major 
premise of the Declaration, the list of wrongs clearly demonstrates two motivations for declaring 
independence: 1) King George has violated the right to “life” by physically attacking the 
Colonists, and 2) limited “liberty” (rhetorical action) through the invocation of immutable 
conceptions of the “good” or “just,” as well as the placing of spatial and temporal strictures on 
the colonists’ ability to self-govern and question the State.  
What, then, is left of the third term? For Jefferson, simply having the rights of life and 
liberty do not promote happiness. Reflecting the republican ideal of participatory governance, 
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Jefferson recognizes that it is the exercising of these rights through self-governance that leads to 
happiness. Recalling Jefferson’s valorization of the Native Americans and their anarchistic 
communities, it is clear that when it comes to the “pursuit of happiness,” Jefferson believes that 
rhetorical engagement among individuals is its sine qua non. According to Jefferson, “I am 
convinced that those societies (as the Indians) which live without government enjoy in the 
general mass an infinitely greater degree of happiness than those who live under the European 
governments (“Letter to Edward Carrington” 24). If decentralization and permanent revolution—
two tenants of anarchistic politics—is created and maintained through rhetorical action and just 
government is that which is “most likely to effect…Safety and Happiness,” then the pursuit of 
rhetoric within the anarchy is the basis for happiness. Such a sentiment is echoed by Paul 
Goodman:  
[A]s Thomas Jefferson pointed out, only such an organization of society is self-
improving; we learn by doing, and the only way to educate co-operative citizens is to 
give power to people as they are. Except in unusual circumstances, there is not much 
need for dictators, deans, police, pre-arranged curricula, imposed schedules, conscription, 
coercive laws. Free people easily agree among themselves on plausible working rules; 
they listen to expert direction when necessary; they wisely choose pro tem leaders. 
Remove authority, and there will be self-regulation, not chaos. (94)    
For one to retain his/her liberty by resisting the growth and reach of the State, one must exercise 
that same liberty by engaging in the anarchic rhetorical process. 
In short, a rhetoric grounded in self-evident truths is what gives the Declaration its lasting 
appeal. Self-evident truths are unarguable, yet their abstractness leaves them empty. As a result, 
the Declaration is a seemingly “empty” document with its content left to be supplied by a rhetor. 
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Moreover, because the Declaration reflects what Darren Staloff calls the Enlightenment’s 
“metaphysical disenchantment,” it creates an egalitarian vision of politics. To put it another way, 
Howell argues that the Declaration “employed the forms of philosophical address at a time when 
such forms were believed equal to the tasks of persuasion and appropriate as means of 
expressing the doctrine of human rights” (214). As such, the Declaration permits anyone and 
everyone to make arguments about the justness of government. The text, then, because of its call 
for rhetorical action, models its own ideal. If individuals have the ability to act rhetorically, and 
rhetoric plays an an-arkhê-istic function by unmasking and calling into question the metaphysical 
and political arkhê that unjustly determine and limit the actions of individuals, while also serving 
as the grounding for anarchist communities, the Declaration, when put into rhetorical action, is 
the anarchistic and an-arkhê-istic document par excellance. 
“The earth belongs always to the living” 
Although I have been making the case for an anarchist Jefferson, even a cursory look at 
Jefferson’s writings suggest that he saw a role for government, albeit a very particular role. 
While this may seem to put Jefferson at odds with anarchism—or at least its common 
connotation as the complete lack of government and organization—in what follows, I hope to 
suggest that Jefferson’s vision of government, which includes concrete proposals for the 
organizing of a society and its institutions, does not put him at odds with anarchism. On the 
contrary, Jefferson’s vision of government, which reflects his resistance to institutionalized 
government—the State—actually lays the foundation for the politics of the first American 
anarchist Benjamin Tucker and consequently allows us to rethink Jefferson and anarchism’s 
contribution to radical thought.  
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Jefferson suggests that government can be—and should be—dynamic, voluntary, and 
subject to change depending on the will of those people who will be directly affected by it. In the 
most pointed lines of the Declaration, Jefferson makes clear his view of government. He asserts: 
Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends [life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness], it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, & institute new 
government, laying it’s [sic] foundation on such principles & organizing it’s [sic] power 
in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. (The 
Declaration of Independence 10)  
Reflecting this notion, Jefferson advocated for republican arrangements that would minimize the 
concentration of power and allow for democratic self-government. In a letter to Joseph C. Cabell, 
Jefferson proposes that “the way to have a good and safe government, is not to trust it all to one, 
but to divide it among the many” (62). This means continuously dividing and subdividing the 
nation into states, counties, and wards with each division having certain responsibilities that were 
appropriate to it. Important to Jefferson’s idea of government was the notion that the higher up 
an institution was on the republican ladder, the less power and influence it had over the 
multitude. The aim, according to Jefferson, was to trust “fewer and fewer powers in proportion 
as the trustees became more and more oligarchical” (“To Joseph C. Cabell” 62).    
Of all these divisions, however, the power rests in the hands of individuals, who, through 
their direct participation in their local wards, would have the opportunity to exercise his/her 
liberty and self-govern. Jefferson’s ward system would create an environment where “the voice 
of the whole people would be thus fairly, fully, and peaceably discussed, and decided by the 
common reason of the society” (“To Samuel Kercheval” 75). Reflecting (rather gleefully) on his 
idea, Jefferson suggests, “These wards, called townships in New England, are the vital principle 
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of their governments, and have proved themselves the wisest invention ever devised by the wit of 
man for the perfect exercise of self-government, and for its preservation” (“To Samuel 
Kercheval” 71). Jefferson’s very definition of republicanism reflects his beliefs in liberty and 
self-government. Acknowledging that definitions have been “very vague,” Jefferson offers a 
rather succinct account of his own republicanism: 
Were I to assign this term a precise and definite idea, I would, purely and simply, it 
means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to 
rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less 
republican, in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the 
direct action of its citizens. (“To John Taylor” 65) 
What is called Jefferson’s republicanism, then, is a radically democratic program that seeks to 
prevent the rise of an inherently unjust State by democratically allowing everyday citizens to 
exercise their liberty by participating in the debates that would directly impact them and their 
locale. The direct participation of citizens in the governing process would ensure that there exists 
a plurality of opinions, ideas, and debates, which would also prevent the stagnation of the same. 
Michael Hardt suggests that “Jefferson’s insistence, in particular, on the direct action of the 
population in government—not through representatives determined by election or otherwise—is 
one element that make this a radically democratic conception” (xv). In other words, a republican 
arrangement of society would give individuals the opportunity to participate in the free-market of 
argument and debate and represent their own concerns and interests.  
Yet, republican arrangements in and of themselves will not preserve liberty and promote 
self-governance. Implicit in Jefferson’s republican-ward system is what has often been said to be 
Jefferson’s contribution to radical thought. To be specific, several scholars, particularly Richard 
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Matthews and Michael Hardt, have argued that the nexus of Jefferson’s radicalism rests in his 
notion that only the living can decide their politics. Jefferson argues that the dead have no rights, 
thus cannot dictate and/or influence the politics of the living. As a result, individuals must 
continually rebel and revolt in order to determine their own “living” politics. He writes, “The 
earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from 
it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are master too of their own persons, and 
consequently may govern them as they please” (“To James Madison” 56). As a result of such a 
belief, it follows that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law” 
(“To James Madison” 56). Jefferson’s view stands in sharp contrast to those such as John 
Adams’, who argued that a just republic is an “empire of laws, not of men” (Adams 236). In 
other words, apart from the impracticality of representative government, the notion that there can 
be created a document or institution that acts as a transcendent and everlasting arbiter between 
individuals and/or individuals and the State is unjust. To prevent this injustice, Jefferson suggests 
that “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally, expires at the end of 19 years. If it be 
enforced longer, it is an act of force and not of right” (“To James Madison” 57). Such a 
principle—what Hardt calls the “eternal return” of rebellion (xiii)—prevents the concentration of 
governmental power in the form of the State, as well as its negative effects on individuals, 
which, in turn, allows for self-governance. Hardt notes that for Jefferson, “rebellion has an 
intrinsic value, regardless of the justness of its specific grievances and goals. Periodic rebellion is 
necessary to guarantee the health of a society and preserve public freedom” (xiii). Thus, 
Jefferson’s ward-republics undergirded by a philosophy of constant and continual revolution 
would be the best arrangement to both foster self-government and prevent the rise of a despotic 
State.  
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Jefferson’s views—unjust government as an intrusion on liberty, continual rebellion as a 
duty of the populace, decentralized political power—allow the opportunity for the full exercise 
of one’s liberty and ability to self-govern, while also staving off State power. Summarizing this 
idea, Jefferson writes:  
Where every man is a sharer in the direction of his ward-republic, or of some of the 
higher ones, and feels that he is a participator in the government of affairs, not merely at 
an election one day in the year, but every day; when there shall not be a man in the State 
who will not be a member of some one of its councils, great or small, will he let the heart 
be torn out of his body sooner that his be wrested from him by a Caesar or a Bonaparte. 
(“To Joseph C. Cabell” 63)   
Jefferson’s ideal political arrangement—anarchy—sought to allow for individuals to willingly 
and directly participate in the managing of the public’s affairs, which, because it was also 
localized, was bound to matter and affect him/her directly. It would also stave off the 
establishment of static and coercive political, social, and/or economic arraignments. In short, the 
anarchist Paul Goodman seems to capture the spirit of Jefferson’s anarchism when he posits that 
anarchism “is always a continual coping with the next situation, and vigilance to make sure that 
past freedoms are not lost and do not turn into the opposite, as free-enterprise turned into-wage 
slavery and monopoly capitalism, or the independent judiciary turned into a monopoly of courts, 
cops, and lawyers, or free education turned into School Systems” (56).       
Jefferson’s republicanism, which includes concrete proposals for the arranging of a 
society, foreshadows the anarchism of Benjamin Tucker. Throughout his lifetime, Tucker would 
attack the “monopoly,” which he defined as: 
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any person corporation, or institution whose right to engage in any given pursuit of life is 
secured, either wholly or partially, by any agency whatsoever—whether the nature of 
things or the force of events or the decree of arbitrary power,—against the influence of 
competition (qtd. in Martin 210). 
As a remedy, Tucker would advocate government by “non-compulsive organization” and 
“associative combination” (qtd. in Martin 218): self-government. Like Jefferson, Tucker 
recognized that liberty could only be exercised and maintained by voluntarily and directly 
engaging with other individuals who, being non-coerced and willing themselves, also recognized 
some benefit in the interaction. In short, people were free to establish groups and institutions as 
long as they served particular purposes, were dissolved after those purposes were met, and did 
not intrude on the liberty of others. 
It is clear that Jefferson’s political philosophy and the republican arrangements that 
reflected it seem at home within the anarchist tradition. Although the anarchist Rudolf Rocker 
places Jefferson in the liberal tradition, he argues that, along with Thomas Paine, Jefferson laid 
the foundation for American anarchism: “The anarchism which developed on American soil has 
its starting point in the philosophic ideas of the Eighteenth Century which circulated in England 
and were brought here by the Fathers of this country and were modified under the influence of a 
new environment” (155). As an alternative to the State, Jefferson posited a non-teleological 
process of continual rebellion and rebuilding: permanent revolution. Moreover, as has been 
shown, Tucker recognized the anarchist strands of Jefferson’s thought. It was also Tucker who 
argued that “[t]he Anarchists are simply unterrified Jeffersonian democrats” (“State Socialism: 
How Far they Agree and Wherein the Differ” 13). 
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“Unterrified Jeffersonian Democrat” 
While Jefferson himself would not have been aware of anything called the anarchist 
movement (anarchism was first embraced in America as a political program by Benjamin Tucker 
in the 19
th
 century), his politics has distinct shades of anarchism. Jefferson was a seminal figure 
among the American anarchists of the nineteenth-century. The anarchist Benjamin Tucker, 
whose quote serves as the epigraph of this essay, made the anarchism-Jefferson connection in no 
uncertain terms in Liberty, the journal he both edited and published for nearly thirty years. In 
fact, included in the journal’s promotional material was a quote from Samuel Cooper, a 
Philadelphia lawyer, which read: “Liberty is a journal that Thomas Jefferson would have loved” 
(qtd in. Tucker, “Advertisement 3” 7). Thus, to make solid the connection between anarchism 
and Jefferson explicit we can look to Liberty and the work of Benjamin Tucker.  
On December 9
th, 1882, Tucker published a brief piece titled “Anarchism and Consent” 
that links Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence with an anarchist rejection of government by 
tacit consent. The piece begins by pointing to the strange acceptance of the Declaration among 
“law and order” aristocrats in the U.S. and Europe. Tucker suggests that among such circles, the 
Declaration represents “a chimera of generalities imbibed by Jefferson through familiar contact 
with French atheists” (2). This reputation is ironic, Tucker suggests, as the Declaration has 
“numerous internal evidences to show that, were Thomas Jefferson living to-day [sic], he would 
be a pronounced anarchist” (“Anarchism and Consent” 2). To make this connection Tucker 
draws out Jefferson’s claim in the Declaration that “governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed.” According to Tucker, the logical conclusion of this claim suggests 
that government is an unjust intrusion on the individual because consent to be governed was 
never rendered. He points to the Constitution’s limiting of voting rights, protection of slavery, 
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and “other constitutional bars” as instances that drastically limit those who can consent to being 
governed. The restrictions have resulted in “less than one-tenth of the whole people” having the 
opportunity to actively consent (or dissent) to being governed by the State. Therefore, according 
to Tucker, it “follows that when any individual is governed by a government without his or her 
consent, that government is exercising unjust power and is a usurpation” (2). By extending 
Jefferson’s argument in the Declaration, Tucker reaches anarchist conclusions. In short, “Under 
any conceivable interpretation of Jefferson’s talk about the consent of the governed, every 
existing government is outlawed beyond recovery, and the ‘just powers’ vanish into thin air” (2).  
Tucker’s assertion is not without warrant. Throughout Jefferson’s writings, one finds a 
profound skepticism of both the practical and ethical facets of institutionalized government. In a 
letter to James Madison, Jefferson made known his aversion to institutionalized government and 
its desire to embody the interests of a people. According to Jefferson, there is no form of 
government that is able to obtain and/or embody the will of the majority because any claim of 
complete representation is forever undercut by the inability to bring individuals together to voice 
their opinions, as well as the damning effects of personal interests when codified in laws, 
practices, and institutions:  
The people cannot assemble themselves; their representation is unequal and vicious. 
Various checks are opposed to every legislative proposition. Factions get possession of 
the public councils. Bribery corrupts them. Personal interests lead them astray from the 
general interests of the constituents. (“To James Madison” 57) 
The result of Jefferson’s claim is that a just government based on the consent and will of the 
majority is an impossibility. Peoples are too spread apart, their differences too great, and humans 
too self-interested to be fully and justly represented in a static institution.  
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Moreover, apart from being impractical, institutionalized government violates Jefferson’s 
view of individual liberty, a view that resembles and precedes the anarchist one. In outlining his 
complaints against statist governance, Jefferson also reveals his vision of just governance. That 
is, one can detect in his admonishments above, the ideals of direct participation and individual 
liberty. Liberty, according to Jefferson, is the “natural condition of human life” (Yarbrough 9). 
Moreover, synonymous with liberty is self-government. Jefferson writes, “Every man, and every 
body of men on earth, possesses the right of self-government: they receive it with their being 
from the hand of nature” (“Jefferson’s Opinion” 195). Describing this idea, Matthews observes 
that for Jefferson “[s]elf-governance is essential, vital, natural” (87). Indeed, in the draft of the 
Declaration of Independence that Jefferson included in his autobiography, he asserts that 
government is an intrusion on self-government. In reference to King George and the British 
government, he argues, “He [King George] has waged cruel war against human nature itself, 
violating it’s [sic] most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people who 
never offended him” (“Draft” 13). While these exact words were omitted from the final draft of 
the Declaration, this idea—institutionalized government as an intrusion on liberty—would 
remain in the final draft and his writings as a whole. Jefferson concludes that because humans 
are naturally endowed with liberty (the ability to self-govern), government as a static institution 
that attempts to speak for or represent an individual, robs individuals of their natural ability, and 
is thus an artifice that promotes subjugation.    
This conceptualization echoes against Tucker’s anarchism. Tucker defined liberty as 
“simply and solely the freedom and power to choose,” and government as “invasion, nothing 
more or less,” (qtd. Martin 215). The freedom and power to choose what to do with one’s 
liberty—self-govern—can only be exercised in the absence of government. More pointedly, one 
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can detect the similarity between Jefferson and Tucker in the description of the journal Liberty. 
The journal was described as “[a]n anarchistic journal, expounding the doctrine that in Equal 
Liberty is to be found the most satisfactory solution of social questions, and that majority rule, or 
democracy, equally with monarchical rule, is a denial of liberty” (“On Picket Duty” 1). Putting 
these two together, it is evident that both Tucker and Jefferson share the belief that government, 
no matter the form, is an intrusion on liberty qua the ability to self-govern. For one to be able to 
fully exercise his/her personal liberty and ability to self-govern, the State as a codified system of 
governmental institutions, must be abolished or at least severely limited. 
Jefferson suggests that a strong centralized government, based on what Gordon S. Wood 
calls “virtual representation6,” fundamentally excludes the majority of the people from 
determining their politics. This idea creates a distinction between those who can participate and 
determine the public’s affairs, and those who are excluded and left to the inferior private realm. 
One, then, finds Jefferson sounding rather like Jacques Rancière. For Rancière, as with Jefferson, 
such a politics is “an oligarchic form, a representation of minorities who are entitled to take 
charge of public affairs” (Hatred of Democracy 53). Challenging this movement means creating 
and fostering a democratic “movement that ceaselessly displaces the limits of the public and the 
private, of the political and the social” (Hatred of Democracy 62). While we have already 
outlined Jefferson’s own democratic challenge, we have yet to situate the resulting anarchist 
Jefferson within the larger scholarly debates surrounding his political and rhetorical legacies. 
                                                 
6
 Wood describes “virtual representation” as the dominant political ideology of the 
eighteenth-century, which suggested that the populace could be represented in governmental and 
public institutions by individuals who—because of their “disinterestedness”—would embody 
and carry-out the will of the public good. “Virtual representation” was placed against “actual 
representation,” a profound “mistrust” of elected officials to represent individual interests. Wood 
claims that “American democracy grew out of this pervasive mistrust” (30)  
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Liberal, Republican, Anarchist 
 The divergent use of Thomas Jefferson in political discourse has only been 
paralleled by the scholarly interpretations of Jefferson and the other Founding Fathers. While the 
conventional wisdom has always suggested that Jefferson was a model Lockean, the twentieth 
century saw the proliferation of a variety of competing interpretations. Describing the many 
alternatives to a Lockean Jefferson, Forest McDonald points to: 
a Bolingbrokean and English Oppositionist Jefferson (Lance Banning), a Scottish 
Enlightenment moral-sense Jefferson a la Frances Hutcheson (Garry Wills), a Scottish 
Enlightenment rationalist Jefferson a la Thomas Reid (Morton White), an antimodern 
agrarian expansionist Jefferson (Drew McCoy), and a champion of commercialism and 
capitalism Jefferson (Joyce Appleby). (396-397) 
Despite all of the ink that has been spilled trying to place Jefferson in this or that paradigm, it has 
done little to explain his status as a “free-floating icon.” In fact, it more or less has contributed to 
Jefferson’s indeterminacy. That is, it would be hard to imagine the Populists evoking the 
“champion of commercialism and capitalism” Jefferson. Moreover, the scholarly debates 
surrounding Jefferson’s politics do little to explain Jefferson’s anarchist appeal.  
Richard Matthews, however, provides a counterpoint to the Jefferson debates, while also 
providing a substantive grounding to the anarchist claim. Matthews argues in his 1984 book that 
Jefferson’s political philosophy provides an alternative to both the liberal and republican 
interpretation of Jefferson in the form of a radically democratic and communitarian anarchism 
(16-18). Against those such as Joyce Appleby, Carl Becker, and Louis Hartz who argue that 
Jefferson’s Declaration is a rehashing of Locke’s Second Treatise, which, in turn, also laid the 
groundwork for America’s “unique brand of market liberalism,” Matthews suggests that 
54 
 
 
Jefferson’s “vehement arguments against economic exploitation and in favor of substantive 
economic and political freedom” points to Jefferson’s inherent humanism. Jefferson’s reverence 
of the Native Americans, Matthews also argues, reveals Jefferson’s “communitarian anarchism,” 
while his figuration of “permanent revolution” suggests a radically democratic vision of self-
governance. Although Matthews targets most explicitly the liberal interpretation of Jefferson, he 
is not willing to align himself with those who advocate a republican Jefferson. Pointing to the 
work of J.G.A. Pocock, Matthews notes that while “the language of the civic-humanist paradigm 
is indeed helpful for understanding Jefferson,” “his ideal human would balance the public and 
the private, for a life totally devoted to either would be less than fully human” (17).  
Likewise, Jay Fliegelman, in his situating of Jefferson among the “world of eighteenth-
century theories and practices of rhetoric,” concurs with Matthews’s assertion regarding the 
balance between public and private. He points to Jefferson and the Declaration as being 
emblematic of an “oratorical revolution” that is of “greater significance than his [Jefferson’s] 
indebtedness to Locke or Hutchinson” (4). Fliegelman locates a shift in rhetorical theory and 
practice that “sought to replace artificial language with natural language and to make writing 
over in the image of speaking” (24). The result was the collapsing of the public/private binary: 
Once a decorous, rule-governed, and class specific behavior that articulated the public 
virtues of civic-humanism—the honor of the office and the public good—public speaking 
became reconceptualized in the mid eighteenth century as an occasion for the public 
revelation of a private self. (24) 
In doing so, the “oratorical revolution” largely leveled the playing for rhetorical and political 
action. By questioning the public/private binary, the “oratorical revolution,” Fliegelman argues, 
allowed for the “declaring of independence” (24-25). These shifts in rhetoric sanctioned the 
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ability of anyone and everyone to make political arguments that question the legitimacy of 
government while also expressing their own personal wants and beliefs.  
Formulated in this light, eighteenth-century rhetoric existed as something of an aporia. 
Fliegelman posits:  
The oratorical revolution was rife with internal conflicts—between self-control and 
passionate expression…between transcendent representativeness and personal 
revelation…between rational persuasion and affective appeals; between logic and 
rhetoric…between argument and self-evidence. (190) 
As such, rhetoric possessed a certain deconstructive force that undid the epistemological and 
metaphysical assumptions of the eighteenth-century. Fliegelman claims, “The oratorical ideal 
that loomed so large in the America of 1776 presumed to contain or mediate these conflicts” 
(190). He continues by suggesting that the ways in which rhetoric served as a site for these 
conflicts has been “historically neglected” despite being a “crucial battleground of American 
Revolutionary culture” (190).   
In his reading of Jefferson’s famous letter to Maria Cosway, Jeremy Engels locates in the 
tension between the calls political rationality and irrational romanticism that characterized the 
later eighteenth century a rhetoric that leads to political anarchism. He writes, “Jefferson did not 
fear anarchy per se but its consequences: that anarchy would yield powerful rhetorical 
justifications for despotism” (429). Against the conclusions of Matthews and Fliegelman, Engels 
suggests that although Jefferson clearly demonstrates anarchist tendencies, Jefferson is also 
quick to temper those tendencies by calling for a rational and enlightened educational program 
that would enable the polis to operate within a republican society and avoid the pitfalls of a 
pejorative anarchism characterized by relativism and irrationality.  
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Conclusion 
Jefferson’s distrust of the State and his embrace of rhetoric in challenging that power, 
sustaining individual liberty, and producing happiness hold sway for contemporary rhetorical and 
political theory. The continual appropriation of Jefferson’s image and writings among various 
radical groups, today’s Tea Party being the most obvious, as well as the recent expunging of 
Jefferson from social studies text books by the Texas legislature, suggests that Jefferson’s 
political thought represents a challenge to State and institutionalized power while also acting as 
the animus for anarchy in America.  
The following chapters will sharpen our understanding of this rhetoric “without content” 
and underscore its shifting allegiances. That is, like Jefferson, anarchic rhetoric has no partisan 
home, and, as such, has been used by those on the right and left of the political spectrum. Before 
elaborating on this claim, though, chapter two will trace Jefferson’s influence on the nineteenth 
century anarchists by grounding anarchic rhetoric within the debates and polemics following the 
Chicago Haymarket bombing in order to more fully develop our understanding of this concept. 
Specifically, chapter two will examine the anarchist Benjamin Tucker’s response to the events at 
Haymarket in order to connect anarchic rhetoric with Adam Smith and his figuration of 
“sympathy.” Chapter two will be followed up by a discussion of the Marxist C.L.R. James’s 
appropriation of anarchic rhetoric during the middle of the twentieth century. The final chapter 
will take up the recent resurgence of anarchic rhetoric by today’s Tea Party. The second half of 
chapter four will discuss the implications of anarchic rhetoric for contemporary critical, 
rhetorical, and political theory.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
IMAGINING COLLECTIVITY: TASTE, SYMPATHY, AND THE “ENDS” OF 
ANARCHIC RHETORIC 
 “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no 
idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what ourselves 
should feel in the like situation” (Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
9). 
 
“‘Mind your own business’” is its [anarchism’s] only moral law (Benjamin 
Tucker, “State Socialism” 15). 
 
We established in chapter one that Thomas Jefferson’s republicanism points to a societal 
arrangement with a rhetorical grounding. In order to best foster liberty and stave off intrusions on 
that liberty, Jefferson suggests that a free and happy society must take as its rasion d’etre the 
dynamic exchange of ideas among its members. Specifically, by revising Jefferson’s own 
definition of republicanism, we established that a society is considered anarchistic in proportion 
to the engagement of its members in determining their own politics. The opposite of this 
figuration—the attempt to circumscribe rhetorical action within the State—is an intrusion on and 
usurpation of liberty.  
And while in the last chapter we began to spell out the differences between these two 
competing figurations of rhetorical action—one which is dependent on the State form and the 
other which seeks to undermine it—we by and large focused on rhetoric’s general (and ideal) 
role within an anarchist society. Regarding anarchic rhetoric and its role in creating and 
maintaining a Stateless society much remains to be parsed. Expanding on this issue, though, 
means tackling the most common critique of anarchism, which, according to our logic here, 
echoes the Platonic critique of rhetoric: how can anarchism (rhetoric) be theorized as a positive 
societal arrangement instead of pure chaos and moral relativism? That is, if the critique of 
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anarchism (and rhetoric) is that it lacks all transcendent arbiters—the State, Truth, God—and 
these arbiters serve to prevent anarchy (in both its positive and pejorative senses), how can one 
expect equitable interaction within such a society? In short, what can be said about the “ends” of 
these competing rhetorics when it comes to questions of persuasion and ethics?  
This essay will argue that “sympathy” represents the rhetorical and political “end” of 
anarchism, which might be contrasted against what I will refer to as the “dialectical empathy” 
that is prominent in much liberal and Marxist thought. My conceptualization of “dialectical 
empathy” will allow me to connect two views, which, at first blush, seem rather dissimilar: 
Plato’s view of dialectical rhetoric and Marx’s view of historical materialism. In turning to this 
binary, I hope to add to the discourse(s) known as the “affective turn” in critical and rhetorical 
studies, which has sought to theorize non-representational logics of solidarity, community, and 
politics in the wake of poststructuralist thought. Indeed, as Brian Massumi has suggested, “There 
seems to be a growing feeling…that affect is central for an understanding of our information- 
and image- based late capitalist culture, in which so-called master narratives have been perceived 
to have foundered” (18). Yet, in contradistinction to Deleuze and Guttari or Hardt and Negri, all 
of whom turn to Spinoza to connect the affective and political, I turn to Adam Smith and his 
concept of “sympathy,” which may prove more useful in thinking about affect’s role in ushering 
in political and social change. To be specific, I hope to show that anarchic rhetoric, with its 
seeming rejection of all forms of representation, reliance on axiomatic truths, and dynamic 
exchange of ideas, takes Adam Smith’s figuration of “sympathy” as its goal.  
I will make this argument by examining the response of the individualist anarchists 
located in and around Boston to the Chicago Haymarket Affair. The Haymarket Affair produced 
a unique rhetorical situation whereby the followers of anarchism were left to combat the public’s 
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outrage against anarchism, as well as continue to propound the anarchist agenda. Examining the 
responses found in the pages of Benjamin Tucker’s Liberty will reveal anarchic rhetoric’s 
“sympathetic” ends.   More pointedly, through my analysis, I hope to argue that in tackling the 
question outlined above—how can individuals interact equitably without the mediation of the 
State?—the anarchists offered a figuration of affect that has much to offer our thinking about the 
role of affect in human interaction today. Indeed, while many have argued for the centrality of 
affect in theorizing ethics, politics, and ontology, little has been said about the process through 
which affect might be able to constitute more equitable human relationships and/or interactions. 
To take one example, while Hardt and Negri suggest that the valorization of affective labor has 
become part and parcel to contemporary capitalism, as well as the idea that “[v]alue-affect opens 
the way to a revolutionary political economy in which insurrection is a necessary ingredient and 
which poses the theme of the reappropriation of the biopolitical context by the productive 
subjects” (Hardt and Negri 88), we are, according to someone like Timothy Brennan, left without 
an understanding of how the latter might actually take place. 1 Further, Ruth Leys makes explicit 
the idea that today’s theories of affect “imply such a radical separation between affect and reason 
as to make disagreement about meaning, or ideological dispute, irrelevant to cultural analysis” 
(40). Smith, I argue, provides what today’s thinkers have not: an account of how affect can 
constitute equitable relationships and community. Finally, the essay will end by situating my 
argument against Plato’s description of dialectical rhetoric in the Phaedrus, which will allow me 
to draw out what I call “empathetic Marxism,” anarchic rhetoric’s affective and political 
opposite.    
                                                 
1
 Brennan suggests that the role of affect in Hardt and Negri’s Empire points to “a 
gathering of subjectivities (the multitude) who never actually meet or converse and who 
therefore can never be guilty of repressing their political foes or, for that matter, of exercising 
their political wills” (350). 
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Tucker’s Liberty 
Published in Boston from 1881 to 1908, Liberty, Not the Daughter But the Mother of 
Order has the distinction of being the longest-lasting anarchist periodical, and, as such, may be 
the best record of anarchism in America. In fact, as Peter Marshall notes, its editor, Benjamin 
Tucker, was the “first American thinker to call himself an anarchist with pride” (389). However, 
despite being a prolific writer, Tucker and his unique brand of anarchism have received little 
notice. Indeed, Tucker, his compatriots, and his journal have all but been forgotten. Thus, an 
explanation of his work is in order.  
In the first full-length study of American anarchism, James J. Martin, pits “individualist 
anarchism” against “syndicalist anarchism” and suggests that the growth of what came to be 
known as “anarcho-syndicalism,” which developed in Europe in opposition to the work of Karl 
Marx, was paralleled by a “kindred but nearly unconnected phenomenon in America, seeking the 
same ends through individualistic rather than collective dynamics” (ix). Specifically, Martin 
suggests that the forerunners of “individualist anarchism,” American radicals such as Josiah 
Warren, Lysander Spooner, Stephen Pearl Andrews, William B. Greene, and Ezra Heywood, 
reacted to “the crystallization of the means of political expression into a conventional series of 
ritual-like gestures,” and that such a tendency violated their “Jeffersonian” beliefs (1). However, 
“individualist anarchism” as a distinct political category began to take shape when Benjamin 
Tucker introduced to other American radicals via Liberty the ideas of Proudhon, Bakunin, Max 
Stirner, and Herbert Spencer (Martin 203). Benjamin Tucker’s work, then, “is the cultural 
synthesis of the earlier exponents and innovators of the various elements of which this variety of 
American radicalism was composed” (xii). Frank H. Brooks supports this claim when he writes 
that “the anarchism expressed in Liberty owed only a general debt to individualist thinkers in 
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America such as Thoreau or Jefferson and a substantial debt only to one American thinker, 
Josiah Warren. The major intellectual influences were British, French, and German” (2). 
Specifically, Brooks points to Herbert Spencer’s “law of equal freedom,” Proudhon’s “mutual 
banking,” and Max Stirner’s egoist ethics (Brooks 2). One might say, then, that “individualist 
anarchism,” which came to “maturity” in the late nineteenth century within the pages of Liberty 
(Martin 208), represents the joining of the native radicalism(s) of Jefferson, Paine, Thoreau, 
Emerson, and others, with the European anti-statism(s) of Pierre Joseph-Proudhon, Mikhail 
Bakunin, Max Stirner, and Herbert Spencer. 
The result of such a synthesis has born competing interpretations, especially when 
compared to the European anarchism imported to America by such figures as Emma Goldman 
and Alexander Berkman. For instance, David DeLeon argues that “individualist anarchism” 
represents a “right libertarianism” when placed against the “communist anarchism,” or “left 
libertarianism” of Goldman and Berkman (85). Specifically, DeLeon argues that “right 
libertarianism” is a “capitalist” view that overlaps with “militant Liberalism” and stands in 
opposition to the anti-capitalist views of “left libertarianism” (61-85). Peter Marshall posits that 
Tucker grafts “Left Hegelianism onto the American Individual tradition of natural rights” (390). 
That is, while locating certain “rightist” positions in Tucker’s thought, Marshall argues that 
Tucker ultimately falls on the side of “left-wing libertarianism” (391). For Brooks, such an 
anarchism might be “a meeting point of right and left” (xii). However, Martin is quick to suggest 
that the differences between these anarchisms were thrown into relief only after the Chicago 
Haymarket affair when anarchism was put under the political microscope (x). Indeed, prior to 
Haymarket, little attention was paid to the differences between the American and European anti-
statist programs. Partisan labels aside, one might paint the following picture: “The individualists 
62 
 
 
see the danger of obligatory cooperation and are worried that a collectivist society will lead to 
the tyranny of the group. On the other hand, the social [communist] anarchists are concerned that 
a society of individualists might become atomistic and that the spirit of competition could 
destroy mutual aid and general solidarity” (Marshall 6). In short, the difference between the 
communist and individualist programs is one of means not ends. While they both share the desire 
for a Stateless society, they differ on the methods for realizing that goal.
2
  
However, because the focus of this essay is on the American or “individualist” anarchist 
tradition, a more detailed discussion of its particular aims and methods is in order. David 
DeLeon isolates three beliefs of the individualist anarchist. First, the powers of the State “were 
not based upon valid contracts” (76). Following Jefferson’s maxim “the earth belongs to the 
living,” the anarchists argued that “since all of those who had signed the Constitution were now 
dead, this moldy old document should be null and void. It violated the supremacy of the present” 
(DeLeon 76). Secondly, the anarchists argued that “the state was a bastion of privilege, such as 
monopolies in patents, copyrights, legal benefits, limited banking, land restrictions and tariffs” 
(DeLeon 76). Indeed, throughout the pages of Liberty, Tucker identified and railed against the 
government’s four monopolies: money, land, tariff, and patent (“State Socialism” 9). Lastly, the 
anarchists argued “the state was unjust because people were never given the choice of accepting 
or rejecting its power” (DeLeon 76). Taken as a whole, then, the anarchist program in America 
amounted to the abolition and replacement of all “unnatural,” non-consensual monopolies with 
new forms of organization based on voluntary association. DeLeon calls this notion 
“Jeffersonianism” (79). 
                                                 
2 For a summary of anarcho-communism see Alexander Berkman’s What is Anarchism?. 
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How was such a transformation to take place? DeLeon argues that “the anarchists relied 
more on education than on nitroglycerine to demolish government” (76). The American 
anarchists argued that the use of violence, as opposed to peaceful boycotts and education, would 
simply result in the more rapid and aggressive concentration of power in the State. To be 
specific, the anarchists relied on an agenda that sought to educate and inform the masses about 
anarchism in general, but also about what the anarchist alternative might look like. Apart from 
dispelling the myths surrounding anarchism, the rhetorical agenda would include illustrating how 
“alternatives to state functions should be built through schools, labor and community exchanges, 
cooperative banks, businesses, and labor unions” (DeLeon 76). The results would be that 
“[a]narchism would be irresistibly attractive if it were properly understood” (DeLeon 76).  
Yet, what is of note here is not this seemingly pedestrian rhetorical goal, but rather how 
Tucker seems to reach that goal. Indeed, one can detect in the description of Liberty that Tucker 
included in the first issue a rhetoric that violates conceptualizations of dialectical and rational 
persuasion. Tucker emblazoned the first page of the periodical with a forceful description of his 
editorial aims: 
It may be well to state at the outset that this journal will be edited to suit its editor, not its 
readers. He hopes that what suits him will suit them; but if not, it will make no difference. 
No subscriber, or body of subscribers, will be allowed to govern his course, dictate his 
policy, or prescribe his methods. Liberty is published for the very definite purpose of 
spreading certain ideas, and no claim will be admitted on any pretext of freedom of 
speech, to waste its limited space in hindering the attainment of that object. (“Declaration 
of Purpose” 1) 
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Liberty certainly reflects Tucker’s view; Tucker spent pages responding to critics, often to a 
detriment. Martin suggests that much of Tucker’s writing was “wrangling and hair-splitting of 
little or no value which in the alter days gave the paper the tenor of a debating society” (208). 
With this characterization in mind, it appears that Tucker seems to neglect one of rhetoric’s most 
tried and true tenets: the construction of arguments that accord with audience expectations. In 
essence, when Tucker writes, “He hopes that what suits him will suit them,” he flips the script on 
rhetorical invention. Instead of composing arguments that appeal to his audience, he asks his 
audience to appeal to his argument. To phrase it another way, Tucker expects to “spread” the 
gospel of anarchism not by dialectical persuasion, but by the evoking of affective judgments that 
reflect Adam Smith’s concept of “sympathy.” Even more pointedly, in response to the 
question—how can such a non-dialectical rhetoric persuade individuals to join the anarchist 
cause?—Tucker answers “sympathy,” which, as will be discussed below, asks interlocutors to 
judge an orator’s argument not on how well the rhetor speaks to his/her particular beliefs and 
assumptions, but by imagining his/her own response to the same exigency. Before explicating 
my claim here, it is necessary to outline the Chicago Haymarket Affair: one of the most 
important events in American radical politics, the nadir of anarchism in America, and the event 
that precipitates Tucker’s “sympathy.”  
The Haymarket Affair 
According to the labor historian James Green, Post-Civil War Chicago epitomized the 
“Gilded Aged—an age of excess when businessmen accumulated huge fortunes, constructed 
lavish mansions, exploited the public domain and corrupted public officials” (38). In addition to 
the prevalent social and economic inequities that characterized Chicago, the Great Chicago Fire 
of 1871, a growing immigrant population, the failure of socialist electoral politics, and a series of 
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labor battles resulting in overt police brutality would result in the bombing of a battalion of 
police officers and the arrest and execution of several prominent anarchist labor agitators. 
Indeed, the trials and tribulations of Chicago radicalism and politics were by and large shaped by 
the prominent labor agitator and orator Albert Parsons, his wife Lucy, and his comrades August 
Spies, and George Engel in their drift from reform-minded socialists to militant anarchists.          
The late-1870s saw an explosion of radical clubs and trade unions in response to the 
failures of the Socialistic Labor Party, a newly formed Marxist-influenced party that had enjoyed 
a rapid period of growth among Chicago’s immigrant population. After a defeat at the polls in 
1879, the absorption of many socialist candidates and supporters into the Democratic and 
Republican ranks in 1880, and a voting scandal in 1881 that nullified the election of a socialist 
city council member, many German radicals who once comprised the Socialistic Labor Party 
were left searching out alternative routes for social and political change (Green 90). That is, the 
debates surrounding the relationship between of electoral politics, trade unionism, and radical 
politics “hardened hearts and closed minds, leading passionate young socialists like [Albert] 
Parsons and [August Spies] to reject electoral politics completely” (91). As a result, many of the 
SLP’s former members, led by Spies and Albert and Lucy Parsons, became dispersed among the 
anarchist International Working People’s Association (IWPA) and/or the militant Knights of 
Labor. 
The Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor (KL) was founded in 1869, and, 
because of its embrace of a mystical Catholicism, appeared to be a sort of off-shoot of the Free 
Masons (Green 96). Like many other radical groups of the time, the Order believed that 
capitalism should be replaced by a “cooperative economy that would allow dependent wage 
workers to become independent producers” (Green 97). The group’s aim attracted Albert 
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Parsons, who would join the Order on July 4th, 1876 and found the Knight’s first Chicago 
branch. The Order operated as a point that “amalgamated the fractured trade unions into one 
solidified organization,” which, consequently, attracted thousands of American to join the KL. 
Indeed, the cause of the KL’s ascendency was the organization of a mass strike in 1885 against 
the railroad magnate Jay Gould, which saw its membership swell to over 700,000 (Dubofsky and 
Dulles 131). Despite its prominence on the national stage, in Chicago it was a different story; in 
1883, just as quickly as the KL rose to eminence among Chicago’s working-class, its 
membership dropped by 49,000 in less than a year after being defeated by Western Union in 
their attempt to secure better working conditions (Green 98-99). The KL in Chicago, however, 
after a series of successful strikes and organizing by the Chicago anarchists, would experience 
another sustained period of growth in 1886, which would pave the way for the dramatic events of 
May.          
In the wake of the KL’s dramatic fall from grace in 1883, Chicago presented fertile 
conditions for the IWPA, a European anarchist organization formed in London in response to the 
ousting of anarchists from the First International by Karl Marx in 1872. In 1881, the followers of 
Mikhail Bakunin convened in London to found the International Working People’s Association 
(IWPA). Against the Marxist International Workingmen’s Association, the anarchists who 
formed the IWPA in London “acted on their belief that socialist propaganda could not effectively 
read workers through trade unions and political parties; nor would revolutionary change result 
from strikes, mass demonstrations and election campaigns” (Green 93). The result was a 
program that stressed “propaganda by deed,” “a violent act planned by a secret conspiracy and 
committed by a dedicated militant, [which] could impress the world with the evil of the despotic 
state and with the fearless determination of those who intended to destroy it” (Green 93). Albert 
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Parsons and August Spies attended the 1883 meeting in Pittsburgh that established the American 
branch of the IWPA. In fact, Parsons, along with the newly-minted Chicagoan Johann Most, 
wrote The Pittsburgh Manifesto—the IWPA’s statement of principles in America, which opened 
with a quote from the Declaration of Independence. Soon thereafter, the “militant socialists of 
Chicago began identifying themselves as anarchists” (Green 129).  
Near the end of 1893, the Chicago economy was growing at a rapid clip. Indeed, “the net 
value of goods produced by the city’s leading manufacturers leapt from $28 million to a 
staggering total of $760 million” (Green 102). Unsurprisingly, the dramatic increase was the 
result of increased downward pressure on worker’s wages and the expanded use of technology in 
the production process (Green 105). In addition to the changes in mass production and the effects 
they had on Chicago’s wage workers, a depression soon befell the city and country. 
Consequently, Chicago’s major trade unions and radical groups, led largely by the speeches and 
publications of Albert Parsons and his comrades, would engage in a massive organizing effort, 
which would result in an unprecedented expansion of membership roles, including the 
reemergence of the Knights of Labor after a series of successful strikes against Jay Gould’s 
Southwest Railroad System and the organization of workers in the vehemently anti-union 
McCormick Reaper Works in Chicago in early 1886 (Green 145-159). Indeed, what has come to 
be known as the “Great Upheaval,” the coordinated efforts and sympathy strikes that appeared 
across the United States, had Chicago as it “epicenter” (Green 146). 
To be specific, Chicago’s anarchists, radical socialists, and trade unionists, notably the 
IWPA and its trade union the Central Labor Union (CLU), galvanized around the surging 
Knights of Labor and the reinvigorated calls for an eight-hour workday (Green 154). This 
coordination would result in unprecedented action that surprised anarchists, unionists, and 
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capitalists alike. In a warm-up to a planned May 1st rally and strike, 15,000 members of the 
anarchist-led CLU marched through downtown Chicago on April 25th, 1886 in front of an 
estimated 50,000 onlookers to argue for a shortened working-day. After giving rousing speeches 
full of allusions to dynamite, Albert Parsons and August Spies were singled-out in the press as 
dangerous agitators who were plotting to use violence during the May 1st rally (Green 158-159). 
Much to the police’s surprise, the May 1st rally came and went without incident; thousands of 
workers went on strike and paraded through the streets of Chicago. Dances were held and 
speeches were given, and the festivities continued well-into the weekend (Green 164-167).  
However, the mood began to change on May 3rd. A fatal clash between workers and 
police in front of the McCormick Reaper Works, the open drilling of Chicago police officers, the 
firing of KL workers from the Gould railway system, and the summoning of National 
Guardsmen ripened the discord among the striking workers (Green 168-169). The strikes 
resumed on May 4th and were to culminate in a protest at Haymarket Square against the rampant 
police violence. Among others, Albert Parsons and August Spies gave fiery speeches denouncing 
the police’s actions against striking workers at McCormick’s. Then, at 10:20pm, despite most of 
the crowd having left, six columns of Chicago police marched into the square to disperse the 
remaining protestors. As the police marched forward, a bomb was thrown into the center of the 
columns. The police then opened fire on the protestors. Over the ensuing days the exchange 
would result in the death of seven police officers and an unknown number of anarchist protestors 
and civilians, as well as the arrest of dozens of anarchist agitators (Green 180-189). After a 
sensational trial where eight anarchists were tried for murder, the Haymarket Affair would result 
in the hangings of four, the suicide of one, and the life-imprisonment of two. 
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In sum, the political and economic conditions of late-nineteenth century America 
provided fodder for a growing radicalism and labor movement, which pitted not only radicals 
against capitalists but radicals against radicals. In other words, concomitant with the fight against 
the injustices caused by capitalism and the State was a fight about how best to wage that war. As 
we will see in the following sections, it was the latter battle that occupied the writings of the 
Boston anarchists in the weeks and months following the Haymarket blast.  
Liberty’s Sympathies 
From 1886 to 1887, like most of America’s other newspapers and periodicals, the events 
at Haymarket occupied the pages of Liberty. Because the bombing had attracted so much 
attention to anarchism, Tucker and his compatriots had to tip-toe between two competing 
motivations: separating themselves from the anarchism associated with the Haymarket bombing 
while still arguing for the relevance of their program. From 1886 to 1888, Brooks notes that 
“Tucker and writers tried to differentiate individualist anarchism theoretically, economically, and 
strategically from the ‘Chicago anarchism’ represented by the defendants in the Haymarket case” 
(7). In a response called “The Boston Anarchists,” which Tucker published on May 22nd, he 
writes, “the Boston anarchists are ready to denounce the savage Communists of Chicago, who, 
falsely sailing under Anarchistic colors, commit murder, arson, and mob violence” (5). However, 
despite the scrutiny of anarchism as a result of the actions of the Chicago anarchists, Tucker 
argues, “I see no reason why we should take in our shingle and so give the appearance of running 
away from our philosophy. We propose to let the old sign-board stand” (5). What is more, in 
another piece published in the same issue, Tucker also suggests, “The outbreak at Chicago, 
whether the actors in it were good or bad, is a very small one, compared to those that proceed 
from ‘bad laws’ in this and other parts of the world” (“Coming to Its Senses” 5). Tucker’s 
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exigency, then, consisted of negotiating the paradox of denouncing the Chicago anarchists while 
simultaneously raising the anarchistic banner higher on the mast.     
To meet such a challenge, Tucker aimed to pique his readers’ “sympathies.” In response 
to the impending execution of the Chicago anarchists, Tucker included a piece written by 
“A.H.S.”3 titled “A Fellow-Feeling” on November 5th, 1887.4 Specifically, this short piece 
(about 250 words) is aimed at “those Anarchistic members of the Order” (“A Fellow-Feeling”). 
A.H.S. here refers to the Noble and Holy Order of the Knights of Labor, who, because they had 
became so closely tied to Haymarket bombing, supported the execution of the Chicago anarchists 
in an effort to salvage their reputation in the face of public anger. As Dubofsky and Dulles note, 
“The Knights of Labor were as violent in condemning them [the anarchists] as the most 
conservative newspapers” (112). The Knights’ decrying of the action at Haymarket was all the 
more offensive to the anarchists because among those to be executed was the anarchist and 
founding member of the Knights of Labor in Chicago, Albert Parsons. As the two groups were 
closely aligned in the struggle for worker’s rights, the anarchists reacted negatively. To be 
specific, the piece begins with a portrait of a speech by the Order’s leadership to its members; the 
author writes, “‘While we as individuals have sympathy for the men about to be executed, as an 
order we believe in the majesty of the law, and that the anarchists, having been condemned, 
should be punished,’ said General Treasurer of the K. of L. Frederick Turner. And ‘me too’ 
echoed Secretary Charles H. Litchman” (A.H.S 1). According to A.H.S., the motivation for 
asking the Knights of Labor to suppress their sympathy for the condemned anarchists is that 
“perhaps the secession of some of the ‘brothers’ was anticipated by some of the Grand and Petty 
                                                 
3
 A.H.S. is most likely A.H. Simpson, a regular contributor to Liberty. 
4
 On November 11
th
, 1887, the anarchists Albert Parsons, George Engel, August Spies, 
and Adolph Fischer were executed by hanging. 
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Masters, and that is why they have used the funds of the Order to get into the law-making 
business” (1).5 In short, A.H.S. argues that the leaders of the Knights of Labor commanded its 
members to disregard their identification with the condemned anarchists in order “to maintain 
discipline” because sympathy poses a threat to order—to the Order (1). Reflecting the anarchists’ 
dismay with the Knights’ actions, “A Fellow-Feeling” culminates in the following question: 
“How does this [the Knights’ support of the execution of the anarchists] strike the Anarchistic 
members of the Order who believe in discipline and red-letter tyranny—when it is used to 
preserve the majesty of the Order” (1)? By ending this piece with such a question, the author 
asks the anarchist members of the Knights of Labor to resist the Order’s call to suppress their 
sympathy with the soon-to-be-executed anarchists and obey the rule of law.  
As a counter, then, to the Knights of Labor’s appeals to “law and order,” wherein they 
ask/command their members to resist their own identification with the anarchists bound for the 
gallows, A.H.S.’s rhetorical tack foregrounds the concept of sympathy. Apart from explicitly 
evoking Adam Smith’s definition of sympathy as “fellow-feeling,” A.H.S. seems to borrow 
directly from the pages of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. That is, like Smith, A.H.S. relies 
on a scene of a “brother’s” torture and execution to exemplify the sympathetic function. Noting 
the explicit evocation of Adam Smith’s “sympathy,” what follows is an examination of the 
sympathetic process and its connection to anarchist politics.    
Adam Smith begins his treatise on ethics with the following claim, which also serves as 
the epigraph of this essay: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can 
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what ourselves should 
                                                 
5
 In response to the events at Haymarket, the Knights of Labor would throw themselves 
headlong into reformist and electoral politics in the fall of 1886. See Dubofsky and Dulles 132-
133. 
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feel in the like situation” (9). He continues, “Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we 
ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us what he suffers” (9). Against a vulgar 
empiricism, Smith grounds his ethical system in a seemingly anti-representational logic that 
suggests that humans cannot know or experience the sentiments of others, even those of kin. 
Because “we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,” our cognitive 
representation of the Other’s subjective experience cannot bring us into knowledge of the Other 
and his/her subjective position. “True knowledge” of an Other is impossible. Instead, “By the 
imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same 
torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with 
him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though 
weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them” (9). For Smith, we come to know the 
experiences of others by imaginatively placing ourselves in the Other’s position. However, this 
imagining of oneself in the position of the Other does not mean taking on the Other’s 
subjectivity. Although one’s subjectivity may, in fact, change as a result of such an exercise, the 
sympathetic process relies on the two participants retaining their own subjectivities so as to 
remain distinct. According to Smith, sympathy, while possibly being synonymous with pity or 
compassion, “denote[s] our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever” that results from 
imagining ourselves in the position of the Other (10). 
Stephen McKenna has argued that sympathy, the process by which affects are 
engendered as shared moral sentiments, is an inherently rhetorical project (117). In fact, against 
the view of most Smith scholars who find his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres derivative 
of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, McKenna argues the opposite—Smith provides us a “Theory 
of Persuasible Sentiments” (114). To be specific, sympathy is a natural human tendency that 
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grounds Smith’s ethics, yet its expression can only be realized through communicative 
interaction. McKenna argues that Smith’s rhetorical ethics “rejects the either/or fallacy of a 
choice between foundational knowledge (or transcendent criteria) on the one hand or pure 
contingency of value on the other as a basis for morality” (139). Thus, one might say that the 
anarchist response to the question posed at the beginning of this essay—how can anarchism (or 
rhetoric), with its rejection of transcendent arbiters, be theorized as a positive societal 
arrangement instead of pure chaos?—would be sympathy. In other words, in place of a 
transcendental criteria that is used to ground ethical action, such as the Knights of Labor’s appeal 
to “law and order,” and the seemingly chaotic, “anything goes” view that anarchism is so often 
accused of fostering, Tucker and the Boston anarchists promote “sympathy”—the rhetorical 
construction of ethical norms and moral sentiments.  
However, the process through which sympathy occurs, its connection to anarchism, and 
the implications for connecting the two still deserves explanation. According to Smith, in order 
to sympathize, the hearer must understand the causes of the speaker’s joy or grief and evaluate 
the response to such a situation. He writes, “The first question we ask is, What has befallen 
you?” (11). That is, for sympathy to take place, the hearer must know the exigence motivating 
the speaker. Smith continues, “Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the 
passion, as from the situation which excites it. We sometime feel for another, a passion which he 
himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that 
passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his form the reality” (12). 
For sympathy to occur, the speaker must formulate a response to an event that demonstrates 
“propriety.” According to Smith, “In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or 
disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists 
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the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action” (18). To 
achieve the rhetorical propriety that will lead to sympathy between rhetor and interlocutor means 
constructing an argument that is aimed not at a particular audience, but an imagined “impartial 
spectator.” Because Smith begins his ethics with the premise that one cannot experience the 
feelings of another, this means that a rhetor cannot appeal to the beliefs and feelings of an 
audience. Instead, an imagined “impartial spectator,” or what Smith calls “reason, principle, 
conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge and arbiter of our 
conduct” guides our affective response to a given situation (Smith 139). According to McKenna, 
the “impartial spectator” that “grounds rhetorical and ethical propriety” is the archive of 
experience comprised of previously formed sympathies (McKenna 67, 131). That is, the 
“impartial spectator” is the internalization of social norms and practices that determines propriety 
in the rhetorical/ethical. Responses, then, are constructed with an eye to this storehouse of 
experience and social norms (“impartial spectator”), which, because the interlocutor has also had 
sympathy with others, functions as the bridge between the communicants.       
In effect, then, Smith’s figuration of sympathy might be characterized as the following: A 
rhetor who finds him/herself in a particular situation that warrants a response must call upon 
his/her past experiences and social interactions (the “impartial spectator”) so as to craft an 
appropriate response. The hearer, then, must judge the speaker’s response to that situation 
appropriate by understanding the rhetorical exigence and placing him/herself in the same 
situation. In essence, the hearer must answer the following: “Judging from the speaker’s 
expression of the situation, which is also an appeal to the synecdoche of our cultural practices 
and norms called the ‘impartial spectator,’ would I feel and act the same way in that same 
situation?” If the hearer answers “yes,” the result is sympathy, a shared moral sentiment that 
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induces the hearer to action and guides political action without any sort of institutionalized 
meditation, be it the State or transcendent criteria, while also avoiding absolute ethical relativity.  
As McKenna points out, such an evaluation may at first blush appear to simply be a 
matter of taste or personal preference. In this light, the hearer’s judgment that results in 
sympathy, in “fellow-feeling,” often overlaps with Smith’s figuration of aesthetic judgment 
(McKenna 118). However, McKenna points out that the difference between the two has to do 
with the interlocutor’s interestedness. That is, aesthetic judgment for Smith involves a 
disinterested individual’s evaluation of a how well an object expresses its subject. However, 
Smith admits that sympathy is not the end of aesthetic judgment as aesthetic judgment is often 
one of personal taste. In short, while two people may share an affective response to an object, 
there is no need to actively seek sympathy. On the contrary, when an individual is (self-) 
interested in an orator’s subject, the response to some sort of joy or grief-inducing situation, the 
evaluation moves from the aesthetic realm into the rhetorical/ethical and thus serves as the 
material that will ground the judgment.  
Framed in such a way, the role the sympathetic process has distinct Kantian overtones, 
particularly Kant’s description of taste and its ability to foster community through 
communication. In the Critique of Judgment, Kant suggests: 
Now taste is at bottom a faculty for judging of the sensible illustration of moral ideas (by 
means of a certain analogy involved in our reflection upon both these); and it is from this 
faculty also and from the greater susceptibility grounded thereon for the feeling arising 
from the latter (called moral feeling), that the pleasure is derived which taste regards as 
valid for mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each. Hence it 
appears plain that the true propaedeutic for the foundation of taste is the development of 
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moral Ideas and the culture of the moral feeling; because it is only when sensibility is 
brought into agreement with this that genuine taste can assume a definite invariable form. 
(152) 
Kant’s make clear in no uncertain terms that collectivity and community can be built through 
taste: the evaluation of a “sensible illustration of moral ideas.” To be specific, the judgment of 
such sensuous “pleasure” moves from the subjective and “disinterested evaluation” of an 
individual to questions of “interestedness” and the “good” (i.e. ethics) through communicative 
interaction with others. Indeed, Kant’s description of humanity explicitly points the importance 
of the sympathetic process and its manifestation through rhetorical exchange. He suggests that 
humanity “on the one side indicates the universal feeling of sympathy, and on the other the 
faculty of being able to communicate universally our inmost [feelings]” (151). Taste, in other 
words, “makes possible the transition, without any violent leap, from the charms of Sense to 
habitual moral interest” (Kant 150). Like Smith and the anarchists, aesthetic judgment for Kant 
has the ability to foster relationships between individuals without the need for a common 
epistemological or metaphysical grounding.     
The sympathetic process, as suggested earlier, seems to function not through the 
construction of arguments to accord with audience beliefs and assumptions (“You should feel the 
same way as I do because it is in your interest to do so.”), but by inviting the interlocutor to 
evaluate the argument as though it were his/her own (“I feel this way because of this situation. 
Judge for yourself whether or not you would too”). In short, a rhetor creates a message that is to 
appeal to an “impartial spectator” (an imagined audience constructed from past experiences), 
which is then evaluated by an interlocutor, who, by imagining him/herself in the rhetor’s 
position, draws upon their own potential affective response to guide his/her judgment of the 
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rhetor’s original message. Cast in this way, one might say that throughout the sympathetic 
process, both rhetor and interlocutor overcome their inherent egoism—their inability to feel that 
which others feel—by focusing on their own self-interestedness. Indeed, it is at this juncture that 
the connection between sympathy and anarchism becomes clear. That is, the focus on one’s own 
self-interest that characterizes the sympathetic process might be detected in Benjamin Tucker’s 
assertion that the only moral law is “Mind your own business,” or his claim that “[t]he most 
perfect socialism is possible only on the condition of the most perfect individualism” (qtd. in 
Marshall 390). In other words, the most perfect socialism—anarchism—is possible only when 
one rejects both chaos and the transcendental and evaluates rhetorical/ethical propriety by 
imagining oneself (replete with “interestedness”) in the position of others. According to 
Benjamin Tucker and the other Boston Anarchists, sympathy, then, can serve as the basis for 
self-government in the absence of a State.  
Apart from publishing the piece by A.H.S. in the days prior to the Chicago anarchists’ 
execution, Tucker also makes this view explicit in a piece titled “Ralph Waldo Emerson on Law” 
published a month after the hanging. In this particular piece, Tucker excerpts selections from 
Emerson’s essay “Politics.” The longest selection Tucker includes is a section wherein Emerson 
describes the process through which individuals can make their own laws. This process is none 
other than that of sympathy:  
For, any laws but those which men make for themselves, are laughable. If I put myself in 
the place of my child, and we stand in one thought, and see that things are thus or thus, 
that perception is law for him and me. We are both there, both act. But if, without 
carrying him into the thought, I look over into his plot, and guessing how it is with him, 
ordain this or that, he will never obey me. This is the history of governments,—one man 
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does something which is to bind another. A man who cannot be acquainted with me, 
taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall go to this or that 
whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy. Behold the consequence. Of all debts, 
men are least willing to pay the taxes. What a satire is this on government! Everywhere 
they think they get their money’s worth, except for these. (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on 
Law”) 
In this long passage, we see the sympathetic process and its implications for a Stateless society. 
To be specific, like Smith’s sympathy, Emerson/Tucker suggest that just laws are not constructed 
by imagining how the Other might feel if and when he/she is subjected to a particular law, but by 
using the Other’s response to gauge one’s own reaction to the law. In other words, there is no 
“guessing how it is with him.” A law can be just only “[i]f I put myself in the place of” the 
Other, which is to say, if I imagine myself being subjected to a particular law. The result of “both 
being there, both acting” is a “shared perception” that can serve as law. Sympathy, the rhetorical 
construction of a shared affective response, allows the participants to remain unique in their 
subjectivity and can serve as the ethical motivation to engage in collaborative action without the 
mediation of the State with its alleged embodiment of transcendent criteria. For Emerson/Tucker, 
just laws are those that individuals construct for themselves through the rhetorical construction 
of a shared moral sentiment (“sympathy”), which, in an anarchist society, takes the place of the 
transcendental laws that are said to be embodied in the State and also avoids falling into disputes 
of personal preference and taste. Moreover, because laws that are developed through sympathy 
are constructed in a particular moment to meet a certain aim, they themselves resist the 
institutionalization and codification of law that, on the anarchist view, results in elevating that 
law to the metaphysical and transcendent.                      
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Empathy or Dialectic? 
In the passage of Emerson’s that Tucker excerpts, one also sees the opposing process 
through which laws can be made and enacted. That process I mention is the one whereby an 
individual “look[s] over into [an Other’s] plot, and guess[es] how it is with him, [and] ordain[s] 
this or that” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on Law”). Emerson further suggests, “This [process] is the 
history of governments,—one man does something which is to bind another. A man who cannot 
be acquainted with me, taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall 
go to this or that whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on 
Law” 7). That is, whereas Adam Smith’s sympathy, or anarchism’s rhetorical ethic, presupposes 
that individuals cannot “know” the thoughts and feelings of an Other, its opposite, what I call 
“empathetic identification,” is founded on the idea that one can, thanks to a dialectical 
knowledge, “know” the thoughts and feelings of an Other.   Before elaborating on this claim, it is 
necessary to note what I mean by empathy. According to University of Cambridge 
Developmental Psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, empathy “is our ability to identify what 
someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an 
appropriate emotion” (16). It is my argument in the following pages that the ability to identify 
and respond to what someone else is thinking and feeling—to empathize—is the “end” of the 
dialectical method theorized in Plato’s Phaedrus (and, by extension, Marx’s theory of 
revolution). As such, we might think of the dialectic/rhetoric binary that has characterized much 
of Western thinking for over two millennia in terms of a binary framed in affective terms: 
empathy/sympathy.    
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In Plato’s dialogue Phaedrus, Socrates’ explanation of dialectic can be said to mirror 
what Baron-Cohen calls empathy. To unpack my claim, I turn to the succinct summary of 
dialectical persuasion Socrates offers Phaedrus in opposition to the sophistry of Lysias: 
Serious discourse…is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic method and plants and 
sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able to help themselves and him who 
planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other 
minds other words capable of continuing the process forever, and which make their 
possessor happy, to the farthest limit of human happiness. (141)  
While Socrates clearly suggests that the goal of dialectic is to bring one closer to the 
immutable/transcendent, what deserves some explanation here is Socrates’ mentioning of 
“fitness.” It is important to note that to deem one appropriate or “fit” presupposes that one 
individual possesses the knowledge that allows him/her to deem another appropriate or “fitting.” 
That knowledge that sanctions such an evaluation and selection is dialectical knowledge of one’s 
own “character,” or the relationship between self and God. That is to say, because I have 
dialectical knowledge, I can deem someone appropriate for such knowledge. Summarizing this 
view, Socrates tells Phaedrus, “Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful 
according to his character, and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were 
his god, to honor and worship him” (127). The Other is deemed fit, then, if one is able to 
recognize one’s own self in the Other. As a result, the Other becomes remade in the image of the 
dialectician. One, in essence, places him/herself in the position of the Other in order to select 
oneself. The Socratic dialectic of the Phaedrus amounts to the following: I have knowledge that 
brings me close to God, the all-powerful. You do not have dialectical knowledge, yet I see 
myself in you. Because I know me, and I see myself in you, I know that you are wont of 
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dialectical knowledge. Therefore, I will give you the dialectical knowledge that will make you 
me. All of which is to say, one bases his/her knowledge of the Other on self-knowledge.  
In the case of Socrates’ dialectic, the interlocutor must labor to ensure that the 
dialectician remains in power. In other words, the interlocutor must give up him/herself to the 
dialectician. That is, because the dialectician convinces the interlocutor that his/she is in need of 
dialectical knowledge about a particular topic (virtue, rhetoric, government) and the acquisition 
of that specific dialectical knowledge brings one closer to the divine, the interlocutor sees in the 
dialectician the path to power. To put the situation in simpler terms, I accept that I lack the 
dialectical knowledge that brings me closer to God, the all-powerful. You have dialectical 
knowledge, which I need in order to become closer to God, the all-powerful. I see myself in you. 
Therefore, I will receive the dialectical knowledge because it will make me you. The form of 
identification for both the dialectician and the interlocutor is the same: Because I am you, I know 
what you are thinking and feeling.  
The result of such a dialectical process is empathy, which, for the anarchists, is the path 
to unjust laws. That is, the dialectician is marked by his/her “ability to identify what someone 
else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate 
emotion” (Baron-Cohen 16). To satiate the point, the dialectician “identif[ies] with what 
someone else is thinking or feeling” because he/she is that “someone else.” So, the dialectician 
can always “respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.” The conclusion 
is always, already known. The discourse then is made to retroactively fit the conclusion.  
On the anarchist view, empathy elides what sympathy makes explicit: that one has “no 
immediate experience of what other men feel” (9). The dialectician, in placing him/herself in the 
position of the other, in essence, “guesses how it is with him,” which, according to our logic 
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here, is nothing other more than empathizing with the Other. It is the process that Tucker, 
Emerson, and the anarchists suggest leads to the construction of laws that serve to keep power in 
the hands of the few, its “rightful” place. Or, as Emerson himself puts it, “A man who cannot be 
acquainted with me, taxes me; looking from afar at me, ordains that a part of my labor shall go to 
this or that whimsical end, not as I, but as he happens to fancy” (“Ralph Waldo Emerson on 
Law”). In sum, to the dialectician the interlocutor must pay the ultimate tax: his/her liberty.       
Marxism and Rhetoric     
In his Rhetoric of Marxism, James Aune suggests that Marx failed to fully consider the 
role of rhetoric in ushering in capitalism’s demise. First, Aune picks up on Alvin Gouldner’s 
work, which suggests that the dialectical conflict between labor and capital is “inevitable” and 
will result in the concentration of the means of production in the State controlled by the 
proletarian vanguard before the eventual “withering away of the State.” Such a situation boils 
down to the notion that there is no need to persuade individuals to join in the work of 
overthrowing capitalism because the revolution is “inevitable.” Gouldner calls this situation 
Marxism’s “nuclear contradiction” (13). Refuting this notion, Aune writes, “contrary to 
Gouldner, Marx’s argument that change will accelerate and be more positive if one chooses to be 
a revolutionary seems to work somewhat effectively as a response” to the “inevitability thesis” 
(13). Instead, Aune finds a more significant rhetorical problem within Marx’s thought. That is, 
Aune suggests that Marx failed to consider “What sorts of communicative processes enable 
historical actors to see liberatory possibilities” (14).     
Aune points to Marx’s work on ideology as Marx’s most concrete statement on rhetoric 
and the function of language in ushering in social and political change (27). While I recognize 
that the vast amount of work and debate surrounding the term “ideology,” I take Marx’s 
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definition of ideology as the “camera obscura” as my starting point. Or, in other words, I’ll begin 
my reading of Marxist rhetoric with an understanding of “ideology” as, what both James Aune 
(among many others) suggests is “false or deluded speech about the world and the human being 
who inhabit it” (28). What is more, because the concept of ideology represents well-worn 
territory, I want to focus less on what makes ideology “false speech,” and more on what might be 
“correct” or “right” speech in Marx’s thought. Indeed, it is my claim that despite his allergy to 
Plato, Marx’s project, or more specifically his rhetorical project, is more Platonic than first 
appears. Drawing this comparison will then allow me to put forward my conceptualization of 
Marxist rhetoric as being “empathetic.”  
In 1848, Karl Marx, along with Friedrich Engels, published The Communist Manifesto, 
the most well-known call for the “forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions” (Marx and 
Engels 48). This singular document “deals in turn with the relations between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat, between the communists and the proletariat, and between communism and 
existing socialist doctrines” (Kołakowski 187). For our purposes here, section two of the 
Manifesto will serve to exemplify Marx’s “empathetic” ends. That is, focusing on the 
relationship between “the communists and the proletariat” will allow one to detect Marx’s 
Platonism, which, following our logic here takes the form of an “empathetic dialectic.”  
In this section, Marx and Engels describe “communists” in a way that immediately evokes 
Socrates’ description of those with dialectical knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus. They are 
described as:  
on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class 
parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, 
theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly 
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understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the 
proletarian movement. (27)    
Furthermore, the communists desire the “formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of 
the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat” (27). To form the 
proletariat into a class—the driving force behind historical materialism—the communists “point 
out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of 
nationality,” which means “[i]n the various stages of development which the struggle of the 
working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass through, they [the communists] always and 
everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole” (27). Marx and Engels portray 
the communists, like Socrates himself, as possessing a unique knowledge that allows them to see 
through ideology/“false speech”, and, as a result, able to lead those without such knowledge to 
“class-consciousness” or the “immutable.” To phrase it another way, the communists possess the 
requisite knowledge that allows them to see and express the ways in which capitalist production, 
in its exploitation of workers, “supply the proletariat with fresh elements of enlightenment and 
progress” (Marx and Engels 24).  
To elaborate, the class-conscious communist draws on two knowledges to bring 
individuals into contact with the “good” or “just” much like Socrates’ dialectician. First, Marx 
and Engels note that the communists “have no interests separate and apart from those of the 
proletariat as a whole” (26). The communist and the proletarian, then, are one and the same. 
However, though the communist and proletariat are, according to Marx and Engels, 
indistinguishable, the communists’ understanding and expression of the dialectical progression 
of history and class conflict separates them from their proletarian comrades. The class-conscious 
communist “express[es], in general terms, actual relations spring from an existing class struggle, 
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from a historical movement going on under our every eyes” (Marx and Engels 27). Thus, like the 
dialectician who uses knowledge of his/her own “character” to choose a “fitting” Other, the 
communist uses knowledge of his/her relation to capitalist production to choose and form the 
proletariat. In other words, because both the dialectician and communist possess knowledge of 
the dialectic that engenders a certain understanding of their own relationship to the “good” (the 
divine or communism), they have ability to choose and remake others in their own image. 
Therefore, the communist, like the dialectician, is characterized by “empathy,” or his/her “ability 
to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings 
with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen 16). That is, the communist puts to work his/her 
knowledge of the proletarian and historical materialism in order to “know” what other workers 
think or feel and respond in a way that brings them into the revolutionary class.   As a result, the 
communist’s knowledge of the conditions of capitalism and class formation gives way to a 
rhetorical program whereby the communist employs:  
the dialectic method and plants and sows in a fitting soul intelligent words which are able 
to help themselves and him who planted them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed 
from which there spring up in other minds other words capable of continuing the process 
forever, and which make their possessor happy, to the farthest limit of human happiness. 
(141)  
In conclusion, Marx’s rhetoric takes us back to the beginning of this section, as well as Western 
thought. That is, for Marx, rhetoric operates in the same way that Socrates dialectic in Plato’s 
Phaedrus, which, as I have argued, takes the form of empathetic identification.  
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“the ultimate and bitterer conflict will be still to come” 
Sixty-four years after the death of Thomas Jefferson, eighteen years after Marx’s ousting 
of the anarchists from the First International, and three years after the execution of four Chicago 
anarchists, Benjamin Tucker, in his seminal 1890 essay, “State Socialism and Anarchism: How 
Far they Agree, and Wherein they Differ,” describes the evolution of 19th century radical 
socialist thought and offers a bleak assessment of the relationship between Marxism and 
anarchism. Originally written for the North American Review, one of the most widely read 
periodicals of the time, Tucker first lays out the commonalities between Marxist/State and 
anarchist socialism.
6
 He posits that “the economic principles of Modern Socialism are a logical 
deduction from the principle laid down by Adam Smith in the early chapters of his “Wealth of 
Nations”—namely, that labor is the true measure of price” (“State Socialism” 3). Tucker then 
delineates between the responses to the labor theory of value, which are represented by the 
positions of Josiah Warren in America and Joseph-Pierre Proudhon in France with that of Karl 
Marx in Germany. The philosophies of Warren and Proudhon, which Tucker suggests both point 
to “the road of Liberty” despite developing independently of each other and on different 
continents, stand in opposition to Karl Marx’s authoritarian “state socialism.”  
In concluding his essay, Tucker borrows from the French journalist and anarchist Ernest 
Lesigne’s characterization of these two socialisms and presents over forty “crisp antitheses” that 
spell out the differences between these two political programs. Tucker specifically points to the 
role of the State as emblematic of their respective philosophies:  
The first [Marxism] regards the State as a society sui generis, of an especial essence, the 
product of a sort of divine right outside of and above all society, with special rights and 
                                                 
6
 Despite being called one the “ablest” pieces the magazine’s editor had ever read, it was 
never published. 
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able to exact special obedience; the second [anarchism] considers the State as an 
association like any other, generally managed worse than others. (“State Socialism” 16) 
According to Tucker, Marxist politics would rely on the implementation of “a régime of Archism 
fully as despotic as that of the State Socialists themselves” (“State Socialism” 15). These 
positions, Tucker alleges, “are more diametrically opposed to each other in the fundamental 
principles of social action and their methods of reaching the ends aimed at than either is to their 
common enemy, existing society” (“State Socialism” 2). More pointedly, even if these two 
programs were able to jointly combat and overthrow the existing order, “the ultimate and bitterer 
conflict will be still to come” (“State Socialism” 3). In short, Tucker locates in the conflict 
between anarchism and Marxism a conflict more consequential than that between labor and 
capital.  
Tucker’s remarks make apparent that the battle between radical socialisms is a battle 
between two politics with two very different rhetorical “ends.” When characterizing the telos of 
each program, Tucker notes, “Both are in pursuit of the great possible welfare for all,” yet “One 
[Marxism] aims to establish happiness for all, the other [anarchism] to enable each to be happy 
in his own way” (“State Socialism” 16). That is, on one hand, Marxism seeks dialectical 
empathy, the result of which will be “a State religion, to the expense of which all must contribute 
and at the altar of which all must kneel” (“State Socialism” 7). Anarchism, on the other hand, 
advocates rhetorical sympathy, or “liberty both as end and means” (“State Socialism” 15). To 
phrase it another way, in place of the State and its supposed embodiment of certain immutable or 
metaphysical concepts (reason, justice, etc), anarchism proposes a rhetorical ethic called 
sympathy that allows for individual liberty by to flourish while also staving off the concentration 
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of power in institutionalized government, as well as the bad sort of anarchy: chaos, violence, and 
relativism.  
Because of its association with political violence resulting from the Haymarket bombing, 
anarchism as a distinct political category would soon become unrecognizable. That is, by the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the heirs to the individualist anarchist tradition would 
“gradually decline into the obscurity of the depression of 1929-1939” (Martin 274). However, as 
the next two chapters aim to show, the empathetic/sympathetic (dialectic/rhetoric) divide and its 
persistent entanglement with questions of the State would reappear and find competing partisan 
homes. Specifically, in opposition to what we might call Jefferson and Tucker’s nonpartisan or 
pre-partisan anarchism, the next chapters will trace the use of anarchic rhetoric for both leftist 
and rightist politics. Specifically, the next chapter will show how in his drift away from orthodox 
Marxism and Trotskyism, the political theorist C.L.R. James enacts anarchic rhetoric, while the 
last chapter will examine reemergence of anarchic rhetoric in the twenty first century under the 
Tea Party moniker.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
“BRING[ING] THE UNIVERSAL INTO PLAY IN A POLEMICAL WAY”: ETHOS, 
AESTHETICS, AND ANARCHISM IN C.L.R. JAMES’ “FIRESIDE CHAT”  
“The critical mind must free itself from a Marxism which says that all will be well 
if only you become a socialist” (Max Horkheimer, Towards a New Manifesto 21). 
 
“Politics occurs wherever a community with the capacity to argue and to make 
metaphors is likely, at any time and through anyone’s intervention, to crop up” 
(Jacques Rancière, Disagreement 60). 
 
In chapter two, we continued our work of explicating anarchic rhetoric by taking up the 
work and ideas of Benjamin Tucker and his compatriots in order to argue for anarchism’s 
“sympathetic” end(s). Analyzing the response of the Boston Anarchists to the bombing of police 
officers at Haymarket Square and the resulting condemnation of anarchism allowed us to connect 
Adam Smith’s conceptualization of “sympathy” and anarchist politics. The result suggested that 
anarchic rhetoric seeks the rhetorical alignment of affective responses—the rhetorical 
construction of “moral sentiments”— can serve as the basis for self-government in place of the 
State. Extending the argument, we were also able to locate certain strands of Platonic thought in 
Marx’s historical materialism despite his own ambivalence towards the Greek philosopher. This 
connection allowed us to construct a foil to “rhetorical sympathy” in the form of “dialectical 
empathy.” This chapter continues to elaborate on this notion by examining the Marxist C.L.R. 
James’ response to and remedy for the problems associated with Stalinist-Marxism and the 
failures of American liberalism in regards to African American politics. In particular, this 
chapter aims to show that Marxism and liberalism’s desire to represent African Americans and 
have them identify with the State (Marxist or liberal) was, like our figuration of “dialectical 
empathy,” simply a ruse to obtain power and opened the door for James’ employment of 
anarchic rhetoric. 
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Both the writings and shifting political affiliations of C.L.R. James suggest an oftentimes 
conflicted relationship with Marxism, which, for our purposes here, hold much import for 
thinking about the relationship between rhetoric and radical politics. In particular, James came to 
America as a member of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), before joining another 
dissident Trotyskist group called the Workers Party (WP) in 1940, only to rejoin the SWP in 
1947. However, in 1951, James would eventually reject Trotskyism all together and go on to 
form an original “Marxist tendency” with Grace Lee Bogg and Raya Dunayevskaya called 
Correspondence Publishing Committee. James biographer Paul Buhle suggests that these shifts 
represent a “philosophical journey,” and that James’ novel approach “told the Old Left what it 
did not want to hear, and spoke to the rising New Left in a voice that it could not clearly 
understand” (Introduction xxi). That is, one can see that throughout his writings, James’ 
recognition that because of its perversion under Stalin, twentieth-century Marxism cannot—and 
should not—serve as an alternative to liberal capitalism: “The philosophy of Stalinism is the 
philosophy of the elite, the bureaucracy, the organizers, the leaders, clothed in Marxists 
terminology. It is the extreme, the historical limit of the rationalism of the bourgeoisie, carefully 
organized to look like a new revolutionary doctrine” (James, State Capitalism and World 
Revolution 121). On James’ view, the various responses to Stalinism, which included a focus on 
existentialism and psychoanalysis, were impotent in solving the problems posed by liberal 
capitalism and Stalinism. The problem facing James and his compatriots was the idea that “There 
is no longer any purely philosophical answer to all this. These philosophical questions, and very 
profound they are, Marxism says can be solved only by the revolutionary action of the proletariat 
and the masses. There is and can be no other answer” (State Capitalism and World Revolution 
129).  
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Consequently, there has been much difficulty in trying to pin down James’ politics 
among leftist-oriented academics and activists. For example, James biographer Kent Worcester 
notes, “James was able to forge a space for his idiosyncratic brand of radical and democratic 
politics with the context of Pan-African and black nationalist movements” (xiii), while E.P. 
Thompson suggests that James’ work is an “instinctive, unarticulated anarchism” (qtd. in 
Rosengarten 26). While many are willing to acknowledge his flexible approach to radical 
politics, his most well-known interpreters have insisted on placing him within the Marxist 
tradition. Worcester is quick to argue that “James’ politics were forged in the crucible of 
classical Marxism, and in many respects his life and work can only be understood with reference 
to his lifelong attachment to Marxist principles” (xiii). Regarding the anarchist claim, Paul Buhle 
posits that “[t]he misapprehension of James’ position” as “‘syndicalist’ or ‘anarchist’ in its 
treatment of party and state” is “sincere but mistaken” (“Marxism in the USA” 56). What, then, 
to make of James’ politics? James’ political indeterminacy, I argue, can best be understood as a 
rejection of dialectical/metaphysical Marxism/liberalism in favor of a rhetorical anarchism.  
However, as was mentioned in the last chapter, in being labeled a dangerous European 
phenomenon that espouses violence and dynamite, anarchism’s future in America was all but cut 
off at the legs. Indeed, James Martin notes that after the Haymarket Bombing and the death of 
Benjamin Tucker, anarchism in American and Europe would seemingly disappear within “avant 
garde…literature, philosophy and art,” smaller syndicalist movements, and “small libertarian 
groups ranging from experimental educators to exponents of social decentralization” (277). 
Thus, despite nearly disappearing as a distinct political category, as I hope to show in this 
chapter and the next, anarchism and its strategies of persuasion become appropriated for dueling 
political purposes. That is, in contradistinction to Jefferson’s pre-partisan anarchism and 
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Tucker’s non-partisan anarchism, there is a reemergence of anarchist thought and strategies in 
leftist American radicalism of the twentieth century, as well as far-right conservatism in the 
twenty first century. Regarding the former, this chapter argues that CLR James, who, in his drift 
away from dogmatic Marxism and Trotyskyism and distrust of liberal politics, would begin to 
advocate for a localized, decentralized, and autonomous (i.e. anarchist) African American 
politics. After all, James observed in the 1956 preface to the second edition of State Capitalism 
and World Revolution, “The great fact of the present organizations is that they suppress and 
crush what is always required for the building of a new society, the powers and energies of those 
have to build it” (xxxiii). Whether it is the Marxist or liberal State, or the labor unions working 
for political reforms on behalf of its members, “the bigger the traditional organizations grow and 
the more power they wield, the more they act as a brake upon these creative energies” (“Preface” 
xxxiii). In response to the failure of liberal and Communist statism and to foster the 
“construction of a new society from the bottom up (“Preface” xxxiv), James enacted an anarchic 
rhetoric that, like in our previous chapters, demonstrates the anarchistic/an-arkhê-istic qualities 
of decentralized, localized, and affective rhetorical acts. It is important to note, however, that 
while James confirms much of the work done in preceding chapters, he also extends our 
figuration by emphasizing anarchic rhetoric’s presupposition of absolute equality, demonstrating 
the power of anger within the sympathetic process, challenging traditional conceptualizations of 
ethos, as well as privileging the role of aesthetics in creating/judging anarchistic/an-arkhê-istic 
arguments. 
To that end, I first trace a brief history of James’ engagement with American politics, 
before moving into a discussion of his “‘My Friends’: A Fireside Chat on the War by Native 
Son.”  
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C.L.R. James Comes to America  
In 1932, upon moving to Britain from his native Trinidad, James made a name for 
himself as a sports reporter, creative writer, and political thinker. After the success of his 
political writings, notably his World Revolution 1917-1936 and The Black Jacobins, James found 
himself in high demand. In late 1938, at the request of Leon Trotsky, James left Britain for the 
US “to contribute to the work of the newly formed Socialist Workers Party” (LeBlanc 4), the 
organization representing Trotsky’s views in America. According to his friend and collaborator 
Grace Lee Boggs, James arrived in the US eager to engage in political activism, which included 
taking up the “negro question” with Trotsky, an issue that had increasingly come to the fore 
within American radical politics. She notes that upon landing in the US, James “had already 
studied and internalized the most important achievements of European civilization. But as a 
black man, a colonial, and a Marxist, he also knew that European barbarism had not just begun 
with Hitler” (Boggs 165).  
With this knowledge, and soon after landing in the US, James began meeting with 
workers, writers, and activists to discuss revolutionary politics. James first took up residence in 
Harlem where he socialized with many radical New York writers and activists. During his stay in 
Harlem, James met Richard Wright, and, despite their initial disagreements—James was a 
Trotskyist and Wright a Stalinist—they would go on to become friends. In fact, as will be 
discussed below, James located in Wright’s novel Native Son a figure through which he would 
develop his vision of radical socialism. James then embarked on a speaking tour in early 1939, 
which included a public debate concerning “pacifism” and “socialist revolution” with Bertrand 
Russell; according to McLemee, “[B]y a vote of audience, James won the debate” (xiii). These 
experiences began to solidify James’ role within American radical politics, as well as offer him a 
94 
 
 
glimpse into the American political, economic, and social scene that would greatly shape his own 
unique brand of revolutionary socialism. 
As suggested above, James’ American sojourn also solidified his reputation as an 
effective orator and polemicist with an uncanny ability to synthesize a variety of authors in his 
critiques of capitalism, racism, and dogmatic Marxism. In his first encounter with James, Martin 
Glaberman describes being “entranced by this tall (six foot, four inch) dark man who kept an 
audience in his grasp for three hours speaking about the British Empire, striding back and forth 
across the stage without a podium, without a note. I thought then, and I think now, that he was of 
the great orators of the twentieth century” (“C.L.R. James: A Recollection” 47). Charles Van 
Gelderen seconds Glaberman’s observation when he writes: 
James was probably the finest orator our movement has produced, at least in the English-
speaking world, and the movement made full use of his talents. In Britain he was the one 
person feared by the Stalinists as being more than a match for people such as Communist 
party leaders Harry Pollitt and R. Palme Dutt. Only once did the Communist party pluck 
up enough courage to engage him debate. In the Islington Library on Holloway Road he 
devastated the CP spokesperson Pat Sloan, himself no orator. (43)  
Apart from being a highly renowned lecturer and orator, James’ rhetorical talents found him to 
be a leading propagandist for revolutionary socialism in America. McLemee notes James’ 
“abundant journalistic output included a fair quantity of what might be called ‘revolutionary 
boilerplate’: newspaper columns denouncing racism, capitalist hypocrisy, and the misleaders of 
the African American community” (xxxi).  
Although James’ work has been taken-up within cultural and literary studies and political 
science, his work remains neglected within rhetorical studies despite his rhetorical prowess and 
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importance as a radical political thinker. However, as I hope will become clear, his 
“revolutionary boilerplate” offers a rich body of texts for rhetoricians interested in the 
intersections of race, rhetoric, and radical politics, and, more specifically, strategies of 
persuasion that run counter to liberal and Marxist thought.  
Marxism and African American Autonomy 
The impetus behind James’ tackling of the “negro question” was the position of African 
Americans in regards to liberal and Marxist politics. That is, while Jim Crow prevented full 
political and economic participation by African Americans, the Stalinist Communist Party, the 
most prominent alternative to liberalism, did no better. According to James, the Communist 
Party (CP) had:  
passed through three stages in its Negro work: (a) up to 1928 when the Negro work was 
neglected, (b) 1929-1935 when it made a drive, the period which coincided with the 
period of [denouncing all other left currents as] social fascism, and (c) 1935-1939, the 
open abandonment of the revolutionary line by the C.P. and the catastrophic loss of 
nearly all its Negro membership. (“The Communist Party’s Zigzags” 116) 
In other words, before promoting the idea of a Popular Front against the rise of fascism, a move 
that largely stifled any revolutionary tendencies outside of the CP and resulted in left-leaning 
coalition governments in France and Spain, the CP called for “self-determination” and the 
establishment of a “Negro Soviet Republic” within the “Black Belt” South. According to Cedric 
Robinson, the policy of “self-determination” advocated by the CP at the behest of Stalin was 
“political opportunism searching for theoretical justifications” (226). In other words, the CP’s 
call for “self-determination,” which was undergirded by historical materialism, was simply a 
tactic to strengthen the CP’s influence in America in order to seize power. Thus, when it did take 
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up the “negro question,” the CP in America, under the direction of Stalin and the Third 
International and in accordance with Marxist theory, presented two answers, both of which 
involved adhering to the State form.  
However, from 1928 to 1938, the Trotskyites, with whom James had aligned himself, 
“took even less interest in the Negro question than did the Communist Party” (James, “Historical 
Development” 74). In fact, in 1933, Trotsky himself did not agree with the stance his own 
organization had taken (McLemee xix). Whereas the SWP was advocating for the “liberal” idea 
of equal rights, Trotsky thought self-determination the more radical idea, although he refused to 
take a hard stance. What he did do was call for “a serious discussion of this question, perhaps in 
an internal bulletin” (“The Negro Question”).  
Trotsky and the SWP would soon be brought in-line thanks to James. In April of 1939, 
James traveled to Mexico to meet Trotsky and discuss the relationship between African 
Americans and Marxism. As McLemee notes, James wrote two resolutions concerning African 
Americans and the radical socialist movement that were accepted by the national convention of 
the Socialist Workers Party. The resolutions were not a call for a “separate black state,” but 
“affirm[ed] the right of the African American people to national self-determination, if they so 
chose, in the course of the revolutionary process” (xxii). Thus, the Trotskyist position on the 
“negro question” was the result of James’ work and discussions with Trotsky.  
In choosing to “affirm” and support rather than dictate and “lead” the actions of African 
Americans, James had developed a position, which despite its mundane appearance, stood in 
direct opposition to the CP’s stance. The CP had turned the “negro question” into a “national 
question,” and therefore stressed the necessity of forming an African American state in the 
South. Perhaps Jay Lovestone, leader of the Communist Party in the USA, best captured the 
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party’s stance: “The especially intense exploitation and heavy oppression to which millions of 
Negroes in America are subject make it imperative for the Party to devote its best energies and 
its maximum resources toward becoming the recognized leaders and champions of the Negroes 
as an oppressed people” (674-675). This view, according to James was “(1) economically 
reactionary and (2) politically false because no Negroes (except C.P. stooges) want it. For 
Negroes it is merely an inverted segregation” (“Preliminary Notes” 8). The idea that an 
organization would work to establish a State without having the assent or involvement of those 
who would occupy the State amounts simply to “they want to get rid of us” (“Note Following the 
Discussions” 15-16). Because the formation of a State was unwanted among the African 
American population, the idea represented a Communist Party dictate designed to seize power at 
the expense of the wants of African Americans.  
According to James, there was a certain irony in the way African Americans had been 
treated by radical socialist groups; their action suggested they were the most revolutionary of all 
populations. Citing the influences of both Black churches and Marcus Garvey, James argues: 
The success of the Garvey movement, the Divine Movement, and the millions of dollars 
poor Negroes pour annually into the churches out of their almost empty purses, all these 
are evidence of their fanatical devotion and capacity for self-sacrifice. And the 
revolutionary energy, the readiness to give all which distinguished the Garvey movement 
in particular, in return for nothing tangible but the promise of a new society, show that 
here, in contradistinction to the great movements of organized workers for wages, closed 
shops, etc., we have perhaps the most important manifestation in American capitalist 
society of one most powerful current in the coming socialist revolution. (“Notes 
Following the Discussions with Leon Trotsky” 16) 
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James recognized that the difficulty lay in reaching and organizing the African American 
populations. Recognizing the CP’s mistakes, as well as the revolutionary potential of African 
Americans, James would begin to advocate for a rhetorical agenda that emphasized local, 
decentralized, and anti-vanguardist politics. Moreover, if, as Joel Olson suggests, anarchism has 
by and large paid little attention to issues of race and politics, and James’ program is “clearly 
consistent with anarchist politics” (41), James might be thought of as the first anarchist thinker to 
seriously tackle this question. 
“My Friends” and “Anarchic Rhetoric” 
As one of the most prominent and active members within the Trotskyist movement and 
the Left Opposition, James took up the “negro question” in his writings for such publications as 
Socialist Appeal, Labor Action, and The Militant, which included tackling the question in a 
variety of genres. Although James often found himself writing for an “audience of Marxist party 
cadre,” James’ journalistic writings were aimed at a wider audience and often provided detailed 
accounts of the conditions of African American workers, reviews of popular books and films, 
and analyses of African American figures and historical events. Regarding his journalistic 
writing, James’ output was remarkable: “There are scores, possibly hundreds, of these pieces” 
(McLemee xxxi). Yet, James’ use of pseudonyms prevents us from knowing exactly which 
pieces James composed. However, in addition to his theoretical and journalistic writings, James 
often penned revolutionary socialist propaganda not restricted to “Marxist party cadre” or 
periodical subscribers. James’ 1940 text “‘My Friends’: A Fireside Chat on the War by Native 
Son” falls into this latter category. Indeed, McLemee suggests “My Friends” is “a very different 
sort of text altogether. Printed by the thousands and distributed as widely as possible, the 
pamphlet is an example of James as revolutionary propagandist” (xxxi). Kent Worcester’s 
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description of “My Friends” also points to its enigmatic character. Worcester suggests the piece 
is a “bibliophile’s prize.” Yet, he also characterizes it as a “fierce polemic” and “passionate but 
odd and strangely disingenuous” (68). While Worcester does not elaborate on his claim, his 
claim suggests that “My Friends” stands apart from the numerous other writings aimed at 
activists and intellectuals familiar with Marxist theory. James’ “My Friends: A Fireside Chat on 
the War by Native Son,” allows one to see how James writes, not as a Marxist theorist, but as a 
propagandist aimed at fostering a decentralized, autonomous, and self-determined African 
American (i.e. anarchist) political movement. 
Recalling the name of Richard Wright’s novel of the same name, which was published 
months before “My Friends,” James writes under the pseudonym “Native Son,” while also 
ironically (re)employing the rhetorical strategies taken by President Roosevelt and the Allies 
during the run-up to WWII, to argue that Roosevelt “should stop being so active in his defense of 
democracy abroad and pay attention to the crimes against democracy at home” (“Fireside Chat” 
20). For instance, James begins the text with Claude McKay’s poem “If We Must Die,” which 
Winston Churchill had recited in front of the American Congress to garner support for the fight 
against the Nazis. Furthermore, James parodies both the form and content of Roosevelt’s 
“fireside chat” throughout the text. James opens the piece by sarcastically pointing-up 
Roosevelt’s reliance on rational deliberation: “But in order to make you feel like you will be 
getting the real inside dope in a confidential manner, I shall begin by saying: ‘My friends, let us 
sit down, you and I, and talk this thing over together.’ That piece of baloney being out of the 
way, we can now get down to business” (18). The “business” James is alluding to is the 
“business” of achieving political and social change in spite of the State. By explicitly 
foregrounding his ironic appropriation of the “fireside chat,” writing as opponent to Stalin, and 
100 
 
 
arguing against Roosevelt’s liberalism, James presents a rhetoric that is motivated by “political 
affect,” equates rhetorical action with absolute equality, and challenges traditional 
conceptualizations of ethos.   
That is, as an astute observer of America culture and politics, James recognized the 
limitations of American liberalism and Stalinist Marxism as political and rhetorical programs. 
Particularly, James suggests that both American liberalism and Marxism have only pandered to 
African Americans, despite their revolutionary potential. In his follow-up notes to his meeting 
with Trotsky, James makes clear his estimation of the Communist Party’s reception among 
African Americans. He writes, “The C.P. [Communist Party] Negroes are looked upon as touts 
for Negro converts in exactly the same way as the Democratic and Republican Parties have touts 
for Negro votes” (“Preliminary Notes” 8). In other words, the desire to bring African Americans 
into the political process only serves the end of taking power. Both liberalism and Marxism seek 
to gain power while “representing” the views of African Americans. Marxism and liberalism 
seek to use African Americans as a means rather than as ends in and of themselves. For James, 
the goal is not simply to be included in politics by consenting to representation by a governing 
body or institution, but to create a revolutionary course that challenges the liberal and Marxist 
programs that insist on representation based on metaphysical principles in order to gain the 
powers of the State.  
James argues against this tendency, and suggests that Roosevelt’s liberalism and Stalin’s 
communism masks the condition of absolute equality qua the ability to act rhetorically. More 
specifically, by appealing to immutable concepts, both liberalism and Stalin’s communism seek 
to put subjects in their “rightful places” and preclude rhetorical engagement by African 
Americans. What I mean by rhetoric is the ability of a rhetor to raise an argument that challenges 
101 
 
 
the grounds or arkhê on which a political arrangement rests. In making this claim, I am using the 
work Jacques Rancière, who although does not employ an explicitly rhetorical vocabulary, 
provides an original and useful way to think through the connection between anarchism, rhetoric 
and politics.
1
 To that end, it is necessary to revisit and provide a brief summary of Rancière’s 
thinking before moving into a discussion of “My Friends.”  
In Rancière’s terms, “dissensus” counters the processes of “consensus” implemented by 
the “police” in order to recognize the logic of an arkhê. “The police,” Rancière tells us, “is a 
distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) whose principle is the absence of void and of 
supplement” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 36).2 Echoing Foucault, he suggests:  
The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and way of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a 
particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a 
particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as discourse 
and the another as noise. (Disagreement 29) 
Rancière finds in Plato’s Republic the first instance of such “partitioning.” Rancière calls the 
result of Plato’s “partitioning of the sensible” an “etho-logy” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 41). 
Because Plato seeks the “complete realization of the arkhê of community,” all individuals are to 
occupy certain roles that correspond to their particular knowledge(s), which, consequently, 
                                                 
1
 With a few exceptions, Rancière’s connection to rhetorical theory has yet to be explored 
in detail. Samuel McCormick, for instance, picked up on Rancière for his reading of Bertolt 
Brecht’s “Mr. Kuener” and the “political identity of the philosopher.” Also, Ethan Stoneman 
recently argued that “Rancière’s political theory implies an aesthetic model of rhetorical 
indecorum of which rhetoricians may avail themselves in order to rethink the relationship 
between rhetorical performance and political praxis” (131). See McCormick and Stoneman.  
2
 Steven Corcoran tells us that Rancière plays on the “double meaning of [the French] 
avoir-part,” which means to both “partake” and “partition.” That is, the “partage du sensible” 
both determines actions and creates distinctions between groups/individuals. See “translator’s 
note” on page 220 in Rancière’s Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.  
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ensures the smooth functioning of the polis (Disagreement 65). Furthermore, it is Rancière’s 
claim that since Plato, all “political philosophy lies in grounding political action in a specific 
mode of being,” and “works essentially to mask the litigiousness constitutive of politics” (“Ten 
Theses” 40). As a result of the ontological connection between knowledge and position, the 
ability of a subject to dissent and present arguments that challenge the arkhê that “partitions the 
sensible” is null and void.  
In his own fireside chat, James critiques Roosevelt’s “etho-logy” and its exclusion of 
rhetoric. In particular, James draws out his critique by pointing up that Roosevelt’s desire to 
speak for all and enter the war is reliant upon individuals consenting to a metaphysical arkhê that 
suggests certain individuals are to perform certain roles that correspond to the certain knowledge 
they possess. As James ironically points out, “I notice that a good fireside chat always has 
something in it about God and prayers. But I notice too that Hitler in all his speeches talks about 
God and asks for his blessing” (“Fireside Chat” 21). In this passage, James makes the case that 
by appealing to God, Roosevelt’s position as commander-in-chief is substantiated not by the US 
Constitution, but the arkhê of Christianity. On James’ reading, Roosevelt effectively masks the 
political by adopting the seemingly non-political form of “the fireside chat” and endowing with it 
appeals to the Almighty instead of the Constitution. Yet, in suggesting that Hitler’s position is 
also sanctified by God, James calls into question this arkhê, as well as the imperative to assent to 
it. The appeal to such an arkhê becomes, then, simply an effort to stave off dissent and arguments 
that challenge the validity of the State. It is simply a justification for the exercising of power. 
James writes, “Roosevelt, Hitler and [President] Wilson not only pray to God, but see to it that 
they have guns, battleships, and planes” (21-22).  
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To undermine the reign of the arkhê and resulting “etho-logy,” one must exercise his/her 
absolute equality by acting rhetorically. In response to impending war and the Popular Front, 
James writes, “In this moment of crisis, it is proper that the voice of the working man should be 
heard. The President governs for all, the priests pray for all, the solider fights for all (so, at any 
rate, we are told) but it is the working man who pays for all” (18). James point out that the 
President, despite his claim of embodying metaphysical figurations of the “good,” “just,” or 
“right,” cannot meet his own expectation: creating an all-encompassing system, logic, or arkhê 
that avoids crisis or dissension. Specifically, exercising one’s absolute equality by acting 
rhetorically upsets the reign of “archi-politics.” As Rancière writes, “The problem is not the 
always more but the anyone at all, the sudden revelation of the ultimate anarchy on which 
hierarchy rests” (emphasis in original, Hatred of Democracy 16). Confirming Plato’s suspicion, 
James’ rhetorical response seeks to question the metaphysical arkhê on which Roosevelt’s 
liberalism rests. Any attempt to speak for “all” can be undercut through rhetorical action. That is, 
“when the president talks about preparing America for war I demand my right to be heard” 
(James, “My Friends” 18). In short, any claim to political representation based on metaphysical 
concepts attempts to preclude rhetoric, the “litigiousness constitutive of politics.” The ability of 
rhetoric to question politics based on a metaphysical arkhê is an-arkhê-istic. It attempts to make 
the arkhê account for itself. In doing so, such a rhetoric performs the very function that Emma 
Goldman assigns to political anarchism: “Anarchism urges man to think, to investigate, to 
analyze every proposition” (50). James’ anarchism, then, can be thought of as a rhetorical 
response to a claim of representation based on a metaphysical arkhê, which invites an 
interrogation of the very premises on which the claim to representation relies. In other words, 
James enacts critique, which, as Wendy Brown writes, “[P]assionately reengages the text, 
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rereads and reconsiders the text’s truth claim. In so doing, critique reasserts the importance of the 
text under consideration (whether a law, nation, principle, practice, or treatise), its power to 
organize and contain us, its right to govern us” (16). This interrogation reveals the rhetorically 
constructed nature of the metaphysical arkhê on which politics, whether liberal or Marxist, 
appear to rest.  
Moreover, what I call James’ anarchic rhetoric presupposes Rancière’s absolute equality; 
one always has the ability to speak for oneself. James argues, “So that when the President talks 
about preparing America for war I demand to be heard. I know how to make a fireside chat. You 
are all sitting down listening to me and I am sitting down talking to you. You know it, I know it, 
everybody knows it” (“My Friends” 18). The “it” everyone possesses is the ability to act 
rhetorically in order to make a counter-fireside chat. This argument suggests that despite claims 
to the contrary, there is no ontological connection between the knowledge one has and the 
position he/she occupies. To act rhetorically, that is, to construct and present arguments that 
undermine what one might call Roosevelt’s metaphysical politics, means one has the ability to 
create and occupy new spaces and subjectivities.  
Painted in such a way, a picture of the connection between anarchist politics and 
rhetorical practice begins to emerge; it is anarchistic to be rhetorical. Or, in other words, rhetoric 
has the ability to call into question the arkhê on which political arrangements rest, which 
confirms Brian Garsten’s observation that “the reigning view of rhetorical speech is that it is a 
disruptive force in politics and a threat to democratic deliberation” (3). Indeed, Rancière’s own 
definition of politics relies on this calling-into-question the legitimacy of the arkhê. He argues, 
“Politics occurs wherever a community with the capacity to argue and to make metaphors is 
likely, at any time and through anyone’s intervention, to crop up” (Disagreement 60). This 
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response to and rejection of a metaphysical arkhê, or what I call James’ anarchic rhetoric, 
presents several implications still to be parsed. In what follows, I explore the relationship 
between anarchic rhetoric and judgment, as well as its relationship to the classical appeal of 
ethos.  
Affect and Judgment 
Despite his ambivalence towards the Communist Party in 1939, James recognized the 
need for thinking through the “negro problem.” James suggested that the SWP “must give its 
frank, sincere, and unwavering support” in “the awakening and bringing into political activity of 
the large mass of Negroes” (“Preliminary Notes” 11). Yet, the support must be unconditional; “it 
must be insisted upon that support of a Negro mass movement must not be conditional upon 
whether it is or soon will be socialist or not” (emphasis in original, “Preliminary Notes” 11). 
More pointedly, “The Negro much be won for socialism. There is no other way out for him in 
America or elsewhere. But he must be won on the basis of his own experience and activity” 
(James, “Preliminary Notes” 8). If there was to be an African American political movement it 
would have to develop autonomously with a minimum of outside influence. Because of the 
failures of both American liberalism and Soviet Communism, the only viable option was a self-
determined political program.  
To help foment political engagement among African Americans, James proposed that the 
Trotskyist Fourth International form a “section entirely devoted to the Negro question.” This 
section should “embark on an unremitting study of the Negro question, and immediately make 
arrangements for the publications of articles.” The section should also reach out to the active 
“Negro organizations in Harlem and elsewhere” (“Preliminary Notes” 12-13). The goal was to 
develop and compose a rhetorical program aimed at those African Americans active in the 
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NAACP, the Urban League, and other groups that were “reformist” and not seen to be radical. 
The program would “fight for the party’s ideas in a manner carefully adapted to their hearers’ 
point of view” (“Preliminary Notes” 13). By reaching out to these groups and appealing to their 
particular demands, “the transition to revolutionary socialism will not ultimately be difficult” 
(“Preliminary Notes” 11). James argued that the Fourth International could correct the mistakes 
made by the Stalinist Communist Party and play a role in the development of an African 
American movement by aiding instead of dictating. He concludes, “What the party must avoid at 
all costs is looking upon such a movement as a recruiting ground for party members, something 
to be ‘captured’ or manipulated for the aims of the party, or something which it supports 
spasmodically at the time it needs something in return” (“Preliminary Notes” 9). Thus, the 
challenge for James was constructing a rhetoric that avoided appearing vanguardist or 
prescriptive, yet assisted in fomenting a radical political movement.  
A quick note of clarification is needed before proceeding. While the next few paragraphs 
echo our earlier discussion of the rhetorical construction of shared “moral sentiments” 
(“sympathy”), I want to offer here an example of how the sympathetic process coalesces around 
the particular affect of anger, which Simon Critchley suggests is that which “moves the subject 
to action” (130). In other words, I want to draw attention to the role of anger in motivating 
anarchic rhetoric—an idea that will also be explored in more detail in the following chapter.  
For James, the response to Roosevelt stems from a seemingly axiomatic and affective 
judgment. That is, when Roosevelt claims that the moral act is joining in the fight against Hitler 
in order to protect American democracy, James responds, “Our democracy! My friends, when I 
heard that I laughed for ten minutes. Yes. Laughed. I’ll tell you why. It was because I was so 
damned mad that if I didn’t laugh I would have broken the radio.” James further argues, “I have 
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no democracy and the democracy I haven’t got Hitler didn’t take from me” (19). Describing the 
enemies of democracy in the US, which include President Roosevelt and the entire Democratic 
Party, as well as the American Federation of Labor and those “Negro-hating, Negro-baiting little 
American Hitlers from the South,” James argues “[t]hey have been lynching me and my people, 
giving us the dirtiest job, at the lowest pay, Jim Crowing us, taking the taxes we pay to teach 
while children, treating us worse than they treat their dogs” (19-20). The judgment stemming 
from this crisis is not an evaluation of how well a claim corresponds to a transcendent conception 
of the “good” or “just” (Rorty xvii). Rather, the judgment is a self-evident and affective response 
to a certain political and social situation that challenges the “correspondence” notion of 
judgment. Describing this notion, James writes:  
My friends, the President warns us about the fifth column. I understand that this is the 
new name for the enemies of democracy. Where have the President’s eyes been all this 
time? If he wants to find out who these fifth column people are, he just has to ask the 
Negroes. We know them. We spend our lives fighting against them. (“My Friends” 20)  
Anarchic rhetoric, then, does not seek validation in aligning a claim or course of action to a 
metaphysical figuration. It instead echoes John Protevi’s concept of political affect, which he 
describes as “the historically and socially embedded aspect of affective cognition” (35). 
Affective cognition is described as the ability of a body to be affected and make sense of that 
affection in order to develop a course of action (Protevi 51). If a claim of representation creates a 
sense of anger or wrong, one is motivated to exercise his/her absolute equality by acting 
rhetorically. In doing so, it “exposes the embodied and imitative nature of the political animal, its 
condition of political affect—that is, precisely that which disrupts the transcendent vision of the 
intellect” (Protevi 71). Against appeals to reason and/or rationality that seek to tame one’s 
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affective response in order to maintain order, and against Spinoza-influenced post-
Marxist/Autonomist theories that center on affect’s “constitutive power,”3 anarchic rhetoric 
recognizes the potential affect in general and anger in particular has in effecting radical political 
change by vetoing the very distinctions between “right” and “wrong” judgment. One might say, 
then, that rather than constitute an antagonism between two classes/groups within a static world, 
such a figuration of affect reveals the gap between two sensory worlds by making “visible that 
which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another” (Rancière, “Ten Theses on 
Politics” 38).   
Anarchy and Ethos 
Scholars of rhetoric will find that James’ rhetoric, when read through Rancière’s notion 
of “etho-logy” challenges rhetorical understandings of the ethical appeal, as well as reveals its 
aesthetic dimension. Risa Applegarth provides a useful definition of ethos when she writes:  
As simultaneously a spatial and social concept, ethos is a situated practice, neither fully 
and freely chosen nor yet thoroughly determined, but shaped through the interaction 
between individual rhetors and the social and material environments within which they 
speak. (49)  
For James, this definition of ethos is exactly the problem; the dialectic between a rhetor and the 
social/spatial, which is seen as the space in which a rhetor exercises his/her agency, is simply the 
dominant power’s acceptable process of invention. One can only “be” and “say” that which is 
permitted by his/her lot. As a result, within an “etho-logy” a rhetor’s ability to challenge the very 
                                                 
3
 The State, according to Antonio Negri, is a limit of desire, and can only be 
“overcome…to the extent to which we express love rather than hatred or other negative 
passions.” See Negri 170 
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terms of the argument is effectively preempted. The problem is not that only this or that is 
“sayable,” but that whatever is said remains ineffectual.  
Against the spatial-social figuration of ethos described above, anarchic rhetoric allows for 
the construction of subjectivities that, although unrecognizable under the reign of an “etho-logy,” 
exist nonetheless. Rancière calls this process “subjectification” and is the “action of subjects who 
by working the interval between identities, reconfigure the distributions of the public and the 
private, the universal and the particular” (Hatred of Democracy 61-62). That is, subjectification 
“constantly bring[s] the universal into play in a polemical way” (Hatred of Democracy 62). This 
process means one is able to observe more and different means of persuasion than those admitted 
under an “etho-logy.” To be specific, it allows for a wider body of ethical topoi from which a 
rhetor can draw, including those means that were once thought illegitimate or invalid. Thus, 
anarchic rhetoric readily opens up new rhetorical, ethical, and political possibilities, including 
using those that were formerly used as a weapon in the forming of an “etho-logy.” In short, 
anarchic rhetoric takes as its goal the upsetting of traditional figurations of ethos, which, in turn, 
opens up the available means of persuasion to both construct new spaces and subjectivities.  
By writing under the pseudonym “Native Son” and evoking the “fireside chat,” James 
violates the racial and political order of early-to-mid-twentieth century America. Scott McLemee 
suggests “My Friends” is a “fiction of a black sharecropper taking President Roosevelt’s place at 
the microphone” (xxxi). The setting is a living room replete with presidential amenities: 
newspapers, a radio, a fireplace, and literature. However, the pseudonym “Native Son,” which 
evokes Richard Wright’s character Bigger Thomas, as well as Bigger’s murder of a white 
woman to prevent rape allegations, creates a Burkean “perspective by incongruity:” a black 
sharecropper occupying the White House.  
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The figure of Bigger Thomas is an important one for James. A month before “My 
Friends” was published, James published “On Native Son by Richard Wright” in Labor Action. 
In this piece, James takes up the question: “Is Bigger ‘typical?’” The answer foreshadows 
Rancière’s notion of “etho-logy” and James’ anarchic rhetoric. He writes, “What is a ‘typical’ 
Negro? ‘Typical’ of what? In capitalist society at the present time, no ‘typical’ Negro could 
express the point of view that Wright wished to portray. Bigger Thomas represents the Negro in 
revolt” (56). Under 1940s capitalist logic, certain actions, rhetorics, and subjectivities were 
allowed and/or forbidden. However, according to James, because Bigger’s actions are not 
“typical” or correspond to the logic of an arkhê, they violate the accepted understanding of 
ontology, politics, epistemology, and rhetoric. Indeed, Bigger “does not quote Marx and say, 
‘Workers of the world unite,’ or, ‘Black and white, unite and fight.’ He does not even know what 
the ‘Reds’ stand for. But he is a revolutionary nevertheless, instinctive but none the less 
powerful” (56-57). In other words, although Bigger lacks an understanding of revolutionary 
Marxism, his knowledge, which lacks the requisite correspondence to an abstract and 
metaphysical category, is revolutionary nonetheless. In describing Bigger Thomas in such a way, 
and drawing on this image in “My Friends,” James asks the 1940’s reader to consider a new 
subjectivity, that of Bigger Thomas, a black man who does not fit within the liberal American or 
revolutionary Marxist schema, occupying the White House. 
Cast in this way, James’ take on Bigger seems to violate the notion of “typicality” put 
forth by Georg Lukács.
4
 Instead, James seems to argue for the sort of art that Lukács derides: “If 
a work of art depicted only the overflowing abundance of new concepts, only those aspects 
                                                 
4
 Lukács argues, “The work of art must therefore reflect correctly and in proper 
proportion all important factors objectively determining the area of life it represents. It must so 
reflect these that this area of life becomes comprehensible from within and from without, re-
experiencable, that it appears as a totality of life” (38) 
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which provide new insights…then the reader would merely be confused instead of involved” 
because “the appearance of such aspects in life generally confuses people and leaves them at a 
loss” (39). As already stated, James here employs what Kenneth Burke calls “perspective by 
incongruity,” which Burke describes as the intermediate stage in the creation of “new meanings” 
that involves the “rending and tearing” of formerly held “orientations” (69).  
Through this “perspective by incongruity,” whereby James asks the audience to consider 
a subjectivity that violates the logic undergirding political and rhetorical engagement, the 
connection between rhetorical action and political anarchism becomes explicit. James argues that 
because anyone can act rhetorically, there is no connection between the knowledge one has and 
the position they occupy; anyone can occupy the White House and offer a fireside chat. 
Moreover, the figure of the White House, which was once used to suppress dissent, is now the 
site of dissension; the tool of the oppressor becomes the tool of the oppressed. As a result of 
anyone and everyone having the ability to act rhetorically, which allows for the construction of 
an-arkhê-istic subjectivities, it invalidates the ontological connection between knowledge and 
position and consequently points to the irrelevance of the White House and government as a 
whole. If anyone and everyone can govern, then no one need govern; government is simply 
unneeded in so far as government is epitomized by the State.  
The summoning of Bigger Thomas in James’ text also points to the aesthetic dimension 
of politics and rhetoric. In line with Rancière’s thought, James blurs the line between rhetoric 
and aesthetics. “Subjectification,” or the process of creating an an-arkhê-istic/anarchistic political 
subjectivity, is an aesthetic process: “politics is aesthetic in principle” (Disagreement 58). More 
specifically, Rancière writes, “Political invention operates in acts that are at once argumentative 
and poetic” (Disagreement 59). By evoking the figure of “Native Son” and creating the 
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“perspective by incongruity” mentioned above, James makes the implicit argument that a radical 
politics demands a corresponding aesthetic and that the aesthetic is always political. That is, one 
reads in James’ text an aestheticized rhetoric that collapses the division between rhetoric/poetics 
or rhetoric/aesthetics. Further, the figure of “Native Son” suggests James’ discontent with both 
Roosevelt’s liberalism and Marxism. While “Native Son” explicitly takes issue with Roosevelt’s 
liberal policies, James’ characterization of Bigger Thomas as unaware of Marxism and 
revolutionary socialism suggests that James’ own malcontent with Stalinist Marxism and CP 
politics are coalesced in the figure of “Native Son.” Without an awareness of or acceptance by 
the Communist Party, James’ “Native Son” suggests that the only way forward is to create one’s 
own politics. Indeed, James’ anarchic rhetoric seems to resonate with Max Horkheimer’s 
suggestion, which also serves as the epigraph of this chapter, “The critical mind must free itself 
from a Marxism which says that all will be well if only you become a socialist” (21).  
“an entirely new comprehension of the meaning of socialist politics” 
Already a well-known figure and writer within radical circles and Trotsky’s Left 
Opposition, James’ time in America proved to be a formative experience both for him and his 
approach to radical politics. Throughout his extended stay in the U.S., which ended in 
imprisonment and deportation by the U.S. Government, James began to develop his wholly 
original approach to revolutionary politics. James himself suggested that his years in the U.S. 
were “the most important years of my life, intellectually and personally” (qtd. in McLemee xiv). 
Worcester argues, “It is indisputable that the United States offered James a set of relationships 
and challenges that stimulated some of his best writing while it also opened him up to an entirely 
new comprehension of the meaning of socialist politics” (“James and the American Century” 
177). In short, because of his engagement with the American scene, James’ political writings can 
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be seen as his effort to translate and transform European socialism and Marxism into an 
American political program. In other words, when James wrote that “[t]here is no longer any 
purely philosophical answer to” the problems of Marxism and liberalism, and that these 
problems “can be solved only by the revolutionary action of the proletariat and the masses” 
(State Capitalism and World Revolution 129); James provided an alternative in the form of 
anarchic rhetoric.  
What’s more, James’ rhetoric, anticipating certain strands of poststructuralist thought, 
lays bare the stifling effects and consequences of metaphysical politics, be it Marxist 
vanguardism informed by dialectics, or liberalism and its assumption of rationality within 
dialectical exchange. In addition, James foreshadows Rancière in arguing that the arkhê borne of 
metaphysical/dialectical politics masks absolute equality, as well as Rancière’s aestheticization 
of politics. Finally, James points up the way in which anger can motivate—via the sympathetic 
process—the disruption of the political status quo. As such, James also sets the stage for its 
appropriation by twenty-first century conservatives, which we will explore in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
WHAT’S LEFT OF THE RIGHT AND RIGHT WITH THE LEFT?: FINDING THE 
FUTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY IN THE END(S) OF RADICAL POLITICS 
“We have corruption unlike anything we’ve ever seen. We have socialism and 
communism. I read a Web site today from — I think it was the Communist Party 
USA — they’re taking credit for a lot of the victories recently in the elections 
here in the last week. I mean, did you even know these guys were around 
anymore? They’re rearing their ugly heads, revolutionaries and anarchists” (Glenn 
Beck, “The Enemies of America Are Hard at Work”). 
 
“When in doubt, in American politics, left, right, or center, deploy the Founding 
Fathers” (Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes 14).  
 
“The historian’s ancestry goes back to Socrates.” (Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” 91). 
 
The last chapter demonstrated how C.L.R. James in his drift away from dogmatic 
Marxism and Trotskyism enacted anarchic rhetoric from a leftist position. That is, in response to 
the failures of both liberalism and Marxism, James began to question the role of both the liberal 
and Marxist State and their ability to create, manage, and/or protect an equitable political 
arrangement, and, as a result, enacted anarchic rhetoric to advocate for a localized, decentralized, 
and autonomous (i.e. anarchist) African American politics. As we have seen throughout the last 
few chapters, such a rhetoric is both anarchistic and an-arkhê-istic because it presupposes 
absolute equality; aims for the aligning of rhetorically constructed “moral sentiments” 
(sympathy); questions traditional conceptualizations of ethos; blurs the boundary between 
rhetoric and aesthetics; and seeks the dynamic non-teleological exchange of ideas and 
arguments.  
While this dissertation has traced the genealogy of anarchic rhetoric as a series of 
strategies running parallel to the more “traditional” varieties of American leftism, this chapter 
presents a rather peculiar situation by suggesting that the best example of anarchic rhetoric today 
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has taken shape under the Tea Party movement associated with America's radical conservatism. 
In other words, as in the epigraph above, when Glenn Beck asks his audience if they are aware 
that “anarchists” are “still around,” this essay answers: “Yes, Glenn. And you are one of them.” 
In making such an accusation, my aim here is to argue that instead of placing its faith in the more 
“traditional” liberal, socialist, or Marxist politics, which includes the once ubiquitous Occupy 
Wall Street movement, a reevaluation of the rhetorical strategies of today’s far-right 
conservatism might better serve today’s Left as it looks for a new ways to intervene in the social, 
political, and economic inequities that mark the world today. Or, perhaps more pointedly, 
applying our model of anarchic rhetoric to the Tea Party will demonstrate the elasticity of 
anarchic rhetoric, which, I hope, will also ask us to reconsider our political categories and 
practices by pointing out that the deeply engrained rejection of representative thinking 
(dialectics) and politics (liberalism, Marxism, socialism) present in American radicalism is an 
attitude that begins to blur the contemporary boundaries between “right” and “left.” To be clear, 
those on the Left, or those who are simply concerned with today’s inequities, would do well to 
recognize that there exists a body of rhetorical topoi—anarchic rhetoric—that not only has done 
much to intervene in these areas of human life, but also redirects our attention back to the legacy 
of critical theory, by challenging the teleology stemming from the metaphysics undergirding our 
political arrangements and institutions. Instead of emphasizing reason over the affective, 
empathy over sympathy, the dialectical over the rhetorical, the teleological over the open-ended, 
in order to wrest away power from another group, those who desire a just, participatory, and 
egalitarian should, I suggest, recognize that anarchic rhetoric gives individuals the tools needed 
to determine their own ends, their own telos. In doing so, such a project evokes an all but 
forgotten (and/or maligned) political tradition: anarchism.  
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Taking up anarchism, then, means doing what the radical anarchist “ex-worker 
collective” CrimethInc, who implicitly express both the connection of rhetoric to anarchist 
politics and the importance of such a connection, suggest is necessary for creating a just, 
equitable, and participatory society. In what I would argue is the most succinct summary of the 
anarchic rhetoric, they write in Fighting for Our Lives: a Primer on Anarchy:  
Meddle with The Truth, undermine it, create a space in which new truths can form. 
Introduce questions, not answers—though remember, not all questions end in question 
marks. For the revolutionary, the essence of a statement lies in its effects, not in whether 
or not it is “objectively” true—this approach distinguishes her from philosophers and 
other idle bastards. (10)  
For today’s radicals and critical theorists, in other words, the goal should not be to create a 
politics that aims to become more faithful to the “Truth” than its predecessors like today’s return 
to metaphysics and Marxism. Rather, on the anarchist view, we ought to revive what Kenneth 
Burke (and Derrida after him) taught us: “all effective medicines are potential poisons” (Burke 
126). One might say, then, that radicalism today means rejecting both the illnesses and remedies 
associated with politics and political thought by “declaring our independence” from the body 
politic outright. In “declaring our independence” from the body politic, today’s critical theorists 
and radicals ought to strive for creating innumerable societies founded on the free-flowing 
exchange of affective/aestheticized responses to subjective and empirical perceptions that allow 
for the endless congealing and dissolving of human sympathies. 
False Negatives: How Politicians Diagnose and Cure Political Illness 
Like the politics of Jefferson, Tucker, and James, there has been a certain awkwardness 
among politicians, pundits, and critical theorists in addressing and assessing both the rhetorical 
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approaches and political expediencies the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movements. 
For instance, upon the clearing-out of OWS protestors in Zuccotti Park, New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg asserted, “Protestors have had two months to occupy the park with tents and 
sleeping bags. Now they will have to occupy the space with the power of their arguments” 
(Bloomberg). These remarks reveal Bloomberg’s inability or unwillingness to recognize the 
point of OWS. Prior to clearing-out the park Bloomberg bluntly stated, “It was just an 
opportunity for a bunch of unions to complain or to protest or whatever they want to do” (M. 
Lee). However, whether he is unable or unwilling is of little concern; his actions reveal the wont 
to put protestors back into recognizable positions. Because OWS protestors did not engage in the 
deliberative process, their arguments were either unrecognizable or inadmissible within the realm 
of political rhetoric. In short, Bloomberg’s desire to have protestors “occupy the space” with “the 
power of their arguments” is simply the desire to have protestors reengage the acceptable spaces 
and arguments.  
There was also a similar reaction to the earlier Tea Party movement. In its early stages, 
much like OWS, the Tea Party did not engage in deliberation and consensus building. The 
resurgence of the “Town Hall Meeting” during the debate surrounding President Obama’s 
“Affordable Care Act” serves as a case in point. After suspending his town hall meetings with 
constituents due to “angry, sign-carrying mobs and disruptive behavior,” Democratic 
congressman Tim Bishop remarked, “There is no point in meeting with my constituents and [to] 
listen to them and have them listen to you if what is basically an unruly mob prevents you from 
having an intelligent conversation” (qtd. in Isentadt). Indeed, the scenes of citizens openly and 
polemically engaging their elected officials in response to health care reform shocked American 
politicians on both sides of the aisle. Republicans made a hard right to appease an angry 
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electorate, while, like Congressman Bishop, President Obama called for a roundtable discussion 
in order to “procedurally” and “methodically” examine the differing health care proposals in 
order to reach some sort of mutual agreement (Brown and Allen). Both of these responses—the 
sudden embracing of far-right conservatism and the call for reasonableness and rationality—
were moves that sought to engage the Tea Party in the political process.   
The difficulty in understanding both the Tea Party and OWS movements has also been 
played out in the media coverage of these movements. In an attempt to define and explain the 
Tea Party, The Christian Science Monitor, for instance, suggested that the Tea Party movement 
is best characterized as the slogan “You can't fix stupid, but you can vote it out” (Jonsson). 
Ambiguous as it might be, the description suggests that the Tea Party, at least in its earlier 
incarnation, was not interested in making “demands.” They simply sought to vote out those who 
did not agree with certain conservative principles. While the Tea Party made no qualms about 
what they were against, their positive agenda was, according to some, nowhere to be found. Like 
the Tea Party, the OWS movement and its lack of “demands” left pundits and commentators 
befuddled. Indeed, the lack of an apparent agenda motivated a group of Huffington Post writers 
to turn “to a panel of marketing experts to find out what this unlikely startup [OWS] can do, 
marketing-wise, to survive and grow” (Chun). Because the OWS and Tea Party movements 
adopted a tack that foregrounds their rejection of deliberation and consensus, pundits and 
politicians have been left to construct caricatures and straw men in order to respond to both of 
these movements.    
Similarly, for left-oriented critical theorists, most notably Slavoj Žižek, OWS has 
provoked a response that seems to undercut the contemporary critique of liberal politics within 
critical theory. Interestingly, Žižek, whose work would appear to embrace the rhetorical program 
119 
 
 
of OWS, suggests that the lack of demands will eventually have to change. In fact, his comments 
about OWS apply just as well to the Tea Party movement, which he calls both a “sister 
movement” to OWS and the “only true opposition to liberal consensus” (qtd. in A. Lee; Living in 
the End Times 464). Noting the effectiveness of not engaging in dialogue, Žižek argues, “This 
silence, this rejection of dialogue, of all forms of clinching, is our ‘terror’, ominous and 
threatening as it should be” (“Occupy First”). In place of negotiation and dialogue, the OWS and 
Tea Party movements favor an unrelenting critique of the current political and economic 
institutions. However, Žižek also argues that OWS “will have to coalesce not only in some new 
master-signifiers, but also in concrete answers to the old Leninist question, ‘What is to be 
done?’” (“Occupy First”). In making this claim, it appears that Žižek, who, despite his vehement 
and often violent condemnations of liberal politics, holds on to the notion that equitable politics 
must be won either by participating in the State through representative process, or by adopting 
the Marxist approach and simply taking it over.     
Despite the competing partisan leanings, what is clear, judging by the responses of 
politicians, commentators, and political theorists, is that both the OWS and Tea Party movements 
violate liberal notions of deliberation and consensus. Liberalism, as John Rawls argues, is 
concerned with “political society as a fair system of social cooperation” with “citizens as 
reasonable and rational, and free and equal” (134-135). Picking up on this definition, Bryan 
Garsten suggests that the rhetoric of liberalism “assumes that people can find some shared point 
of agreement and asks how they can engage in deliberation within the boundaries set by that 
underlying agreement” (6). Thus, participants in the liberal political process begin with a shared 
set of assumptions and work towards building consensus on some issue or policy. Both OWS and 
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the Tea Party stand in opposition to the rhetoric of liberalism; they refuse to engage in rational 
dialogue, liberalism’s defining form of communicative interaction.  
While these similarities are striking, each group rages against a different machine, which 
has borne out varying successes. Indeed, the descriptions The New York Times provide are 
indicative of the ways in which these two movements are viewed; OWS “stand[s] against 
corporate greed, social inequality and the corrosive power of major banks and multinational 
corporations over the democratic process” (“Occupy Movement”), while the Tea Party is “is an 
antigovernment, grass-roots political movement,” whose “supporters tend to unite around fiscal 
conservatism and a belief that the federal government has overstepped its constitutional powers” 
(“Tea Party Movement”). Further, the results of these two movements are today beginning to 
become clear; whereas by early 2012, the OWS movement has seemingly vanished from the 
political scene and national discourse (Freidman), “Tea Party-style politics is likely to remain for 
so0me time to come, a pivotal part of ongoing, fierce disputes about what the U.S. government 
should do and not do” (Skocpol and Williamson 205). Given that both OWS and the Tea Party 
have forwarded pointed critiques of liberal politics, which have also met with varying success, 
we might wonder: In terms of coalition-building and political influence, what has led to the 
success of the Tea Party? And, more importantly, what implications does this have for critical 
and rhetorical theory, and the radical Left?   
I argue that the Tea Party’s longevity and political successes are thanks to its enactment 
of anarchic rhetoric, which, consequently, may also have something to offer to those on the Left 
concerned about social, political, and economic justice. To make this case, I will paradoxically 
take up a recent event that saw the Texas State Board of Education rewrite its social studies 
curriculum to reflect an overt conservatism. The changes included dramatically playing up the 
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role of Christianity in influencing the American Revolution while relegating Thomas Jefferson to 
a minor role (Lepore 13). What is of interest in this situation is the way in which the Texas State 
Board of Education was able to make such sweeping changes. In fact, part of my argument here 
is that the actions of the Texas State Board of Education are representative of a larger shift 
within American political and cultural life that, in addition to serving as the catalyst for this 
current study, has warranted a revaluation of critical theory and its attachment to radical politics. 
To be specific, as the philosopher of science Mario Pigliucci points out, the Texas State Board of 
Education (ironically) retooled leftist critique for its rightist goals.  
The irony of this rear-guard action by conservatives is that they have learned the 
right sort of politically correct language, talking about uprooting the allegedly left-
imposed “ideological bias” of public education, or about “teaching the controversy” 
(concerning creation-evolution) so that students can “freely” make up their minds about 
the supposed inconsistencies of evolutionary theory. (“Ideology vs. Education”)   
As I hope will become clear, my analysis of this event offers a more optimistic diagnosis 
of the state of critical theory than most: critique is not dead. In fact, it is alive and well, albeit in a 
different form. To be specific, in my estimation, which stands against those on the Left who are 
actively seeking to disregard critical theory’s legacy or have simply admitted its “defeat,” critical 
thought’s political unmooring reveals its radical, egalitarian, and democratic potential. In other 
words, critique—as the examination and laying bare the contingent nature of any claim of 
representation or appeal to immutable “truth”—is thoroughly rhetorical and anarchistic. To be 
specific, instead of critique being wed to a dialectically-informed Marxist vanguardism,
1
 which 
                                                 
1
 In his seminal essay, “Traditional and Critical Theory,” Max Horkheimer suggests, “It 
is the task of the critical theoretician to reduce the tension between his own insight and oppressed 
humanity in whose service he thinks” (221). 
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seemingly reifies the sort of representative thinking and politics we have been criticizing 
throughout these pages, the aims of critical thought takes shape under anarchic rhetoric with its 
presupposition of equality, aestheticized and affective responses to perceived wrongs, rhetorical 
construction of moral sentiments (“sympathy”), and endless questioning of all claims of 
representation or transcendent truths. In short, the uptake of critical thought among today’s far-
right conservatives, which, to many thinkers, has meant the “end of radical politics” and the 
“death of critical theory, gives us good reason to connect the goals of critical thought to 
anarchism: the most radical, egalitarian, democratic, and rhetorical (anti-)politics.    
Before I continue, I want to offer a point of clarification: In what follows, I endorse the 
form of today’s conservative politics, but, it is important to note, I am generally weary of the Tea 
Party’s political goals, particularly its desire for an unfettered capitalism. My point here is that 
the elasticity of anarchist politics and anarchic rhetoric—two concepts that are “without 
content”—may more effectively contribute to developing communicative strategies that aide in 
the creation of a just and equitable society than the Platonism that undergirds the Left’s liberal, 
socialist, and/or Marxist politics.  
The Tea Party? 
Because the Tea Party is a relatively new phenomenon, much of the scholarship has 
focused on defining and explaining the Tea Party’s politics. In their ethnographic study of Tea 
Party activists, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson, two political scientists at Harvard, 
suggest that “the Tea Party is fundamentally the latest iteration of long-standing, hard-core 
conservatism in American politics” (82), which, as a result, has “pulled the Republican Party 
sharply toward the right, and shifted U.S. public debates at a critical juncture” (205). In 
contradistinction, the libertarian and Constitutional scholar Elizabeth Price Foley argues that the 
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Tea Party “has shown a ruthless ability to reject any candidate, of any party, who doesn’t 
embrace their principles and a persistence in pursuing their agenda with any candidate who’ll 
listen. To the extent that the Tea Party has been more successful in obtaining the ear of the 
Republican Party may be (or is becoming) accountable to the Tea Party, and not vice versa” 
(xiv). Ronald P. Formisano splits the difference between Foley and Skocpol and Williamson and 
argues that the Tea Party is “[n]ot quite an independent political party and not quite a full-
fledged populist social movement but [has] some characteristics of both” (15). While the above 
descriptions do little to provide a stable picture of Tea Party politics, they are diagnostic in that 
they highlight the political ambiguity of the Tea Party that we discussed in the opening pages.  
The difficulty in assessing the status of the Tea Party as a political and social movement 
can be owed to the fact that it “is an amorphous, factionalized uprising with no clear leadership 
and no centralized structure” (Barstow). However, such a difficulty is not simply the result of the 
Tea Party not having a clearly defined organizational structure; it also lacks a clearly articulated 
political telos. For instance, political scientists Miller and Walling, calling on the work of social 
movement scholars Stewart, Smith, and Denton, cannot determine whether the Tea Party seeks to 
“revive” a storied past or “resist” changes to the status quo (6). Pointing out the Tea Party’s lack 
of vision and goals, the historian Mark Lilla suggests, “Anarchistic like the Sixties, selfish like 
the Eighties, contradicting neither, it [the Tea Party] is estranged, aimless, and as juvenile as our 
new century” (“Tea Party Jacobins”). Summarizing these views, one might say that the Tea Party 
seems to defy the neat ideological categories that political and social scientists are wont to 
prescribe to it because it is immature and has no positively identified set of ideals to be achieved; 
its partisan promiscuity is thanks to its lack of a political teleology.  
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Yet, as was outlined above, the Tea Party’s lack of a political telos gives pause to today’s 
partisans on both the Left and Right. To no surprise, then, the conservative commentator David 
Brooks’s negative definition proves to be the most succinct characterization of the group. He 
writes: 
The tea party movement is a large, fractious confederation of Americans who are defined 
by what they are against. They are against the concentrated power of the educated class. 
They believe big government, big business, big media and the affluent professionals are 
merging to form self-serving oligarchy — with bloated government, unsustainable 
deficits, high taxes and intrusive regulation. (“The Tea Party Teens”)  
Such a characterization is certainly prevalent in the platform of the Tea Party Patriots, “the most 
grassroots entity among tea party organizations” (Formisano 33). Citing Thomas Jefferson and 
the other Founding Fathers, their “mission is to restore America’s founding principles of Fiscal 
Responsibility, Constitutionally Limited Government and Free Markets” (“About Tea Party 
Patriots”). Despite the appearance of clearly articulated set of goals, when one recalls the Tea 
Party’s unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the Left that we addressed earlier, a defining 
paradox seems to emerge: by not participating in the American political process, the Tea Party 
will restore America’ founding political values. Moreover, if, as was argued in the first chapter, 
those particular political values can be considered anarchist, then one might say that the Tea 
Party is the inheritor of a long line of American anarchism.     
Taken as a whole, the above discussion of the Tea Party suggests that one might think of 
the Tea Party less in terms of a “party” or a “politics,” but what Kenneth Burke calls an 
“orientation.” Burke writes, “Orientation is thus a bundle of judgments as to how things were, 
how things are, and how they may be” (14). Thus, the orientation propelling today’s 
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conservatism is undergirded by an overtly “anti-government” sentiment and distrust of elites and 
experts. 
Comparing the Tea Party’s “orientation” to that of the most visible anarchist group in the 
US, the CrimethInc ex-Workers Collective, the Tea Party’s inherent anarchism comes to the fore. 
According to CrimethInc:  
Whenever you act without waiting for instructions or official permission, you are an 
anarchist. Any time you bypass a ridiculous regulation when no one’s looking, you are an 
anarchist. If you don’t trust the government, the school system, Hollywood, or the 
management to know better than you when it comes to things that affect your life, that’s 
anarchism, too. And you are especially an anarchist when you come up with your own 
ideas and initiatives and solutions. 
To reiterate, then, one can clearly begin to recognize within the Tea Party’s distrust of 
governmental institutions and regulations, scientists and academics, and its non-teleological 
underpinning, the distinct shape of anarchist politics. The result is that the radical Left and 
radical Right begin to overlap. 
The conservative commentator David Brooks also picks up on the Tea Party’s anarchistic 
tendency and suggests that the blurring between left and right is the result of the Right’s 
appropriation of the Left’s earlier use of non-dialectical rhetoric. He suggests, “The Tea Partiers 
have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for street theater, mass rallies, marches and 
extreme statements that are designed to shock polite society out of its stupor” (“The Wal-Mart 
Hippies”). Ronald Formisano makes explicit the Tea Party’s non-dialectical approach when he 
notes that the Tea Party “claim[s] to be above the nitty-gritty of politics and the established 
parties” while “proudly declar[ing] their unwillingness to negotiate or compromise” (17). The 
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result of such an approach, much like the New Left of the sixties, is that the Tea Party is 
unrecognizable as a worthy politics in today’s liberal-democratic arrangement. To put it 
succinctly, the Tea Party is overtly anti-political and the strategies of persuasion they employ 
exemplify the anarchic rhetoric we have been discussing throughout the last chapters; it is an-
arkhê-istic and anarchistic. In other words, the Tea Party today provides the most visible 
alternative to the Platonism present in today’s liberal, Marxist, and socialist politics. An 
examination, then, of the Tea Party’s use of history reveals a rhetoric that presupposes absolute 
equality qua the ability to construct arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political 
arraignment rests, which, in doing so, seeks sympathy as its end, or the aligning of affective 
responses through aesthetic judgment.  
Bitter Tea: Angry, Old, Rich, White Men as Persecuted and Disenfranchised Victims 
The Tea Party’s critique of liberalism is undergirded by a palpable anger and disaffection. 
It is an affective response to the perceived failures of the State. The source of such anger is the 
belief that the US has morphed into its Other: a socialist/communist State. As a matter of fact, 
most journalistic and scholarly commentary locate the origin of the Tea Party in the passionate 
“rant” of CNBC anchor Rick Santelli against President Barack Obama’s governmental policies 
during the “Great Recession.” In response to the passing of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, which was passed less than a month after Barack Obama took the presidential 
oath of office, Rick Santelli decried on live television the government’s decision to cut taxes and 
engage in “stimulus” spending as way to promote economic activity and stave off a recession. 
Expressing his belief that the government had violated America’s defining traits, the US 
Constitution and free-market capitalism, Santelli screamed: “This is America!” (“The Power of 
Rick Santelli’s Rant”). After being sardonically called a “revolutionary” by another anchor, the 
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red-faced and foaming-mouthed Santelli responded by shouting, “If you read our Founding 
Fathers, people like Benjamin Franklin and Jefferson — what we're doing now in this country is 
making them roll over in their graves” (“The Power of Rick Santelli’s Rant”). To phrase it 
another way, Santelli’s vitriol and anger was aimed at the perceived concentration of power in 
the Federal government and its ability to interfere with the Constitution and capitalism, the 
bastions of political and economic freedom the Founding Fathers established as a result of the 
British government’s own intrusion and overreach into the lives of American colonialists. The 
remedy Santelli offered completed his analogy: For the morally misguided Keynesian economic 
policies of President Obama, Santelli proposed “[a] Chicago Tea Party” (“The Power of Rick 
Santelli’s Rant”). Possibly more telling, however, might be the fact that as he stood on the floor 
of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange staring and yelling into a camera, Santelli’s rant was met 
with sympathetic cheers and applause from fellow traders, or the “real Americans” (i.e. 
capitalists and constitutionalists) as Santelli referred to them. 
 Soon thereafter, Santelli’s “shout heard ‘round the world” was being proliferated 
by bloggers, conservative groups, and Fox News. Formisano notes, “In early 2009, economic, 
political, and cultural shocks came together to activate ordinary persons across the country—
mostly conservative Republicans, but also independents and others—to organize and mobilize” 
(27). The election of the first African American Democratic President, the recession, and 
Santelli’s rant resulted in “Tax Day” protests “in some 750 towns and cities across the country” 
on April 15, 2009” (Formisano 27). The fuel for these protests was, in the words of Michael 
Barone, the idea that “Taking money away from those who made prudent decisions and giving it 
to people who made imprudent decisions…cast[s] society's vote for imprudence and self-
indulgence. It mocks thrift and makes chumps out of those who pay their own way” (“The Power 
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of Rick Santelli’s Rant”). Such a visceral reaction on the part of many libertarian Americans 
produced fertile ground for an easy alliance between Americans of different political stripes. 
That is, suddenly, thanks to Santelli’s anarchic rhetoric, a coalition of libertarian, religious 
conservatives, moderates and independents, and conservative democrats—the Tea Party—was 
born. 
In addition to being a rather angry population, the demographics of the Tea Party suggest 
that it is “whiter, older, wealthier, and more educated than other Americans” (Formisano 106). 
Thus, it goes without saying that this is a particular group that has benefitted immensely from the 
State in terms of education, social security, and tax policy. However, as Formisano continues, 
“Besides wholesale reaction against government, the movement also expresses a ‘heartland’ 
ethos of ethnocentrism among older white Americans experiencing rapid change in the kinds of 
people who make up the nation” (110). What is of interest here, however, are the ways in which 
this population chooses to present itself; in response to its anger at the federal government’s 
Keynesianism, it is not afraid to create counter-subjectivities where they are seen as repressed, 
targeted, and victimized. Indeed, present at the first “Tax Day” protests were signs equating 
President Obama with Adolf Hitler, people dressed as American colonists and Revolutionaries, 
and many a Gadsden Flag (“Thousands of Anti-Tax 'Tea Party' Protesters Turn Out in U.S. 
Cities”). Tea Partiers, in order to express their own malcontent with government and 
concentrated power, are not afraid to effectively remix history in order to aesthetically self-
fashion themselves as members of a victimized minority group. Whether it is equating 
themselves as colonists living under the rule of a tyrant monarch or victims of the Third Reich, 
Tea Party activists have sought to create new subjectivities in order to undermine the principles 
guiding political action. Such a situation recalls David Brook’s rather adept observation 
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discussed above: “The Tea Partiers have adopted the tactics of the New Left. They go in for 
street theater, mass rallies, marches and extreme statements that are designed to shock polite 
society out of its stupor” (“The Wal-Mart Hippies”). Like C.L.R. James in the previous chapter 
who sought to create a “perspective by incongruity” by portraying a black sharecropper 
occupying the White House, today’s Tea Partiers, in order to drum up sympathy among the 
American population, employ the same process and fashion themselves in the same sort of 
position as a black sharecropper: the victim of governmental malpractice. In this way, the Tea 
Party seems to echo Simon Critchley’s neo-anarchism when he suggests that the first political 
emotion is anger, and that it can be used to foster and create political subjectivities that can 
challenge State power (131-132).  Thus, the Right, much like the Left in earlier days, produced 
an aesthetic politics capable of producing new and subversive subjectivities founded on affective 
responses to a perceived wrong, which, in turn, fostered sympathy between seemingly disparate 
populations.  
However, today’s conservatism has done more than appropriate the Left’s earlier 
aesthetic and form of rhetorical invention for a different purpose, it has also claimed the Left’s 
epistemology. That is, in an effort to fashion subversive subjectivities, Tea Partiers have drawn 
on constructivist epistemologies in order to challenge and open up the historical record. Indeed, 
as we will see below, the Tea Party’s anarchic rhetoric, which questions history as both an object 
of study and methodology, resembles the effects of Nietzschean genealogy on the Christian 
morality. To be clear, I am not arguing that the Tea Party is employing the genealogical method. 
Rather, the Tea Party shares Nietzsche’s view of the rhetoricity of the historical record: history is 
a linguistic construct and is always open to reinterpretation, repurposing, and redistribution. In 
what follows, I first detail the changes made by the Texas State Board of Education to its social 
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studies curriculum in early 2010, as well as the ensuing backlash, in order to show how the Tea 
Party’s use of history is an affective response to the Left’s Platonism, which has spurred its 
anarchic rhetoric and might also suggest that today’s conservatives have effectively appropriated 
many of the Left’s cherished forms of critique.     
“Education is too important not to politicize.” 
Second only to California, Texas is the second largest producer and seller of education 
textbooks in America. Indeed, “The state’s $22 billion education fund is among the largest 
educational endowments in the country. Texas uses some of that money to buy or distribute a 
staggering 48 million textbooks annually — which rather strongly inclines educational 
publishers to tailor their products to fit the standards dictated by the Lone Star State” (Shorto). In 
other words, any state that buys its textbooks from Texas is also buying Texas’s curriculum. In 
2010, the Texas State Board of Education, an elected board that was largely comprised of 
lawyers and led by a dentist named Gary McLeroy, overhauled the Texas Social Studies 
curriculum. Regarding the curriculum changes and ensuing media firestorm, McLeroy suggested:  
The proposed changes have attracted national attention because they challenge the 
powerful ideology of the left and highlight the great political divide of our country. The 
left's principles are diametrically opposed to our founding principles. The left believes in 
big, not limited, government; they empower the state, not the individual; they focus on 
differences, not unity. (“Opposing View”)  
McLeroy notes that the resulting curriculum “rejected changes that referred to America as 
imperialistic, that deleted the role religion played in the foundations of representative 
government, and that downplayed the First Amendment's protection of the ‘free exercise’ of 
religion” (“Opposing View”). More specifically, The New York Times notes, “the board 
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considered an amendment to require students to evaluate the contributions of significant 
Americans. The names proposed included Thurgood Marshall, Billy Graham, Newt Gingrich, 
William F. Buckley Jr., Hillary Rodham Clinton and Edward Kennedy. All passed muster except 
Kennedy, who was voted down” (Shorto). And, what is sure to bore students to the point of 
revolution, the Texas State Board of Education proposed that “[e]ach school district shall require 
that, during Celebrate Freedom Week…students in Grades 3-12 study and recite” the opening 
lines of the Declaration of Independence (Texas State Board of Education 12). The result of such 
changes was an overtly conservative curriculum that had the potential to affect social studies 
curricula across the country. 
Unsurprisingly, the changes provoked an immediate outcry among academics and 
concerned citizens. Over one thousand historians, for instance, signed a petition calling a delay 
in the Board’s vote arguing that the curriculum should be voted upon “only after public 
consultation with classroom teachers and scholars who are experts in the appropriate fields of 
study” (Erekson et. al). According to the petition’s authors, “recent proposals by Board members 
have undermined the study of the social sciences in our public schools by misrepresenting and 
even distorting the historical record and the functioning of American society” (Erekson et al). 
Moreover, John Gehring, the Director of Communications for the group Catholics in Alliance for 
the Common Good, suggested in The Washington Post that the actions of the Texas State Board 
of Education neglected the “common good” (Gehring). Similarly, the philosopher of science 
Massimo Piggliucci argued that the curricular changes were a rewriting of history that 
implemented a conservative “ideology” at the expense of reason and scholarship (“Ideology vs. 
Education”).   
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For the most hostile critique of Texas’s curriculum changes, one can look to a recent 
study by the Harvard historian Jill Lepore about the Tea Party’s most prominent tropes: the 
Founding Fathers and the American Revolution. In her study, Lepore calls the Tea Party’s 
“version” of the American Revolution and the Founding Fathers “antihistory” that “has no 
patience for ambiguity, self-doubt, and introspection” (15). Furthermore, Lepore characterizes 
the Tea Party’s “antihistory” as “reactionary,” “outside of argument,” without “interest in 
evidence,” “reductive,” unitary,” and “dangerously antipluralist” (96). Yet, recalling Jefferson’s 
own ambivalence towards “history” and its stifling influence on social and political change, 
which was discussed in the first chapter, one might say that the Tea Party’s “antihistory”—
including its reframing of Jefferson within social studies textbooks—is thoroughly Jeffersonian 
(anarchistic). Indeed, part of my argument here is that the Left’s dependence on “argument,” 
“introspection” and “evidence,” far from creating spaces for the construction of a new and 
equitable society, actually undercuts its own goals of creating pluralistic, tolerant, and self-
governing populations.  
“For a free society, history is everything.”    
In an USA Today opinion piece, Don McLeroy suggested that the changes to the Texas 
curriculum that he championed reflected a belief outlined by Thomas Jefferson and reflected in 
Abraham Lincoln and Ronald Reagan. He argues, “The theme is freedom. These men understood 
America and the principles upon which she stood: self-evident truths; liberty, with its twin 
corollaries of limited government and individual responsibility; the embrace of Judeo-Christian 
values; and a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence” (“Opposing View”). McLeroy 
further writes, “The Texas school board is currently adopting changes to the curriculum 
standards to ensure these principles are taught” (“Opposing View”). According to McLeroy, the 
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importance of history, education, and politics could not be understated: “For a free society, 
history is everything” (“Opposing View”). The changes to the curriculum, then, reflected a larger 
battle; it was a battle between the State and the individual.  Recalling the quote above, McLeroy 
suggests that the Left’s view of history “empower[s] the state, not the individual,” and, as such, 
“focus[es] on differences, not unity” (“Opposing View”). The picture McLeroy paints portrays, 
once again, a battle between the State and the individual. The battle over American history is a 
battle between Statism and liberty/freedom. Also, noting Lepore’s negative characterization of 
McLeroy and the Tea Party’s history, this is also a battle between reason, with its “focus on 
differences” and “pluralism,” and self-evident truths, which are “reactionary” and “antipluarlist.”  
What is of note here is the way these two orientations produce and use history. For 
Lepore, the Tea Party, the Texas State Board of Education, and their biggest champions—the 
media personalities Glenn Beck and Sean Hannity—“shared…a set of assumptions about the 
relationship between the past and the present that was both broadly anti-intellectual and, quite 
specifically, antihistorical, not least because it defies chronology, the logic of time” (15). 
Legitimate history, on the other hand, “requires research, that raises questions about perspective, 
that demands distinctions between fact and opinion, that bears audience in mind” (Lepore 161). 
Moreover, “The study of history requires investigation, imagination, empathy, and respect. 
Reverence just doesn’t enter into it” (Lepore 162). In other words, the study of history requires 
the placing of one’s self in the subjective position of another in order to separate fact from 
fiction, true from false (the empathetic function). According to Michel Foucault, such a 
methodology presupposes the notion that “historical consciousness is neutral, devoid of passions, 
and committed solely to truth” (95).  As a method of inquiry, history is an expert’s uninterested 
and detached search for an original Truth that must be expressed today. Foucault writes, “We 
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want historians to confirm our belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and 
immutable necessities” (89). One can begin to see, then, that the sort of history Lepore embraces 
and Foucault dismisses is, because it relegates the passions and the rhetorical in order to present 
a view of the transcendent, is overtly Platonic and dialectical.     
To explain, the method employed by the Tea Party and the Texas State Board of 
Education is, according to Lepore, “Antihistory,” and it has no interest in expertise, reason, 
evidence, and pluralism (96). Indeed, one can detect the opposition between reason/non-reason 
and expert/novice in an impassioned polemic against evolution that McLeroy gave in front of a 
crowd of Texas teachers, parents, and students; McLeroy—a dentist—took issue with the 
scholarship of Stephen Jay Gould by citing Darwin’s description of evolutionary stasis as “the 
greatest challenge” to the theory of evolution scholarship.  According to McLeroy, the critique of 
evolution is self-evident: “It’s not complicated. It doesn’t take mathematics.”  Indeed, such an 
argument needs to be made, according to McLeroy, because “[s]omeone needs to stand up to 
experts” (“Don McLeroy: 'Someone has to stand up to experts!'”). For McLeroy and his 
sympathizers, then, the Left’s embrace of difference, political correctness, and reason means that 
history is always, already imbued with questions of politics and ethics. Thus, McLeroy’s use of 
history is purpose-driven. In being used as a way to forward a certain position, McLeroy’s 
history can be used to undermine the sort of historical Platonism utilized by the Left.  
Ironically, then, McLeroy and the Tea Party’s history resembles what Foucault calls 
Nietzsche’s “effective history.” Foucault argues that Nietzsche’s study of “descent” and 
“emergence”—genealogy—might be characterized as “effective history,” which stands in 
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opposition to the historian whose “ancestry goes back to Socrates” (91).2 This historian “is given 
to a contemplation of distances and heights; the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most 
abstract ideas, the purest individualities. It accomplishes this by getting as near as possible, 
placing itself at the foot of its mountain peaks, at the risk of adopting the famous perspective of 
frogs” (89). It is these historians who “take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work 
which reveal their groundings in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy—
the unavoidable obstacles of their passion” (90), and` harbor a “belief in eternal truth, the 
immortality of the soul, and the nature of consciousness as always identical to itself” (87). 
“Effective history” challenges history’s metaphysical grounding and its attendant asceticism. 
According to Foucault, “effective history” is “parodic, directed against reality, and opposes the 
theme of history as reminiscence or recognition; the second is dissociative, directed against 
identity, and opposes history given as continuity or representative of a tradition; the third is 
sacrificial, directed against truth, and opposes history as knowledge” (93). “Effective history,” 
undoes “traditional history” and “its dependence on metaphysics” by questioning its grounding 
and guiding principle (89). Indeed, “effective history” calls into question the arkhê guiding the 
sort of historical inquiry exemplified by Jill Lepore and other Left-leaning academics. The result 
of such a procedure might be that “genealogy can be considered the anarchist method par 
excellance” (May, Political Philosophy 90).  
                                                 
2
 According to Foucault, “An examination of descent also permits the discovery, under 
the unique aspect of a trait of a concept, of the myriad events through which—thanks to which, 
against which—they were formed” (81). Furthermore, according to Foucault, “Emergence is 
always produced through a particular stage of forces. The analysis of Entstehung [emergence] 
must delineate this interaction, the struggle these forces wage against each other or against 
adverse circumstances, and the attempt to avoid degeneration and regain strength by dividing 
these forces against themselves” (83-84). 
136 
 
 
Once again, it should be noted that I am not arguing that the either the Tea Party of the 
Texas State Board of Education is performing genealogical analyses. However, they do 
recognize, like Foucault and Nietzsche, that history is imbued with perspective, interest, and 
power. That is, they are readily aware that the ability to persuade in the present means 
constructing a past that one can use as rhetorical topoi for the present. To phrase it another way, 
one can shape the past so as to become usable for persuasion today. Despite the seemingly 
adolescent and awkward donning of tricorne hats, flying of the Gadsen flag, and wholesale 
assuming of the Revolutionary ethos by the Tea Party, such an approach suggests that critical 
theory’s emphasis on the power of language in shaping subjectivities and knowledge, far from 
being dead, is alive and well (and being used rather effectively).       
Thus, when those on the Left accuse the Tea Party’s use of history as being “ideological,” 
“distortion” and “amateurish,” they raise history and reason above the concerns of individuals 
whose feet reside firmly on the ground (which includes themselves), as well as preclude the 
creation of counter-narratives. In elevating history to the metaphysical, the expert historian 
denies his/her own affective and emotional preferences and responses: the historian is “divided 
against himself: forced to silence his preferences and overcome his distaste, to blur his own 
perspective and replace it with the fiction of a universal geometry, to mimic death in order to 
enter the kingdom of the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity” (Foucault 92). Such subjectivity 
results from “a necessary belief in providence, in final causes and teleology—the beliefs that put 
the historian in the family of ascetics” (Foucault 92). The expert historian, like Plato’s 
dialectician, venerates the metaphysical at the expense of one’s own affective responses and 
processes, as well as the potential politics an affective and non-dialectical approach might 
produce. 
137 
 
 
The Elasticity of Anarchism, or T.E.A. Party (anti)Politics  
The situation described above is not without irony, nor is it without precedent. Indeed, 
there has been growing tendency among those on the radical Right to employ the philosophical 
and rhetorical methods that were developed in and around the turbulent sixties and meant to 
operate as anti-capitalist, anti-statist, and anti-hegemonic forms of resistance and 
subjectification. Indeed, according to Hardt and Negri, poststructuralist and postmodern thought 
has always been void of all political implications. “The ideology of the world market,” they 
suggest, “has always been the anti-foundational and anti-essentialist discourse par excellance” 
(141), and is the “symptom of a rupture in the tradition of modern sovereignty” (143). More to 
the point, postmodernist and poststructuralist thought, according to Hardt and Negri, “indicate[s] 
the passage toward the constitution of Empire” (143), “the center that supports the globalization 
of productive networks and casts its all inclusive net to try to envelop all power relations within 
its world order—and yet at the same time it deploys a powerful police function against the new 
barbarians and the rebellious slaves who threaten its order” (20). Describing the explicit use of 
these same tools among those with retrograde political goals, Bruno Latour suggests, for 
instance:  
entire Ph.D. programs are still running to make sure that good American kids are learning 
the hard way that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, unmediated, 
unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of language, that we always speak 
from a particular standpoint, and so on, while dangerous extremists are using the very 
same argument of social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our 
lives. (227)  
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While many on the Left might decry the notion that certain elements of critical theory are/have 
been used for seemingly retrograde political goals, I question whether it might not serve as a site 
through which to think a new path towards political emancipation. That is, while critical theory’s 
appropriation by the Right may seem a like nadir in the struggle for a just and egalitarian society, 
I hold that it points to a series of implications for rhetorical and critical theory, which might also 
allow for a revaluation of radical politics in America. It might just point to the need to 
reappropriate that which has been reappropriated, while also pointing up the points of contact 
between the various appropriators whose continual use of the of the critical toolbox does not 
suggest “failure” or “death,” but the potential for liberation from representative thinking and 
politics—a hallmark of the critical tradition from Kant to the Frankfurt School and French 
poststructuralism to Rancière today.  
To clarify, my argument throughout these chapters has been that the philosophies of 
Marxism and liberalism, which, despite their supposed antagonism, share a certain Platonism 
that results in the State being viewed as the vehicle for creating and/or maintaining political 
justice. To phrase it another way, Marxism, with its dialectical view of history and class-
consciousness, and, liberalism, with its dialectical view of reason and reasonableness, both 
depend on the State to embody their respective dialectics, which, consequently, also forecloses 
any thinking about what a non-statist politics might look like and/or offer us today. As a result, 
politics has been synonymous with the State, and any effort to think an alternative has met 
immediate resistance as both liberals and Marxists share a common foe in anarchism. Yet, the 
developments within critical theory and American politics have demanded a revaluation of two 
traditions that stand in opposition to dialectics and the State: rhetoric and anarchism. Drawing 
upon America’s often neglected and maligned history of anti-statism/anarchism, which includes 
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both indigenous and imported forms, has revealed an elastic rhetoric that has been appropriated 
for both left and right political goals. Such a rhetoric presupposes absolute equality qua the 
ability to construct arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political arraignment rests, 
which, in doing so, actively seeks sympathy as its end.  
Regarding the implications of such a view, anarchic rhetoric asks rhetorical and critical 
theorists to end the assumption that meaningful social change must take place via the State 
and/or be dialectical, and, instead, emphasize the role of affect and aesthetics play in ushering in 
social change page. Asking rhetorical and critical theorists to do away with the State, or at least 
entertain alternatives to State-based politics, points not to cosmopolitanism whereby 
individualism gives way to a certain universal consciousness in place of the State, but to seven 
billion “declarations of independence” from the State and global capitalism. Such a move from 
the global and to the local also points, then, to the importance of voluntary associations based on 
sympathy.  
Lastly, I hope that this genealogy of radical politics in America, with its emphasis and 
valorization of anarchism’s (and rhetoric’s) lack of content and elastic nature, aids in a 
reconsideration of what is meant by “anarchism” itself. Indeed, as these chapters have sought to 
illustrate, anarchic rhetoric allows for what might seem like an oxymoron: a more plural 
anarchism. To clarify what I mean, these chapters have aimed to show how anarchic rhetoric, 
with its employment by Thomas Jefferson in the “pre-partisan” Colonial period, the anarchist 
Benjamin Tucker in the nineteenth century, the Marxist CLR James in the twentieth century, and 
twenty-first century far-right conservatives, might allow us to reevaluate our very political 
categories so as to find points of contact and rhetorical topoi from which to draw upon in order to 
move towards creating a more just and equitable society. To phrase it another way, recognizing 
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that “anarchy” really means “anarchies” opens the door for critical theorists to examine events, 
groups, and movements that appear politically disagreeable at first blush, which may reveal, in 
contradistinction to both our historical and contemporary thinking, that politics is not a series of 
problem to be solved; politics is the problem. However, before I elaborate further on these 
claims, I want to provide a gloss of the ways in which the most prominent contemporary 
theorists and philosophers have addressed politics and (the death of) critical theory.      
 Because anarchic rhetoric is both an-arkhê-istic in the sense that it is anti-Platonic, and 
anarchistic in the sense that it resists the codification of Platonism in the State form, anarchic 
rhetoric stands in direct opposition to the current trends in critical and social theory. That is, in 
response to many of critical theory’s most reliable tools—ideology critique, social 
constructivism, and an anti-essentialist theory of the subject—being appropriated by the Right, 
one can isolate four dominant trends with critical and continental thought. Some thinkers, 
exemplified by Alain Badiou, have advocated for a renewed emphasis on “philosophy.” Badiou 
has argued, “The world needs philosophy to be re-founded on the ruins of metaphysics as 
combined and blended with the modern criticism of metaphysics” (Infinite Thought 42). For 
Badiou, the connection between a reconstituted metaphysics and politics is concerned with 
thinking about “justice,” which is the “name by which a philosophy designates the possible truth 
of a political orientation” (Infinite Thought 53). In other words, for Badiou, philosophy is to 
determine politics and political subjects; philosophy’s role is to show that “justice designates the 
contemporary figure of the political subject,” and “it is by means of such a figure that philosophy 
assures, via its own names, the inscription of what our time is capable of in eternity” (Infinite 
Thought 56). What is more, when it comes to anarchism, Badiou’s thought presents a paradox. 
He writes:  
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We know today that all emancipatory politics must put an end to the model of the party, 
or of multiple parties, in order to affirm a politics ‘without party’, and yet at the same 
time without lapsing into the figure of anarchism, which has never been anything else 
than the vain critique, or the double, or the shadow, of the communist parties, just as the 
black flag is only the double or the shadow of a red flag. (The Communist Hypothesis 
155) 
Thus, Badiou gives anarchism both a laudation and denunciation. His goal is anarchy, yet his 
method is not anarchistic; philosophy is instead to give rise to anarchy. And while many have 
identified a certain anarchist bent in Badiou’s work,3 his veneration of philosophy as that which 
gives rise to politics seemingly reifies the sort of Platonism that anarchic rhetoric is wont to 
question and resist. 
Similar to Badiou’s project, Slavoj Žižek advocates a return to philosophy in the wake of 
poststructuralist and postmodern thought. However, for Žižek the return to philosophy means a 
return to and/or a repeat of a Leninist-Marxism. He writes: 
to repeat Lenin does not mean a return to Lenin — to repeat Lenin is to accept that 
“Lenin is dead,” that his particular solution failed, even failed monstrously, but that there 
was a utopian spark in it worth saving. To repeat Lenin means that one has to distinguish 
between what Lenin effectively did and the field of possibilities that he opened up, the 
tension in Lenin between what he effectively did and another dimension, what was “in 
Lenin more than Lenin himself.” To repeat Lenin is to repeat not what Lenin did, but 
what he failed to do, his missed opportunities. (“Lenin’s Choice” 310) 
                                                 
3
 For example, See Benjamin Noys’s “Through a Glass Darkly: Alain Badiou’s Critique 
of Anarchism” and Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding. 
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In essence, Žižek wants philosophy to perform the same act as Badiou proposes: philosophy 
should illuminate the path forward to political emancipation. One can clearly see the affinity 
between Badiou and Žižek in the text Philosophy in the Present. In fact, Žižek makes it apparent 
as he continually showers Badiou with praise that there is little difference in the way they view 
the relationship between philosophy and politics. Citing Badiou approvingly, Žižek posits that 
philosophy “literally exists only through the excessive connections to external politics, which are 
of either an amorous, political, scientific, or artistic nature” (69). Despite the similarities between 
the two, it is evident that their political allegiances differ. Whereas Badiou appears at least 
willing to entertain non-Statist, non-liberal and non-Marxist approaches, Žižek is thoroughly 
embedded in the Marxist tradition. However, noting Žižek’s discussion of Lenin, his Lenin is not 
the historical Lenin and advocate of the vanguard party. In fact, Žižek’s Lenin cannot be the 
historical Lenin. Thus, we are left with a vague picture of what Marxism today might look like. 
Or, as Peter McLaren writes in JAC, “Consequently, it is unclear how he would suggest that we 
proceed—politically and organizationally—in our mission to slay the beast of capital” (644). 
Indeed, one might agree with Todd May when he suggest that “given the contortions made in 
order to bring Marx into alignment with current thinking, one might wonder whether it would be 
better simply to seek a new tradition in which to embed their thought” (“Anarchism from 
Foucault to Rancière” 11). In other words, Žižek’s project points to a Marxism that is no longer a 
Marxism, which, as such, leaves us with nothing but a politics hidden in clouds of dialectics and 
parallax.  
The work of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri seems to suffer the same fate as Žižek’s. 
While Hardt and Negri might provide us with the most succinct diagnosis of the today’s political 
climate, their solutions leave us wanting. As a corrective to the postmodern emphasis on the 
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negative (anti-essentialism, difference, etc), Hardt and Negri seek to transform the fight against 
capitalism and the State into a “positive, constructive, and innovative activity” (413).  Drawing 
on the ideas of Marx, Machiavelli, Deleuze, and Spinoza, they argue, “Their thought is always 
grounded within the real processes of the constitution of modern sovereignty, attempting to make 
the contradictions explode and open the space for an alternative society. The outside is 
constructed from within” (184). Yet, as many have pointed out,4 while Hardt and Negri are in no 
short supply of content, their politics lacks form; they provide no model for how their model of 
political subjectivity—the “multitude”—might come into existence and replace the existing 
order. Indeed, the vagueness of the last two sentences of the book might serve as a piece of 
seemingly axiomatic evidence of Hardt and Negri’s lack of form, as well as recall Marx and 
Engel’s own vague definition of communism in The German Ideology. They summarize, “This is 
a revolution that no power will control—because biopower and communism, cooperation and 
revolution remain together, in love, simplicity, and also innocence. This is the irrepressible 
lightness and joy of being communist” (431). In short, despite the acclaim Hardt and Negri’s 
works have received, we are still left without a concrete statement on how such a theoretical 
amalgamation is to come to fruition and aide in the struggle for a just world. The result, 
according to Timothy Brennan is that Hardt and Negri “[will] their readers to accept their 
assertions—‘This is so, is it not?’” (“The Magician’s Wand” 374).        
Žižek’s philosophical Leninism, however, has its opposite in what today has become 
known as “postanarchism” or “poststructuralist anarchism.” Drawing on the constellation of 
postmodern and poststructuralist thinkers of Deleuze, Guttari, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard, 
many have argued that poststructuralist thought leads to the anarchist politics of Max Stirner, 
                                                 
4
 See Timothy Brennan 337-340.  
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Mikhail Bakunin, and others (Kuhn 20-21). Todd May inaugurated such thinking is his 1994 
book The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism. In this book, May forwards the 
thesis that joining the philosophies of Deleuze, Lyotard, and Foucault to that of “classical 
anarchism” might “sketch the framework of an alternative political philosophy, on that differs 
from its dominant predecessors, especially free-market liberalism and Marxism, not only in the 
vision is provides but also in the level and style of intervention it advocates” (3). Many others, 
including Saul Newman and Lewis Call have furthered May’s ideas in order more fully elaborate 
the “possibilities of anarchist moments entrenched in the postmodern condition” (Kuhn 19). 
While I am sympathetic to the general aims of this work, much of it seems to neglect many 
contemporary anarchists’ own distrust of poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking (i.e. 
philosophy). In The Coming Insurrection, for instance, the authors—a group of imprisoned 
anarchists—explicitly reject poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking:  
Today Western imperialism is the imperialism of relativism, of the “It all depends on 
your point of view”; it’s the eye-rolling or the wounded indignation at anyone who’s 
stupid, primitive, or presumptuous enough to still believe in something, to affirm 
anything at all. You can see the dogmatism of constant questioning give its complicit 
wink of the eye everywhere in the universities and among the literary intelligentsias. No 
critique is too radical among postmodernist thinkers, as long as it maintains this total 
absence of certitude. (92) 
In other words, anarchism as a political project cannot be substantiated by a groundless 
philosophy. Indeed, for The Invisible Committee, once revolution begins, everyone will “be 
forced to take sides” (13); one will have “to choose between anarchy and the fear of anarchy” 
(130). The point here is that political, economic, and social justice will not stem from using 
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anarchist political philosophy to develop alternative epistemologies, ontologies, and ethics that 
secure the tenure-track. Indeed, I agree with Jesse Cohn when he writes, “anarchism has more to 
offer poststructuralism than Newman and May seem to recognize, and that poststructuralism 
affords other and better resources for the development of anarchist theory” (“What is 
Postanarchism ‘Post’?”). In addition to using anarchist political philosophy as a framework to 
develop and expand philosophical and/or critical thought, the goal is to investigate the ways in 
which the various “post-isms” might be used to create, cause, and confirm anarchy.     
The ideas of Jacques Rancière, which we have addressed at some length in this study, 
have begun to take us in that direction. Rancière, unlike many of his comrades on the Continent, 
evokes anarchism as a politics, while also arguing for a reconceptualization of “philosophy” and 
its relationship to politics. By supplanting the notion of the people “as lacking” equality, 
Rancière argues that equality is the sine qua non of politics. On Rancière’s view, politics is 
grounded on an egalitarian presupposition, and that the opposite of politics—the Foucault-esque 
“police”—designates categories that determine political subjects and their acceptable roles. 
Indeed, political philosophy from Plato to Marx functions as “the police.” The “police” 
participate in a process called the “partitioning of the sensible” (“Ten Theses on Politics” 36). In 
such an arrangement, all members of a society have a part to play, which results in “consensus” 
on the part of the populous. However, such an arrangement is undone by a process he calls 
“dissensus;” this process entails subjects putting into actions those very ideas that were under the 
logic of the “police” once unavailable to them. “Dissensus” creates a “supplement,” an 
unaccounted part of the whole that creates a “rupture with the logic of the arkhê” (“Ten Theses 
on Politics” 33). This rupture occurs as a result of rhetorical action; Rancièrian politics “occurs 
where a community with the capacity to argue and to make metaphors is likely, at any time and 
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through anyone’s intervention, to crop up” (Disagreement 60). To explain, making aesthetic 
arguments operates anarchistically; such arguments question the guiding principles on which a 
State (the “police”) rests. Framed in such a way, “dissensus” is thoroughly concerned with 
rhetoric and, like the Tea Partiers who have and continue to don tricorne hats, the construction of 
subversive political subjectivities. While Rancière is mum on the rhetorical tradition, in his 
rejection of political philosophy and development of the “egalitarian presupposition,” he 
provides a sort of rhetorical formalism that seems to take the shape of a neo-anarchism, which 
has revived an interest in the anarchist tradition as an object of study.    
Bearing in mind the four positions above, this current study has sought to direct our 
attention away from the “return to philosophy” in the works of Badiou and Žižek; the incessant 
desire to change philosophical and/or critical thought in order to fit Marxist politics found in the 
works of Hardt and Negri and Žižek; and, the fusion of poststructuralist/postmodern thought to 
anarchist political philosophy. Instead, this study has aimed to develop and give a full-throated 
enunciation of the rhetorical formalism that Rancière’s work suggests by performing a rhetorical 
and genealogical analysis of American anarchism.  
As we’ve seen throughout the last few chapters, we have developed a model called 
anarchic rhetoric that presupposes, like Rancière, absolute equality qua the ability to construct 
arguments that challenge the arkhê on which a political arraignment rests. Moreover, anarchic 
rhetoric puts forward an ethic of shared moral sentiments that can be said to resemble Adam 
Smith’s figuration of sympathy. To be specific, the rhetorical interaction of self-interested 
individuals who, not through rational persuasion but the expression and judgment of affective 
and aestheticized responses, join together in “sympathy” to perform common actions can take 
place of the State. Because anarchic rhetoric provides a process that can take the place of the 
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State, politics, then, becomes a dynamic and ever-changing state of affairs. It becomes what we 
might call a “rhetorical State” that has no political telos other than the staving-off of 
infringements on individual liberty (which each individual is free to define for him/herself). 
Anarchic rhetoric is, in its essence, without content. It is readily available to partisans of all 
stripes, which is, in my estimation, an idea that should be developed so as to resist the “us” 
versus “them” worldview that seems to mark contemporary radical politics while also reifying 
the critique of representative thinking and politics we have been arguing against. In what 
follows, I conclude this study with a short discussion of what such a rhetoric might have for 
today’s radical politics and rhetorical theory.   
While I hope it has become readily apparent, our model of anarchic rhetoric asks 
rhetorical studies to move beyond its emphasis on reason, dialogue, and mediated forms of 
communicative interaction. In other words, it asks rhetorical studies to overcome its own 
veneration of the Platonic, liberal, and Marxist dialectics that seems to ground the field. Indeed, 
as I hope I have showed, these approaches leave little room for thinking about the power of non-
dialectical, affective, and aesthetic communication can have in creating a more just world. Such 
a veneration of these communication models echoes Deleuze’s observation that “[t]o ground is to 
determine” (272). Indeed, I hope that the model of anarchic rhetoric that I have put forward 
throughout these pages suggests a new starting point for scholars interested in questions of 
social, political and economic justice. That is, whereas the Platonic, liberal, and Marxist rhetorics 
presuppose a scarcity of dialectical knowledge and that it is the job of dialecticians to give them 
the give of such knowledge, anarchic rhetoric presupposes everyone has the ability to make 
arguments and that one always, already has the necessary content to effect change: one’s own 
affects. Lastly, because anarchic rhetoric is without content, yet can easily be supplied with 
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affective content, the resulting messages resemble the aesthetic rather than the ritualized and 
mechanistic forms of communication that dialectical models engender. While my view may open 
me up to accusations of moral and political relativism, I would respond by pointing to the 
anarchist Paul Goodman who once wrote, “Men have a right to be crazy, stupid, and arrogant. 
It’s our special thing. Our mistake is to arm any with collective power. Anarchy is the only safe 
polity” (57). Thus, whether it be the enlightening the masses to the ideal forms of justice, beauty, 
etc, cultivating universal procedures for the use of reason, or fomenting class-consciousness, 
anarchic rhetoric resists the concentration of knowledge and power. Anarchic rhetoric, on the 
contrary, is overtly democratic in the sense that it trusts in the skills, actions, and judgments of 
humanity, which is simply another way of saying that “[a]narchism is the revolutionary idea that 
no one is more qualified than you are to decide what your life will be” (CrimethInc 7). Anarchic 
rhetoric provides the form that allows one to exercise his/her equality and freedom and determine 
the life he/she deems fit for living. 
Before pointing up the implications of anarchic rhetoric, I want to provide another quote 
from Paul Goodman who, I think, provides a concise view of anarchic rhetoric while also 
returning us to Thomas Jefferson. He writes:  
And, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, only such an organization of society is self-
improving; we learn by doing, and the only way to education co-operative citizens is to 
give power to people as they are. Except in unusual circumstances, there is not much 
need for dictators, deans, police, pre-arranged curricula, imposed schedules, conscription, 
coercive laws. Free people easily agree among themselves on plausible working rules; 
they listen to expert direction when necessary; they wisely choose pre tem leaders. 
Remove authority, and there will be self-regulation, not chaos. (94)    
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To put it more directly, instead of subscribing to the Platonic dream of finding and fostering the 
best leaders to create and usher in a just society, which, as we discussed in an earlier chapter, is 
simply one individual’s implementing of a single moral vision, we find, create, and/or foster 
better societies where everyone and anyone can participate in determining and debating what is 
just. This is what the Tea Party’s inheriting and employment of anarchic rhetoric, a rhetoric 
deeply embedded in American radicalism, reminds us of today.  
In conclusion, anarchic rhetoric presents two implications, which deserve a brief 
explanation. As Don McLeroy and his comrades on the Texas State Board of Education prove, 
critique is no longer wed to a particular politics. As such, we might say that critique is dead, at 
least in the sense that it no longer serves an outdated Marxist and dialectical vanguardism such as 
Horkheimer suggests (221). Its partisan promiscuity suggests, in fact, that the aims of critique 
reveal an anti-political bent; the examining and exposing of the contingent nature of any claim of 
representation or appeal to immutable “truth,” as well as the power(s) they serve is anarchistic. 
And, like the rhetoric Plato warned against, the aims of critique challenge all claims of 
representation and/or transcendent truths. Critical thought today takes the shape of anarchic 
rhetoric—an astheticized and affective response to a perceived wrong that seeks the dynamic 
congealing and dissolving of sympathies in place of the State and absolute ethical relativism.   
With that said, anarchic rhetoric draws our attention to a facet of rhetoric that has been 
neglected or overlooked by today’s rhetoricians: rhetoric’s an-arkhê-istic function. In fact, when 
compared to most rhetoricians, one might say that philosophers have more readily acknowledged 
rhetoric’s ability to challenge and undo political institutions and ethical arrangement founded on 
“immutable” knowledge. In this sense, the preceding pages have sought to valorize what 
rhetoricians have not seen and philosophers since Plato have belied: rhetoric is democratic, 
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egalitarian, and a threat to any philosophically-informed politics. To phrase it another way, in 
place of the concentrated power and knowledge that both liberalism and Marxism assume, as 
well as the notion of absolute moral chaos that is often assigned to rhetoric, anarchic rhetoric 
puts the power to determine one’s own life in the hands of anyone and everyone. Painted as such, 
this rhetoric—a rhetoric “without content”—provides the framework for seven billion 
Declarations of Independence: the beginning of anarchy.  
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My study suggests there is a homology between the Platonic critique of rhetoric and the 
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taking up a genealogical examination of anarchism in America that begins with America’s 
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